Public Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilder

Decision Date07 May 1971
Docket NumberNo. 45842,No. 3,45842,3
Citation182 S.E.2d 536,123 Ga.App. 754
PartiesPUBLIC SAVINGS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. F. R. WILDER
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Sell, Comer & Popper, Joseph W. Popper, Jr., Macon, for appellant.

Adams, O'Neal, Thornton, Hemingway & McKenney, Hardy Gregory, Jr., Macon, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

WHITMAN, Judge.

This case arises from a suit on an insurance policy providing for certain hospitalization and surgical benefits. The insurance company defended on the ground, among others, that the application, upon which basis the policy was issued, contained factual misrepresentations which were material to the risk. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in the principal amount claimed, plus an award for penalty and attorney's fees. The appeal is from the judgment on the verdict.

1. We consider first the enumeration that the trial court erred in not granting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the application contained misrepresentations material to the risk; that in view of same the defendant had a right to void the policy and had done so; and, therefore, no verdict for the plaintiff would be authorized.

'Absent a clear and unequivocal limitation on the authority of an agent of an insurance company, and absent fraud and collusion between the agent and the prospective insured, and actual knowledge of the agent of facts amounting to innocent misrepresentations in the application for insurance is imputed to the insurer, and the insurer will be estopped to assert that it would not have issued the policy if it had knowledge of the true facts.' Allstate Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 121 Ga.App. 582(2), 174 S.E.2d 591, cert. den. p. 890.

In the present case it appears from the evidence that there were material misrepresentations written by the soliciting agent on the application for insurance in response to questions propounded by the agent. The plaintiff testified under oath that he met with the insurer's soliciting agent for a question-answer interview regarding the application for insurance; that the agent asked questions and filled out the entire application which plaintiff then signed without reading, and that during the interview he had given orally truthful answers to all the agent's questions. It further appears that his answers were not those constituting the material misrepresentations contained in the application. The soliciting agent did not testify in the case.

There was no limitation on the authority of the agent in the application. Thus, in view of the Anderson rule, the jury would have been authorized to find that the plaintiff did give the required information and that the defendant, through its soliciting agent, knew the true facts when it issued the policy. There was no error in overruling the motion for directed verdict made on the ground of misrepresentation in the application.

2. The defendant also made a motion for directed verdict on the issue of penalty and attorney's fees, contending that there could be no finding of bad faith in the matter.

'Bad faith' as the term is used in § 56-1206 of the Georgia Insurance Code means any frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay a claim. The gross discrepancies which appeared between those facts appearing in the plaintiff's signed application and those which investigation disclosed after the claim was made on the policy gave defendant good reason to take issue with the plaintiff. In our opinion the trial judge should have granted the motion and removed the issue from the case. Dependable Insurance Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 316, 127 S.E.2d 454; Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Renew, 121 Ga.App. 883, 888, 176 S.E.2d 103.

3. The Anderson case, supra, which we regard as controlling in the present case, turned not on the presence or absence of the applicant's signature on the application or on opportunity to read before signing, but on the principle that in the absence of any limitation on the agent's authority, the agent's knowledge is inputed to his principal absent fraud and collusion. In view of the evidence and the controlling issue in the case, the trial court did not err in not charging defendant's requests relating to the general rules that a person who can read must read and, absent any fraud in the procurement of one's signature, he is committed to the contents of the instruments which he signs.

4. When the defendant directed a question to the plaintiff as to what plaintiff's other hospitalization policies provided in the way of benefits, the trial court sustained the plaintiff's objection made on the ground that the policies themselves would be the best evidence of their contents. There was no error in sustaining this objection.

5. The trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to testify as to what information he had communicated to the agent during the interview which resulted in the application and issuance of the policy.

6. The appellant having obtained a substantial modification of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Smith v. New York Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 13 Septiembre 1978
    ...Life & Accident Insurance Co., 112 Ga.App. 235, 144 S.E.2d 541 (1965). The following was stated in Public Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Wilder, 123 Ga.App. 754, 182 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1971), a misrepresentation "Bad faith" as the term is used in § 56-1206 of the Georgia Insurance Code means a......
  • Dracz v. American General Life Ins. Co., 3:04-CV-13(CDL).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • 13 Abril 2006
    ...rebutting Ms. Teasley's statement regarding Mr. Dracz's answer. 7. Plaintiff contends that under Pub. Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilder, 123 Ga.App. 754, 182 S.E.2d 536 (1971), Defendant is estopped from relying upon the misrepresentation to rescind the policy because of Defendant's "negligence"......
  • Dixie Const. Products, Inc. v. WMH, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 20 Junio 1986
    ...Bad faith under § 33-4-6 means frivolous and unfounded denial of liability or refusal to pay a claim. Public Savings, etc., Ins. Co. v. Wilder, 123 Ga.App. 754(2), 182 S.E.2d 536 (1971); U.S. Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Woodward, 118 Ga.App. 591(2), 164 S.E.2d 878 (1968). The record indicates th......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT