Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo
| Decision Date | 23 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 29,350.,No. 29,351.,29,350.,29,351. |
| Citation | 2007 NMSC 008,154 P.3d 644 |
| Parties | Jane DOE, by and through her parents and next friend, J.H., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO, Santa Clara Development Corporation, d/b/a Big Rock Casino, Defendants-Petitioners. Ivan Lopez and Lucy Lopez, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. San Felipe Pueblo d/b/a San Felipe Casino Hollywood and CIS Insurance Group, Defendants-Petitioners. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Schoenberg & Bienvenu, LLP, Richard W. Hughes, Santa Fe, NM, Maxine Velasquez, San Felipe, NM, for Petitioners.
Bennett & Kosh, Merit Bennett, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent Doe.
Kennedy & Han, P.C., Paul J. Kennedy, Mary Y.C. Han, Rene Ostrochovsky, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondents Lopez.
Michael B. Browde, M.E. Occhialino, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association.
Catherine B. Stetson, Albuquerque, NM, for Amici Curiae Pueblo of Tesuque, Pueblo of San Felipe.
John D. Wheeler & Associates. P.C., John D. Wheeler, Alamogordo, NM, for Amicus Curiae Mescalero Apache Tribe.
Chestnut Law Offices, Peter C. Chestnut, Ann Berkley Rodgers, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae Pueblo of Acoma.
Nordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Bladh, Wayne H. Bladh, Thomas J. Peckham, Rodina Cole Cave, Albuquerque, NM, for Amici Curiae Jicarilla Apache Nation, Pueblo of Laguna, Pueblo of Santa Ana, Taos Pueblo.
Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Mielke, David Charles Mielke, Albuquerque, NM, for Amici Curiae Pueblo of Isleta, Pueblo of Sandia.
Bergen Law Offices, L.L.C., Leander Bergen, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae Pueblo of San Juan.
Jana C. Werner, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae Pueblo of Pojoaque Legal Department.
{1} In Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 10 n.3, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668, this Court left unanswered the question whether gaming compacts between the State of New Mexico and various New Mexico Pueblos that created concurrent jurisdiction in state courts over personal injury actions against tribal-owned casinos were valid and enforceable in light of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C § 2701 (2000). We now answer that question in the affirmative, holding that state courts have jurisdiction over personal injury actions filed against Pueblos arising from negligent acts alleged against casinos owned and operated by the Pueblos and occurring on pueblo lands. In so doing, we affirm the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals below. See Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 2005-NMCA-110, 138 N.M. 198, 118 P.3d 203.
{2} This appeal involves two separate incidents, each resulting in a personal injury lawsuit filed by a non-tribal member against a respective Pueblo. In the first action, Jane Doe, a fifteen-year-old girl, filed suit through her mother against Santa Clara Pueblo and several individuals for injuries that occurred after she was abducted by three men from Santa Clara's Big Rock Casino and sexually assaulted. Doe alleges the Pueblo failed to take reasonable safety measures to protect her while she was a guest at the casino. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Santa Clara was negligent in not providing proper lighting and security in the casino's parking lot and then in failing to make attempts to locate Doe after it became apparent that she was missing.
{3} In the second action, Lucy Lopez and her son Ivan Lopez filed suit against San Felipe Pueblo for injuries that occurred on the premises of San Felipe's Casino Hollywood. Plaintiffs were walking arm-in-arm into the casino when Ivan Lopez tripped on the corner of an unsecured floor mat causing both he and his mother to fall. Their complaint alleges that the Pueblo failed to adequately secure the floor mat thereby causing their injuries.
{4} Both sets of plaintiffs, Doe and Lopez, chose to sue the respective Pueblo in state court instead of tribal court based on a jurisdiction shifting provision contained in the gaming compact negotiated by the State and the Pueblos (the Compact) which, as will be discussed shortly, permits personal injury suits against the Pueblos to be brought in state court under certain circumstances. Doe filed suit in the First Judicial District and Lopez filed suit in the Thirteenth Judicial District. Both Santa Clara and San Felipe moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Each district court denied the motions to dismiss, relying on the express jurisdiction shifting language in the Compact.
{5} Both Pueblos then requested interlocutory appeal. Santa Clara's request was granted, and in a formal written opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court with Judge Sutin dissenting. Doe, 2005-NMCA-110, 138 N.M. 198, 118 P.3d 203. One week later, based on its decision in Doe, the Court of Appeals denied San Felipe Pueblo's request for interlocutory appeal. Both Pueblos then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the Compact between the State and each Pueblo validly confers state court jurisdiction over these personal injury claims occurring on pueblo lands. We granted certiorari to decide this important question.
{6} The Compact1 was negotiated under the comprehensive scheme of IGRA, a seminal federal statute, which "established the framework under which Indian tribes and states could negotiate compacts permitting ... gaming on Indian reservations located within state territory." Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 9, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668 (footnote omitted); see S.J. Res. 37, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.2001). Both the Pueblos and the State were involved in negotiating the terms of the Compact under the Compact Negotiation Act. NMSA 1978, §§ 11-13A-1 to -5 (as amended 2005). That negotiation process led to the various provisions of the Compact, including Section 8, with which we are concerned in this case.2
{7} Section 8 of the Compact, entitled "Protection of Visitors," acknowledges that the "safety and protection of visitors to a Gaming Facility is a priority of" the parties, and that a purpose of the Compact is "to assure that any such [visitors] who suffer bodily injury or property damage proximately caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise have an effective remedy for obtaining fair and just compensation." The Pueblo, therefore, "waives its defense of sovereign immunity in connection with any claims for compensatory damages for bodily injury or property damage up to the amount of fifty million dollars ($50,000,000) per occurrence asserted." Doe, 2005-NMCA-110, ¶ 6, 138 N.M. 198, 118 P.3d 203. The Pueblo promises to carry liability insurance in that amount.
{8} Following up on this concern over "safety" and an "effective remedy" for visitors, Section 8 addresses subject matter jurisdiction over personal injury claims against the Pueblos resulting from incidents occurring on Indian land in connection with Class III gaming. The pertinent language of Section 8(A) allows for personal injury actions against a Pueblo to "proceed either in binding arbitration ... or in a court of competent jurisdiction." Section 8(A) defines a court of competent jurisdiction to include state courts subject to the following condition: [A]ny such claim may be brought in state district court, including claims arising on tribal land, unless it is finally determined by a state or federal court that IGRA does not permit the shifting of jurisdiction over visitors' personal injury suits to state court. (Emphasis added.) As this language demonstrates, for the limited purpose of personal injury actions involving visitor safety, the parties to the Compact agreed to state court jurisdiction unless IGRA does not permit it. Therefore, our initial inquiry is whether Congress, in IGRA, "does not permit" tribes and states to do as the Pueblos and New Mexico have done here; that is, to negotiate provisions in a tribal-state compact for "the shifting of jurisdiction over visitors' personal injury suits to state court," including "claims arising on tribal land." This is a question of law that we review de novo. Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668. Accordingly, we turn our analysis to IGRA.
{9} "IGRA was Congress' compromise solution to the difficult questions involving Indian gaming." Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir.2003). As part of this solution, Congress defined three separate classes of gaming in IGRA. See State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 566, 904 P.2d 11, 15 (1995). Each class is subject to a different level of regulation. The issue before us pertains exclusively to Class III gaming, "the most heavily regulated and most controversial form of gambling under IGRA." Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino, 353 F.3d at 715.
{10} Class III gaming includes banking card games (where the house has a monetary stake in the game because players bet against the house, not just against one another); casino games such as roulette, craps, and keno; slot machines and electronic games of chance; parimutuel horse or dog wagering; and lotteries. 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (1992). IGRA permits Class III gaming if it is (1) authorized by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of the tribe and the Chair of the National Indian Gaming Commission, (2) located in a state that permits such gaming, and (3) covered by a tribal-state compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A), (B), (C) (2000). We are only concerned here with the third requirement.
{11} IGRA's compact provisions require the state and tribes to negotiate a compact governing Class III gaming. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (...
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