Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle
| Decision Date | 15 October 1921 |
| Docket Number | 16497. |
| Citation | 117 Wash. 351,201 P. 449 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al. CITY OF SEATTLE v. PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT CO. et al. |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Clay Allen, Judge.
Action by the Puget Sound Power & Light Company (formerly named Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Company) against the City of Seattle, the County of King, and others, in which the defendant city filed cross-complaint against defendant county. Judgment for the county and its officers and against plaintiff and defendant city, and plaintiff and the City appeal. Affirmed.
James B. Howe, Hugh A. Tait, Edgar L. Crider, and Norwood W. Brockett, all of Seattle, for appellants.
Walter F. Meier, Edwin C. Ewing, Malcolm Douglas, and Howard A Hansen, all of Seattle, for respondents.
The city of Seattle purchased from the Puget Sound Traction Light & Power Company a street railway 'system, property and equipment.' The purchase was authorized by ordinances of the city duly approved by the mayor. The actual transfer of the property was effected by an instrument dated and delivered March 31, 1919, and a physical delivery of the property the same day. The conveyance contained in its provisions the following:
'It is also further agreed between the parties hereto that if at the time of the delivery of this deed and lien shall have attached to the property or any part thereof for the year 1919 for any tax for the year 1919 such lien shall not constitute a breach of warranty, and that if such tax shall become collectible the same shall be paid before the same shall become delinquent by the respective parties hereto in amounts proportional to the respective periods of time that the same parties are respectively in possession of said property during the year 1919.'
On or after March 15, but prior to March 31, 1919, the state tax commissioner assessed that portion of the property of the company afterwards transferred to the city. The validity of that assessment is the one involved in this suit. It covered operating property and consisted of a substantial amount of real property but more largely of personal property and was assessed in solido as personal property. Subsequently the company unavailingly protested against the assessment to the state tax commissioner, and also before the state board of equalization, that the property was exempt from taxation. The assessment was in due time certified to the assessor for King county. Taxes were levied thereon and the county treasurer gave notice of his demand for the personal property taxes for the year 1919.
The company instituted this action to restrain the collection of the taxes and to have the same declared null and void and canceled as a cloud upon the title to other real property belonging to the company. The city was made a defendant. The complaint prayed that if the taxes be upheld the judgment should require the city and the company to pay each its proportionate part in accordance with the agreement between them. The company alleged that the property became public property before any lien for taxes attached. The city admitted the allegations of the complaint and filed a complaint alleging essentially the same facts as the company and praying for the same relief. The county and its tax officers who were the adversary defendants admitted that the property was assessed as alleged, and claimed it was properly assessed by the state tax commissioner on March 15, 1919 that at that time the lien for taxes attached; and that when the city acquired title on March 31, 1919, it did so subject to the lien.
The superior court gave judgment in favor of the county and its officers, against both the company and the city, and declined to adjudicate the relative rights and obligations of the company and the city to an apportionment of the taxes under the terms of the contract of conveyance between them. The company and the city have appealed.
The contentions of both appellants are similar. In the company's brief it is claimed of assignments 1 and 2 that if the property upon which respondents claim a lien was not subject to such lien the alleged tax would constitute a cloud upon the title, and if it was subject to such lien since appellants had contracted with each other to divide it the court should have adjudicated their respective portions. The propositions are not made clear by argument. If by the first it is meant that the tax being a personal property tax in the name of the company it thereby casts a cloud on the title of real property the company still owns, the answer is that by section 9245, Rem. Code (considered in Scandinavian American Bank v. King County, 92 Wash 650, 159 P. 786) no such cloud can be cast until the county treasurer selects specific real property and charges it with the lien of the personal property tax. If it is meant that the cloud is cast upon the property assessed, then the answer is to be found in the disposition of the other assignments with reference to the validity of the tax. On the other point--apportioning the tax between the company and the city--it is claimed 'equity having acquired jurisdiction it was error on the part of the superior court not to adjudicate the entire matter.' But the pleadings in the case show that no issue was formed upon the subject. If the taxes are paid without sale the respondents care not how the amount may be divided if more than one person pays them, and between those parties their pleadings in this respect are identical. They present no controversy with each other; there is nothing to adjudicate.
Next it is claimed that the property sold and delivered to the city was not subject to assessment or taxation for that year. In considering this assignment we assume for the moment that the assessment was made at a proper time, by the proper officer, and that all the property was for such purpose properly classified as personal property, which will be later discussed herein. Appellants rely on article 7, § 2, of the state Constitution, and subdivision 2 of section 9098, Rem. Code, to the same effect. The constitutional provision is:
'The property of the United States, and of the state, counties, school districts, and other municipal corporations, and such other property as the Legislature may by general laws provide, shall be exempt from taxation.'
Section 9235, Rem. Code, enacted in 1903, provides:
As to the lien the statute lays down one rule for real property and another for personal property. That, of course, is a matter of legislative policy, unimportant to the courts except as necessity arises to keep the difference clearly in mind. That difference is pointed out in the case of State v. Snohomish County, 71 Wash. 320, 128 P. 667. It was a case in which real property was sold to the state after it had been assessed but prior to the levy for that year. It was pointed out that in giving a lien for a real estate tax the statute contemplates a levy as well as an assessment, while as to personal property only an assessment is required; and it was decided that as the levy had not been made at the time of the purchase the state took the real property free of any lien for taxes. In the opinion the court said:
The case of Puyallup v. Lakin, 45 Wash. 368, 88 P. 578, just referred to, was one in which the court was asked to overrule the decision in the former case of Klickitat Warehouse Co. v. Klickitat County, 42 Wash. 299, 84 P. 860, holding that the lien attaches at the date personal property is assessed, but refused to do so and specifically decided that the city of Puyallup in purchasing a water plant after it had been assessed for taxation purposes but prior to the levy that year took the same subject to the tax and that the lien was not divested by devoting the property to a public use prior to the levy, stating:
'If the property had a lien upon it when it was purchased by the municipality, the municipality like an individual would take the property subject to the lien.'
It is claimed the Puyallup Case was, in effect, overruled by Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wash. 444, 100 P. 991, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 68. We do not so understand. It was a case in which the plaintiff sought to foreclose certificates of delinquent taxes upon lands condemned by the city that had paid the condemnation awards into court and the property was now devoted to a public use by the city. In the course of the opinion it was said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United Ry. & Logging Supply Co. v. Siberian Commercial Co.
... ... H ... Hanford, of Seattle, for appellant ... Reynolds, ... ...
- Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. City of Seattle