Pub. Utilities Comm'n v. Gallop.

• Decision Date: 20 October 1948
• Citation: 62 A.2d 166
• Parties: PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION v. GALLOP.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

62 A.2d 166

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

v.GALLOP.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 20, 1948.

Exceptions from Public Utilities Commission.

Proceeding before the Public Utilities Commission for the clarification of a permit to operate as a contract carrier held by Vaughn O. Gallop, doing business as Houlton Truck Express. On exceptions by Vaughn O. Gallop to certain rulings of the commission.

Exceptions overruled.

Frank M. Libby, of Augusta, for Public Utilities Commission.

Nathan Solman and Scott Brown, both of Houlton, for respondent Vaughn O. Gallop.

George B. Barnes, of Houlton, for Cole's Exp. and Maine Freightways.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, MURCHIE, TOMPKINS, FELLOWS and MERRILL, JJ.

MERRILL, Justice.

This case is before us on exceptions to certain rulings of the Public Utilities Commission. The proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission were instituted by the Commission under R.S., Chap. 44, Sec. 21, Par. III, for the clarification of the permit to operate as a contract carrier held by Vaughn O. Gallop, doing business as Houlton Truck Express.

The original permit was issued by the Commission November 15, 1933 to Charles O. McDonald, as a matter of right under the so-called grandfather clause found in P.L.1933, Chap. 259, Sec. 5, Par. C. This permit was duly kept in force by renewals. With the consent of the Commission obtained on February 26, 1946 it was transferred to Vaughn O. Gallop doing business as Houlton Truck Express, and on the same day the permit in question was issued to Gallop by the Commission.

August 30, 1946 the proceedings for clarification of Gallop's permit were instituted by the Commission and notice ordered thereon. Hearing was held on October 10, 1946 and by adjournment continued on October 16 and 17, 1946. The respondent Gallop appeared in person and was represented by counsel. The Commission was represented by its Examiner, acting as its counsel, and Cole's Express and Maine Freightways were represented by counsel, as was F. G. Congdon.

During the progress of the hearing several exceptions (numbered I-II-III-IV-V, in the Bill of Exceptions) were noted to rulings of the Commission. In respondent's brief exception V was expressly abandoned and need not be considered.

Exception I is to the action of the Commission allowing the participation by counsel of other carriers in the proceedings.

Exceptions II, III and IV are to the exclusion of evidence by the Commission.

It is to be noted that there is no general or express exception to the final ruling (decree or order) of the Commission.

Before considering the respondent's several exceptions, the general question of exceptions to rulings of the Public Utilities Commission and their determination by this Court, should be examined.

This Court acting as the Law Court is of limited jurisdiction. As such, the Law Court is a Statutory Court. As such, it performs those duties and exercises those powers only which are conferred upon it by statute. ‘The court cannot properly exceed its statutory powers, nor dispense with the conditions imposed.’ Stenographer Cases, 100 Me. 271, 275, 61 A. 782, 784. The Law Court is without jurisdiction except in cases brought before it in the manner provided by statute, viz.: through the statutory course of procedure. Cole v. Cole, 112 Me. 315, 316, 92 A. 174; Appeal of Edwards, 141 Me. 219, 41 A.2d 825.

The power of this Court to review proceedings of the Public Utilities Commission on exceptions is conferred upon it by R.S., Chap. 40, Sec. 66. So much of that section as is germane to the question now under consideration reads as follows: ‘Questions of law may be raised by alleging exceptions to the ruling of the commission on an agreed statement of facts, or on facts found by the commission, and such exceptions shall be allowed by the chairman of the commission * * *.’

This was the language of the original act, P.L.1913, Chap. 129, Sec. 53, and has been continued without change to the present day.

With respect to the Public Utilities Commission and the power of review of its findings by the Law Court, we said in Hamilton v. Caribou Water, Light & Power Co., 121 Me. 422, 423, 117 A. 582, 583:

‘Acting within its powers, its orders and decrees are final except as a review thereof by the regularly constituted courts is authorized under the act creating the commission.

‘Such and the only power of review is found in R.S. c. 55, § 55, as amended by chapter 28, P.L.1917, and relates only to questions of law: ‘Questions of law may be raised by alleging exceptions to the rulings of the Commission on an agreed statement of facts, or on facts found by the Commission.’

‘The facts on which the rulings of the Commission are based must either be agreed to by the parties or be found by the Commission. Facts thus determined upon are not open to question in this court, unless the Commission should find facts to exist without any substantial evidence to support them, when such finding would be open to exceptions as being unwarranted in law.’

See also Public Utilities Commission v. Water Commissioners, 123 Me. 389, 123 A. 177.

We held in Stoddard v. Public Utilities Commission, 137 Me. 320, 19 A.2d 427, that the remedy by way of exceptions provided R.S., Chap. 40, Sec. 66, is available in proceedings under R.S., Chap. 44, Sec. 21, Par. III for clarification of a permit issued under the grandfather clause so called.

R.S., Chapter 40 is silent on the rules of procedure governing bills of exception and their form, except as provided in Sec. 70 which reads in part as follows: ‘In all actions and proceedings arising under the provisions of this chapter, all processes shall be served and the practice and rules of evidence shall be the same as in civil actions in the superior court except as otherwise herein provided. * * *’

This Court said in Hamilton v. Power Co., supra: ‘A bill of exceptions under this statute should accord with the general practice in the courts and comply with the requirements laid down in Jones v. Jones, 101 Me. 447, 450, 64 A. 815, 115 Am.St.Rep. 328, and Feltis v. Power Co., 120 Me. 101, 112 A. 906. It should not be general, but should specifically set out in what respect the party excepting is aggrieved.’

In the case, In re Samoset Co., 125 Me. 141, 143, 131 A. 692, 693, we said: ‘This court desires to further add that the form of a bill of exceptions in such cases should, so far as possible, conform to the practice in the courts of law (Section 59, c. 55, R.S.; Hamilton v. Water Co., 121 Me. 422, 117 A. 582), and should be a summary statement of the contentions of the excepting party, and, without referring to other documents or the evidence, except in cases where it is claimed that facts were found without any evidence, should show wherein the excepting party was aggrieved by the alleged rulings.’

It is to be noted that the statute, R.S., Chap. 40, Sec. 66 provides how questions of law may be raised, viz.: by alleging exceptions to the ruling of the Commission (1) ‘ on an agreed statement of facts,’ (2) ‘ or on facts found by the Commission,’.

The foregoing provision presupposes that before an exception can be taken of which this Court will have cognizance, there must either be an agreed statement of facts, or facts found by the Commission, and a ruling upon the one or the other as the case may be. The ruling thus referred to, therefore, must be the final ruling which disposes of the case. In other words, the exceptions which are to come before this Court are to the ruling, to wit, the order or decree of the Commission upon the facts in the case. It is this ruling which we must find erroneous in law before we can sustain exceptions thereto. This ruling may be erroneous in law for any one of many reasons. Some may be inherent in the ruling itself, such as the making of an order or decree beyond the authority of the Commission. Others may be errors arising during the conduct of the hearing, such as the reception of inadmissible evidence and basing the decree thereon, or the exclusion of material evidence and failure to give effect to facts which could be proven thereby in making the order or decree. These and many other things can give rise to orders and decrees erroneous in law. It is to such erroneous rulings, (orders or decrees) made upon either agreed statements of facts or facts found by the Commission and, to such rulings only, that the statutory right of exception is given.

With respect to alleged erroneous rulings of law during the progress of the proceeding, it might be argued that strict compliance with the statute requires that the bill of exceptions set forth an exception eo nomine to the ruling (order or decree) on ‘the facts found by the Commission,’ and that such alleged erroneous rulings during the progress of the proceeding be set forth as reasons for the exception. A literal interpretation of the language of the statute lends color to such view. On the other hand, if the purpose of the statute, which is to afford correction of rulings (orders or decrees) erroneous in law, is taken into consideration, mere form in the drafting of a bill of exceptions should not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the statute, but form should yield to substance. An exception noted to a ruling of the Commission at any stage of the proceedings, if the same be allowed and certified to this Court after final decree of the Commission, may be treated in effect as an exception to such ruling (order or decree) itself, with the preliminary ruling alleged as the reason therefor. If the preliminary ruling be erroneous in law, and is prejudicial in the sense of being the proximate cause of an erroneous ruling (order or decree) on facts found by the Commission, it is ground for vacating the final decree. An exception so certified will not have the effect of subjecting the final decree to general attack upon any other grounds than alleged therein. Furthermore, the bill of...