Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Nash

• Decision Date: 10 April 2012
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 11–0957 BB–LFG.
• Citation: 854 F.Supp.2d 1128
• Parties: PUEBLO OF SANTA ANA, and, Tamaya Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Nan G. NASH, District Judge, New Mexico Second Judicial District, Division XVII, in her Official Capacity; Gina Mendoza, as Personal Representative Under the Wrongful Death Act of Michael Mendoza, Deceased; F. Michael Hart, as Personal Representative Under the Wrongful Death Act of Desirée Mendoza, Deceased; and Dominic Montoya, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

854 F.Supp.2d 1128

PUEBLO OF SANTA ANA, and, Tamaya Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiffs,

v.Honorable Nan G. NASH, District Judge, New Mexico Second Judicial District, Division XVII, in her Official Capacity; Gina Mendoza, as Personal Representative Under the Wrongful Death Act of Michael Mendoza, Deceased; F. Michael Hart, as Personal Representative Under the Wrongful Death Act of Desirée Mendoza, Deceased; and Dominic Montoya, Defendants.

Civ. No. 11–0957 BB–LFG.

United States District Court,

D. New Mexico.

April 10, 2012.

Richard W. Hughes, Donna M. Connolly, The Rothstein Law Firm, Santa Fe, NM, for Plaintiff.

Matthew Eric Jackson, NM Attorney General's Office, Santa Fe, NM, Charlotte Mary Toulouse, Toulouse & Associates, PA, David L. Plotsky, Plotsky & Dougherty, P.C., Arlyn G. Crow, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BRUCE D. BLACK, District Judge.

This action comes before the Court on the Personal Representatives' motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction [Doc. 15], and the Honorable Judge Nan G. Nash's motion to dismiss [Doc. 18]. Having read the briefs and the relevant caselaw, the Court will deny the Personal Representatives' motion. The Court will then grant in part and deny in part Judge Nash's motion.

Facts and Procedural Background

The Court derives the facts from the Complaint, see generally Doc. 1, and presumes them to be true for the sake of the present motions. See Alvarado v. KOB–TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2007).

According to the Complaint, Tamaya Enterprises, Inc. (“Tamaya”) operates the Santa Ana Star Casino, located on Santa Ana Pueblo land, and thus within Santa Ana Indian Country. The Star Casino is operated pursuant to the terms of a class III compact between the Pueblo of Santa Ana (“Santa Ana”) and the State of New Mexico (the “Compact”). Section 8(A) of the Compact provides that claims for compensatory damages for bodily injury or property damage “may be brought in state district court” even if the claims arose on tribal land. ¹

Desirée Mendoza, Michael Mendoza, and Dominic Montoya (collectively the “Personal Representatives”) attended a wedding reception at the Star Casino on the evening of July 9, 2006. They were served alcoholic beverages at the Casino by Tamaya employees. Despite the apparent intoxication of Desirée and Michael, Tamaya employees allegedly continued to serve them alcohol. Following the reception, Michael and Desirée left the Casino in a vehicle with Dominic, heading south on Interstate 25. Just north of the Tramway exit, the vehicle rolled over, claiming the lives of Michael and Desirée, and injuring Dominic.

Gina Mendoza and F. Michael Hart, in their capacity as representatives for Michael and Desirée respectively, filed suit in state district court under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act, NMSA 1978, § 41–2–1 et seq.² The state court complaint alleges that Tamaya, through its agents, servants, or employees, knew or should have known that Desirée and Michael were intoxicated, yet continued to sell and serve them alcohol. Further, the state court complaint alleges that the serving and sale of alcohol was negligent and in reckless disregard for Desirée and Michael's safety and was the proximate cause of their deaths.

Tamaya moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. With respect to the state court's jurisdiction, Tamaya argued that New Mexico law provides that alcohol sales on Santa Ana Pueblo land must be governed by Pueblo law. Section 191 of the Pueblo Liquor Ordinance, 71 Fed.Reg. 17,903, 17,910 (Apr. 7, 2006) (“Liquor Ordinance”), in turn, provides that any action premised on a violation of the Liquor Ordinance “ shall be brought in the Tribal Court of the Pueblo, which court shall have exclusive jurisdiction thereof.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, Tamaya asserted that the Personal Representatives could only bring their claim in tribal court: the state district court lacked jurisdiction. Following a hearing on the motion, the state district court dismissed the case.

On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals disagreed, holding instead that the district court had jurisdiction over the action based on the plain terms of Section 8(A) of the Compact. Mendoza v. Tamaya Enters., 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d 903, 910–11 (N.M.App.2010). The Casino then petitioned for and was granted a writ of certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme Court.

The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, as set forth in the published opinion of Mendoza v. Tamaya Enterprises, Inc., 150 N.M. 258, 258 P.3d 1050 (2011) (hereinafter “Mendoza ”). First, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed whether the state district court had jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 1054–55. The court noted that Section 8(A) of the Compact provides state court jurisdiction over personal injury claims brought by persons who suffer personal injury proximately caused by the tribal entity authorized to conduct gaming pursuant to the Compact. Id. The court then cited its prior decision in Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 141 N.M. 269, 154 P.3d 644 (2007), for the proposition that the “jurisdictional shifting” provisions in the Compact, namely Section 8(A), were enforceable. Thus, even though the Liquor Ordinance provided exclusive jurisdiction in tribal court, “by virtue of Section 8 of the Compact, the Pueblo unambiguously agreed to proceed in state court for claims involving injuries proximately caused by the conduct of the Casino.” Mendoza, 258 P.3d at 1055.

Secure in its jurisdiction, the New Mexico Supreme Court then proceeded to the merits of the Personal Representatives' wrongful death claims. The court ultimately concluded that the state court complaint stated sufficient facts to establish a third-party common law claim with respect to the passenger of the vehicle as well as a patron claim with respect to the driver. Id. at 1057–60. The court thus remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id. at 1060.

After the case had been remanded, Tamaya and Santa Ana filed a complaint in this Court seeking relief in the form of (1) a declaration that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1994) (“IGRA”), does not permit the shifting of jurisdiction from tribal courts to state courts over private personal injury lawsuits brought against tribes or tribal entities with respect to claims arising within Indian country, and (2) an order prohibiting Judge Nash from exercising jurisdiction over the state court proceeding and enjoining the Personal Representatives from pursuing their claims in the state court proceeding.

The Personal Representatives move to dismiss the case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for want of federal subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Simultaneously, Judge Nash moves to dismiss the case under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7).

Standard of Review

“[T]o withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Accordingly, when reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir.2007). In making its determination, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to Tamaya and Santa Ana, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955;Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Analysis

I. Personal Representatives' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rooker–Feldman

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine holds that “a losing party in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that Rooker–Feldman is a narrow doctrine which only applies in a limited set of circumstances: “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).

In their motion to dismiss, the Personal Representatives claim that Tamaya and Santa Ana seek nothing more than further review of the judgments entered by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo and/or Mendoza. Such review, the Personal Representatives claim, is barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court must disagree.³

A. Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo

The first question is whether Rooker–Feldman is implicated by the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Santa Clara Pueblo. Decided in 2007, Santa Clara Pueblo held that the jurisdictional shifting provisions in the Compact, specifically Section 8(A), were not expressly prohibited by the IGRA. Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, 154 P.3d at 648. To the contrary, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the IGRA implicitly authorizes a process whereby the tribes and state can “allocate most or all of the jurisdictional responsibility to the tribe, to the State or to any...