Public Utilities Commission v. Staton Transp. Co.
| Citation | 386 P.2d 590,153 Colo. 372 |
| Decision Date | 04 November 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 20329,20329 |
| Parties | , 51 P.U.R.3d 388 The PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff in Error, v. STANTON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY and Kerr Truck Company, both Colorado corporations. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John J. Conway, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff in error.
John P. Thompson, Denver, amicus curiae.
Jones, Meiklejohn, Kilroy & Kehl, Edward T. Lyons, Jr., Denver, for defendant in error Stanton Transp. Co.
The plaintiff in error, the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, will be referred to as the Commission, the defendant in error, Stanton Transportation Company, will be referred to as Stanton or transferor, and defendant in error, Kerr Truck Company, will be referred to as Kerr or transferee.
The action involves an application to the Commission for the transfer of a private carrier permit from Stanton to Kerr. After a hearing the application was granted subject to the restriction that the transferee maintain its operational headquarters and office in Craig, Colorado. Upon application of Stanton and Kerr a writ of certiorari was issued from the District Court of Moffat County pursuant to CRS '53, 115-6-15. The district court modified the decision of the Commission by striking the restriction referred to.
The permit in question was a private carrier authority containing no express limitations as to the territory in which it could be operated or as to the commodities which could be transported under it. It was originally issued to Joseph J. Stanton of Craig, Colorado in 1931. It was renewed from time to time and in 1940 was transferred to Walter Utzinger, doing business as J. J. Stanton Transportation Company. In 1951 Utzinger was authorized by the Commission to transfer the authority to Stanton Transportation Company, a Colorado corporation.
The testimony elicited at the hearing before the Commission established that Stanton's base of operations and office since the issuance of the permit had always been in Craig, Colorado and that every shipment undertaken by Stanton under the permit in question had either begun or ended in Craig or in the surrounding territory.
W. M. Kerr, holder of 51% of the stock of the transferee, testified on cross examination that he personally had charge of Kerr's operations and that if Kerr acquired Stanton's permit it intended to develop transportation out of Denver to points such as Sterling, Granby and Grand Junction, Colorado, and that it would 'try to activate the permit in all of its authority.' (Emphasis supplied) Kerr is an ore hauler operating out of Cameo, Colorado, which is near Grand Junction and considerably removed from Craig, and proposed to establish and maintain its headquarters in Cameo.
Witnesses for common carriers serving the Grand Junction area and other parts of the state testified as protestants at the hearing. The substance of their testimony was that Stanton had never operated in their area and that if Kerr were permitted to operate under the permit with a base of operations in their area and in competition with them, they would suffer sever economic loss.
On this state of the record, the Commission determined that the permit in question had always been operated with headquarters exclusively in Craig and had always been centered in the Craig area; that other operations in other parts of the state had been isolated transactions of an occasional nature and incidental to the operations of Stanton under its private carrier permit; that transfer of the permit should not be effected so as to deprive customers of service to which they are entitled or to disrupt or distort existing motor transportation relationships in the state; that there are several common carriers operating in the area encompassed by the economic sphere in the vicinity of Cameo who adequately serve the territory and no showing of any private need or demand for a private carrier in that area had been made out; that the transfer of the authority, so as to permit the removal of the operations from the Craig area to the Cameo area, would be tantamount to granting new authority in the Cameo area and would seriously distort the existing transportation system in the state; and that the transfer restricting the operation of the permit to headquarters in Craig would constitute a transfer of the authority exactly as it had been operated from the time of its inception and would neither diminish nor enlarge the authority.
The Commission also found that the training, experience, ability and financial responsibility of the transferee had been established to its satisfaction.
The only real issue presented is whether the Commission, upon an application to transfer a private carrier permit is limited, as Stanton and Kerr contend, to the function of satisfying itself only as to the financial fitness of the transferee, or whether it may, as it contends here, impose in the public interest reasonable restrictions not inconsistent with past operations upon how the permit shall be operated by the transferee.
In determining this question, it becomes necessary to examine briefly the background and history of private and common carrier legislation in this state and the purposes sought to be achieved by such legislation. From 1913 to 1927 all common carriers were regulated under the general public utilities law. In 1927 a special act (now CRS '53, 115-9) was enacted for the regulation of motor vehicle carriers, but this Court, in Burbridge v. Public Utilities Commission, 91 Colo. 134, 12 P.2d 1115, held that the 1927 act did not encompass private carriers. Private carriers, therefore, remained outside the scope of regulation. They enjoyed free and unlimited use of the highways and operated wherever they wished. They were able to select only profitable business and reject unprofitable business, while the common carrier was required to accept all business. Under these circumstances, it soon became apparent that to protect the public interest in the survival of common carrier service, it was necessary that some kind of regulation be imposed upon private carriers. McKay v. Public Utilities Commission, 104 Colo. 402, 91 P.2d 965. Thereupon, the 1931 Private Carrier Act (now CRS '53, 115-11, as amended) was passed to coordinate motor vehicle transportation operations for hire or compensation upon the public highways of the state so that there would be no serious conflict between private carriers and common carriers. Highly pertinent sections of that act, as amended, are as follows:
'* * * It is hereby declared that the business of private carriers by motor vehicle * * * is affected with a public interest and that * * * the proper regulation of motor vehicle common carriers using such highways require the regulation of private carriers by motor vehicle * * *.
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