Puentes v. Spohn Health Network, No. 13-08-00100-CV (Tex. App. 6/11/2009)
| Decision Date | 11 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-08-00100-CV.,13-08-00100-CV. |
| Parties | JAIRO A. PUENTES, M.D., Appellant, v. SPOHN HEALTH NETWORK AND CHRISTUS SPOHN HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION D/B/A CHRISTUS SPOHN HOSPITAL, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 319th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices GARZA and VELA.
Appellant, Jairo A. Puentes, M.D., challenges the trial court's summary judgment in favor of appellees, Spohn Health Network and Christus Spohn Health System Corporation d/b/a Christus Spohn Hospital.1 Dr. Puentes sued Spohn alleging, among other things, violations of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act (the "TFEAA"). See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 15.01-.52 (Vernon 2002). By two issues, Dr. Puentes contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Spohn because: (1) Dr. Puentes was not required to produce evidence of dominant market share because Spohn's actions constituted a per se antitrust violation; and (2) the trial court misidentified the "relevant market" in determining whether Spohn had acted in an anticompetitive manner. We affirm.
The Network, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the System, provides managed healthcare services for various employers in a twelve-county area around Corpus Christi, Texas. Dr. Puentes is a pain management physician practicing in Corpus Christi; he also provides radiological imaging services to patients through an entity known as Medical Specialist Group, P.A. d/b/a Saratoga Medical Center ("Saratoga"). Dr. Puentes is a member of the Network; accordingly, if another doctor in the Network refers a patient to Dr. Puentes for pain management treatment, the Network allows reimbursement for that treatment. However, if a doctor refers a patient to Saratoga for radiological services, the Network will not reimburse for those services.
On February 7, 2002, Dr. Puentes filed an application with the Network to allow Saratoga to join the Network as an ancillary provider of radiological services. According to Dr. Puentes, ancillary provider status would allow Saratoga to obtain reimbursement from the Network for radiology referrals from other Network doctors. On March 1, 2002, the Network denied Saratoga's application, ostensibly because Dr. Puentes himself is not credentialed as a radiologist.
Dr. Puentes filed suit against Spohn on November 22, 2002, asserting multiple causes of action including negligence, breach of contract, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and violations of the TFEAA.2 See id. The basis of Dr. Puentes's claims under the TFEAA was that Spohn had acted in an anticompetitive manner by refusing to allow Saratoga to receive reimbursement from Network referrals. According to Dr. Puentes, the actual reason that Saratoga's application was denied was because Saratoga charges less for radiological services than do the System-owned hospitals, which are eligible for reimbursement. Dr. Puentes claimed that, by refusing to allow Saratoga to be reimbursed, Spohn was impermissibly "protecting [its] hospital[s] from competition."3 Spohn notes that Dr. Puentes further alleged in his second amended original petition, filed on July 8, 2005, that Spohn "conspired with others who provide radiology testing facilities to keep prices in the Corpus market artificially high, which benefits the hospital defendant."4
Spohn filed a motion for partial5 traditional summary judgment on February 19, 2007, asserting in part that: (1) the Network does not possess sufficient market power in the relevant market to be liable under the TFEAA; (2) even if the Network did possess sufficient market power in the relevant market, Dr. Puentes cannot show that it willfully acquired or maintained such power; and (3) Dr. Puentes did not identify any entity with whom the Network "conspired" to restrain trade. Spohn also filed a motion for no-evidence summary judgment as to all of Dr. Puentes's causes of action on May 9, 2007, contending in pertinent part that Dr. Puentes produced no evidence showing: (1) that the alleged restraint of trade is unreasonable or has an adverse affect on competition in the relevant market; (2) that the Network has a sufficient market share to exert an anticompetitive effect on the market; (3) that Dr. Puentes has standing to assert an antitrust injury; (4) that Spohn constitutes a monopoly; (5) that Spohn attempted to monopolize; (6) that Spohn engaged in price fixing; or (7) that Spohn conspired, combined, or contracted in restraint of trade.
Accompanying Spohn's motions was an affidavit executed by Robert David Frum, a regional vice president for the System and acting Executive Director of the Network. Frum stated in the affidavit that the "relevant market" in which the Network competes is the twelve-county area around Corpus Christi, and that this area has over a dozen other managed healthcare providers serving employers. Frum further stated that, according to his data, the Network's share of the relevant market, taking into account all competing managed healthcare providers, was 14.67% in 2002 and decreased to 7.18% in 2006. In his responses, Dr. Puentes attached deposition testimony by Frum stating that the System, which owns and operates several hospitals throughout the area, "retains about 65 percent market share of inpatient discharges."
The trial court granted both motions for summary judgment on June 7, 2007. This appeal followed.6
We review a trial court's grant of a traditional motion for summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 n.7 (Tex. 2005) (citing Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 290 n.137 (Tex. 2004)); Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 345 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). To obtain relief via a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 690 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied). If the movant produces evidence sufficient to show it is entitled to summary judgment, the non-movant must then present evidence raising a fact issue. See Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996). In deciding whether there is a disputed fact issue that precludes summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997) ). Evidence favorable to the movant, however, will not be considered unless it is uncontroverted. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1965). Moreover, every reasonable inference will be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 425 (citing Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549).
For a no-evidence summary judgment motion to be successful, the party seeking the judgment must assert that no evidence exists as to one or more of the essential elements of the non-movant's claims which the non-movant would have the burden to prove at trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Holstrom v. Lee, 26 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). When responding to a no-evidence motion, the non-movant is required to present more than a scintilla of probative evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to one or more of the challenged elements. See AMS Constr. Co., Inc. v. Warm Springs Rehab. Found., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Oasis Oil Corp. v. Koch Ref. Co., 60 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
If the trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied upon for the ruling, as is the case here, we will affirm the judgment on appeal if any of the theories advanced by the movant are meritorious. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989)).
The TFEAA provides in relevant part that "[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful," and that "[i]t is unlawful for any person to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of trade or commerce." Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 15.05(a), (b). We construe these provisions in accordance with federal antitrust caselaw. Id. § 15.04; Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 688 (Tex. 2006); see Star Tobacco, Inc. v. Darilek, 298 F. Supp. 2d 436, 440-41 (E.D. Tex. 2003) ().
To establish that Spohn contracted, combined, or conspired in restraint of trade in violation of section 15.05(a), Dr. Puentes must show that the alleged contract, combination, or conspiracy is unreasonable and has an "adverse effect on competition in the relevant market." See Winston v. Am. Med. Int'l, 930 S.W.2d 945, 951-52 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (quoting DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex. 1990)). To establish that Spohn monopolized in violation of section 15.05(b), Dr. Puentes must show: (1) Spohn's possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) Spohn's willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident. See Caller-Times Publ'g Co. v. Triad Commc'ns, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 1992) (citing United States v. I.T.T. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). To...
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