Public Service Commission v. Frazee

• Decision Date: 04 March 1919
• Docket Number: 23,344
• Citation: 122 N.E. 328,188 Ind. 573
• Parties: Public Service Commission v. Frazee
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

122 N.E. 328

188 Ind. 573

Public Service Commission v. Frazee

No. 23,344

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 4, 1919

Rehearing Denied November 20, 1919.

From Rush Circuit Court; Will M. Sparks, Judge.

Action on appeal to the circuit court by Lewis A. Frazee from an order of the Public Service Commission. From a judgment setting aside the order of the commission, the commission appeals. Trial court directed to modify conclusions of law otherwise Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ele Stansbury, Attorney-General, Elmer E. Hastings, U. S. Lesh Edward M. White and Dale F. Stansbury, for appellant.

Miller & Dowling, for appellee.

OPINION

Harvey, C. J.

The Public Service Commission, after a hearing, found against appellee, doing business as the Connersville Telephone Company; and made an order fixing certain rates, rules and regulations for the future conduct of appellee. Appellee, by action in the circuit court, appealed from said order, alleging, in short, that said rates, rules and regulations so fixed were unreasonable, unlawful and confiscatory. From a decision of the circuit court sustaining such allegations this appeal is prosecuted by the commission. The only propositions relied upon by appellant here relate to the admission of evidence, and to the action of the circuit court in rendering judgment for the recovery by appellee here of $ 521.41, paid into the state treasury upon the order of the commission; same being the expense of the commission in the hearing. Appellant's discussion of the rulings of the court relating to evidence is quite general; and we are justified in so treating the rulings. For instance, appellant complains of the admission of evidence of operating expenses at a time subsequent to the decision of the commission.

The statute, § 10052c3 Burns 1914, Acts 1913 p. 167, § 81, provides that the court may hear evidence "different" from, and "additional" to, that heard by the commission; and the statute does not provide that such different and additional evidence shall relate only to matters occurring or existing prior to the hearing or decision of the commission; therefore, so far as expression in the statute is concerned, such evidence may relate to matters occurring after the board's decision and up to the time of trial in the circuit court. The statute further provides that if the trial court hears "additional" or "different" evidence, the trial court shall, before rendering judgment, transmit a copy of the "additional" or "different" evidence to the commission for its consideration; and that the commission may alter or rescind its order, and must report to the court within ten days. Thus the commission is placed upon the same footing, so far as evidence is concerned, as is the circuit court on appeal; and the fact that the evidence may relate to after matters is unobjectionable.

Furthermore, the propriety of hearing evidence as to a practical test of the reasonableness of such order, especially where that question is not clearly solved by a hearing before the commission, is recognized by the courts. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. (1908), 212 U.S. 19, 54, 55, 29 S.Ct. 192, 53 L.Ed. 382, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1134; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. N. Dakota (1909), 216 U.S. 579, 581, 30 S.Ct. 423, 54 L.Ed. 624. This clearly shows that it is proper to hear evidence of things happening after such an order is entered to properly determine whether such order is valid or invalid. This disposes of all objections made to the admission of such evidence.

The remaining objections to evidence are almost entirely directed against permitting witnesses to state opinions regarding various phases of the telephone business.

Appellant chooses from among many such, and as illustrating its position, its objection to the question, in substance, whether in the last few years the cost of operating telephone plants in Indiana has increased per unit, taking the telephone station as a unit.

The court found the witness to be an expert accountant of sufficient experience in telephone matters to understand the same. If it were proper for the court to look only to the experience of other individual telephone companies and make comparisons, it might appear that the cost of operating one plant had increased because of bad management; and it might thus appear that the cost in another case had decreased by extraordinarily careful management; and such comparison would little aid the court. On the other hand, general...