Puchert v. Agsalud

• Decision Date: 27 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 8908,8908
• Citation: 67 Haw. 25,677 P.2d 449
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Parties: , 101 Lab.Cas. P 55,472 George K. PUCHERT, Appellant, v. Joshua C. AGSALUD, in his capacity as Director of the State of Hawaii, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations; Pan American World Airways, Appellees.

Page 449

677 P.2d 449

67 Haw. 25, 101 Lab.Cas. P 55,472

George K. PUCHERT, Appellant, v. Joshua C. AGSALUD, in his capacity as Director of the State

of Hawaii, Department of Labor and Industrial

Relations; Pan American World Airways, Appellees.

No. 8908.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Jan. 27, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Although federal pre-emption was not the basis for dismissal by the administrative agency and the lower court, the question of a court's jurisdiction cannot be disregarded.

2. The doctrine of labor law pre-emption concerns the extent to which congress has placed implicit limits on the permissible scope of state regulation of activity touching upon labor-management relations.

3. The Railway Labor Act provides for compulsory arbitration to settle "minor disputes" which exist where a collective bargaining agreement provides a remedy for the alleged wrongful act.

4. A complaint of unlawful discharge from employment solely because the discharged employee suffered a work injury compensable under the state workers' compensation law finds its source in the statute and not in the collective bargaining agreement.

5. A complaint of unlawful discharge from employment based upon a statutory right is not subject to mandatory arbitration under the Railway Labor Act.

6. An arbitrator may only arbitrate disputes arising under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and is limited to the interpretation and application of provisions contained within the agreement.

7. Where a discharged employee's claim of unlawful discharge has its source in state statute, and his claim is not identical to any claim he may make under the collective bargaining agreement, he is not limited to pursuing remedies in the grievance and arbitration procedures established under the collective bargaining agreement.

8. Although a discharged employee's state law claim of unlawful discharge did not interfere with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the court must also consider whether the application of the state statute interferes with the scheme of the federal Railway Labor Act.

9. Problems and considerations involved in federal-state relations under the Railway Labor Act are analogous to those under the National Labor Relations Act.

10. State statutes prohibiting unlawful discharges for injuries compensable under workers compensation laws are not pre-empted by the Railway Labor Act because such laws are pre-eminently a matter of state concern and are of peripheral concern to the federal labor laws.

11. The state has a substantial interest in the welfare of workers who are injured in the course of their employment and to see that they are not penalized for pursuing remedies granted to them by statute.

12. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result and the language is clearly consistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, judicial construction is inappropriate and the court's duty is to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.

13. Where the language of the statute is ambiguous, the court's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intention.

14. The court has long recognized the remedial character of the workers compensation statutes and has construed them liberally 15. Since the legislative intent of HRS § 378-32(2) is to protect claimants under the workers' compensation statute, the time limits established under HRS § 378-33(b) should be liberally construed to accomplish the humanitarian objective of the legislation.

to effectuate their beneficent purposes.

16. The construction of HRS § 378-33(b) allowing for a hearing on the merits and providing the employee with the avenue by which he may be afforded a remedy for the violation of his rights would be more consonant with the legislative enactment of remedial social legislation for workers than would a technical reading which would deny relief without an opportunity to be heard.

17. HRS § 378-33(b) establishes only the outside limit after which a complaint may not be filed. An employee may file a complaint prior to the date he is able to return to work.

Herbert R. Takahashi, Honolulu, for appellant.

Arthur Muraoka and Jared H. Jossem, Honolulu (Jared H. Jossem and John L. Knorek, Honolulu, on the brief; Torkildson, Katz, Jossem & Loden, Honolulu, of counsel) for appellee Pan American World Airways.

Juliette T. Sarmiento, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, on brief, for appellee Joshua C. Agsalud, Director, Dept. of Labor & Industrial Relations.

Before LUM, C.J., PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ., and TANAKA, Associate Judge, in place of NAKAMURA, J., disqualified.

WAKATSUKI, Justice.

This is an appeal of the first circuit court's affirmance of the director of labor and industrial relations' dismissal of Appellant's complaint of unlawful discharge from employment pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-32(2). The complaint was dismissed for untimely filing under HRS § 378-33(b).

The primary issue involves the construction of a statute, HRS § 378-33. As construed by the director and the lower court, HRS § 378-33(b) requires the filing of a complaint of unlawful discharge from employment only after an employee is able to return to his former job, and not any sooner. We hold that such a construction of the statute does not comport with the legislative purpose and intent of HRS §§ 378-32 and 378-33, and therefore, we reverse.

The parties involved in this action are (1) Appellant Puchert, the employee who filed the complaint of unlawful discharge; (2) Appellee Pan American World Airways (Pan Am), the employer against whom the complaint was filed; and (3) Appellee Agsalud, Director of the State Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (Director) who dismissed Puchert's complaint.

At the time of his alleged unlawful discharge, Puchert had been employed for several years as a port steward by Pan Am. On several occasions, Puchert had suffered back injuries at work, the last of which occurred on December 30, 1978. Due to this December 30th injury, Puchert did not return to work until January 6, 1979, at which time he was allowed to do only light duty work upon the instructions of his chiropractor. By letter of January 9, 1979, Puchert was discharged by Pan Am. The basis for this discharge was Puchert's physical limitations in performing his work.

On January 14, 1979, Puchert, through his union (Transport Workers Union of America), filed a grievance with Pan Am as to his discharge pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between Pan Am and the Transport Workers Union. The grievance was brought before the Board of Adjustment for arbitration on February 7, 1979. The Board's decision modified Puchert's dismissal to a medical leave of absence not to exceed six months, and further, required that Puchert, during that six-month period, obtain a medical report from a physician approved by Travelers Insurance Company and a permanent disability On June 1, 1979, Puchert filed a complaint, pursuant to HRS § 378-32, for unlawful discharge against Pan Am with the department's Enforcement Division. Prior to filing his complaint, Puchert was advised by department personnel to wait until he was released by his doctor to return to work but this advice was not heeded and the complaint was filed.

rating from the State Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (department) Workers Compensation Division which would not restrict him from performing any of the duties of a port steward. The decision further stated that, upon his return to work, Puchert would be required to comply with Pan Am's attendance standards.

Five days prior to the expiration of Puchert's medical leave of absence, as granted by the Board of Adjustment, Pan Am asked Puchert to advise the company of his intention to return to work.

On August 1, 1979, Puchert's chiropractor submitted a letter to the department stating that Puchert was still only available for light duty work. However, on August 6, 1979, Puchert was able to obtain a letter from the same chiropractor releasing him for regular duty "on a trial basis."

The facts are not clear whether Puchert reported for duty on August 7, 1979, and was then discharged, or whether he received notification of his termination in some other manner. Nonetheless, Pan Am contends that on August 7, 1979, Puchert had not complied with the terms of the Board of Adjustment's decision, and therefore he had no right to return to work.

Neither on August 7, 1979, nor at any time thereafter did Puchert file another complaint with the department for unlawful discharge.

In June, 1980, a year after Puchert filed his complaint for unlawful discharge with the department, and ten months from the date he was allegedly able to return to work as a port steward, the department held hearings on Puchert's complaint of June 1, 1979. Thereafter, the hearing officer recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the untimely filing of the complaint. The hearing officer concluded that under HRS § 378-33, the only time Puchert could file a complaint for unlawful discharge was within thirty days after his January 9, 1979 discharge, or within thirty days from the date he was able to return to work. Director Agsalud concurred with the hearing officer's recommended decision. Puchert appealed, and the circuit court affirmed the director's decision.

I.

Before proceeding to an analysis of HRS § 378-33, we address Pan Am's assertion that federal pre-emption applies in view of the federal labor law which provides that where a collective bargaining agreement provides for a resolution of a dispute of this nature through grievance and arbitration proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Although federal pre-emption was not the basis upon which the director and the...