Puckett v. CITY OF COUNTY OF DENVER

Decision Date16 March 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99CA0025.,99CA0025.
Citation12 P.3d 313
PartiesPaul W. PUCKETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a Colorado municipal corporation; Career Service Authority, James Yearby, Director of Personnel; Career Service Board, Mary Celeste, Larry Williams, Jim Raughton, Bernice Lopez, Michael Salazar; and Catherine A. Cary, Career Service Hearings Officer, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtColorado Court of Appeals

Daniel F. Lynch, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

DiManna & Jackson, Gary Jackson, Jane Hazen, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants.

Opinion by Judge NIETO.

In this C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action, defendant, City and County of Denver (City), appeals the judgment of the trial court which reversed the decision of the City's Career Service Board concerning the classification of plaintiff, Paul W. Puckett. We reverse and remand with directions.

Plaintiff was selected to be the unit leader of the General Sessions unit of the Prosecution and Code Enforcement Section (PACE) of the City Attorney's office. There was no job classification for the position of unit leader. The City Attorney's Office classified the position as Assistant City Attorney-Senior (ACA-Senior). Plaintiff appealed through the administrative process of the Career Service Authority, asserting the correct classification was Assistant City Attorney-Supervisor (ACA-Supervisor). A hearing was held before a hearing officer who made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirmed the position classification as Assistant City Attorney-Senior. The Career Service Board (Board) affirmed the decision of the hearing officer without any additional findings of fact or conclusions of law.

Plaintiff sought review of the Board's decision in the trial court. The trial court found that the Board had applied an erroneous legal standard and reversed the decision. The case was remanded to the Board with instructions to classify plaintiff as Assistant City Attorney-Supervisor. This appeal followed.

The City asserts the Board did apply the correct legal standard, and that competent evidence in the record supported the Board's decision. Therefore, it contends the trial court's decision must be reversed. We agree.

The hearing officer for the Board made findings of fact which the parties do not dispute. She found that plaintiff was an assistant city attorney assigned to the PACE section. PACE was supervised by an attorney who was classified as ACA-Supervisor. He supervised eighteen attorneys as well as clerical employees. The City Attorney reorganized PACE into three units, all under the supervision of the ACA-Supervisor. He placed an attorney as unit leader for each of the three units. Plaintiff was selected as unit leader of the General Session unit and promoted to ACA-Senior.

The hearing officer found that plaintiff spent more than fifty percent of his time functioning as unit leader. Some of his supervisory activities included trying cases with subordinate attorneys for purposes of training and covering courtrooms for subordinate attorneys. At least ten percent of his time was spent litigating cases assigned to him. She further found, that while plaintiff had some supervisory responsibilities, he did not have final accountability for his subordinates. Issuing oral warnings was the only disciplinary function he exercised.

The hearing officer found that plaintiff's responsibility did not rise to the level of ACA-Supervisor. His job did not have the critical supervisory elements of final accountability for subordinates, budgeting, staffing, grievance handling, and discipline beyond oral reprimands. The hearing officer concluded that plaintiff performed duties greater than those described for the typical ACA-Senior, but less than the duties described for an ACA-Supervisor. She further concluded that plaintiff's duties more closely fell within the description of ACA-Senior. Therefore, she affirmed the classification of plaintiff as an ACA-Senior.

In a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) review, the court only considers whether the Board exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, "as well as whether an erroneous legal standard was applied by the agency." Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 737 P.2d 822, 826 (Colo. 1987). The standard of review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) is whether, on the basis of the whole record, the findings of the agency are supported by any competent evidence. Cooper v. Civil Service Commission, 43 Colo. App. 258, 604 P.2d 1186 (1979). No competent evidence means the record is devoid of evidentiary support for the decision. Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267 (Colo.1990). The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence presented to the hearing officer. Board of County Commissioners v. O'Dell, 920 P.2d 48 (Colo.1996).

The legal standards the City was to apply in classifying plaintiff's position were in the rules of the Career Service Authority and the following City Ordinance:

The position of every employee of the city in the career service shall be allocated to a class in the classification plan adopted herein. Such allocation shall be made on the basis of the duties of the position and in accordance with the rules of the career service board.

Denver, Colo., Ordinance § 18-37.

The general statement of duties for the job classification of ACA-Senior in the Classification Manual is:

Provides legal counsel to city officers and employees and representation in the prosecution and defense of legal cases before administrative agencies, and trial and appellate courts; and/or performs lead work over subordinate attorneys within the activities of an assigned legal area.

This job description goes on to state eleven job responsibilities. Six of these — numbers one to six — are statements of attorney duties and responsibilities, as opposed to office administration tasks. Four of these —...

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    • November 4, 2004
    ...or abused its discretion, "as well as whether an erroneous legal standard was applied by the agency." Puckett v. City & County of Denver, 12 P.3d 313, 314 (Colo.App.2000) (quoting Elec. Power Research Inst., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 737 P.2d 822, 826 In a C.R.C.P. 106 review, an age......
  • Quaker Court Limited Liability Company v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Jefferson, Court of Appeals No. 03CA1867 (CO 11/4/2004), Court of Appeals No. 03CA1867.
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    • November 4, 2004
    ...or abused its discretion, "as well as whether an erroneous legal standard was applied by the agency." Puckett v. City & County of Denver, 12 P.3d 313, 314 (Colo. App. 2000) (quoting Elec. Power Research Inst., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 737 P.2d 822, 826 (Colo. In a C.R.C.P. 106 revie......
  • Whitelaw v. Denver City Council, Court of Appeals No. 16CA0920
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Colorado
    • April 6, 2017
    ...to demonstrate that the City Council's approval of the proposed rezoning was arbitrary and capricious, see Puckett v. City & Cty. of Denver, 12 P.3d 313, 314 (Colo.App.2000), and they have not overcome the presumption that the City Council's decision was proper. Lieb v. Trimble, 183 P.3d 70......
  • Colo. Judicial Dep't v. Colo. Judicial Dep't Pers. Bd. of Review
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    • Supreme Court of Colorado
    • November 7, 2022
    ...signed by a majority of a five-member board indicating that the termination was justified. Similarly, in Puckett v. City & County of Denver , 12 P.3d 313, 314 (Colo. App. 2000), an employee in the City Attorney's Office challenged his job classification and, following an evidentiary hearing......
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