Puget Sound Power Light Co v. City of Seattle, Wash 12 8212 15, 1934, No. 344

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtSTONE
Citation54 S.Ct. 542,291 U.S. 619,78 L.Ed. 1025
PartiesPUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF SEATTLE, WASH. * Argued Jan. 12—15, 1934
Docket NumberNo. 344
Decision Date19 March 1934

291 U.S. 619
54 S.Ct. 542
78 L.Ed. 1025
PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT CO.

v.

CITY OF SEATTLE, WASH.*

No. 344.
Argued Jan. 12—15, 1934.
Decided March 19, 1934.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.

Page 620

Messrs. Clarence R. Innis and Elmer E. Todd, Frank E. Holman, and William M. Allen, all of Seattle, Wash., for appellant.

Messrs. A. C. Van Soelen, Corp. Counsel, Walter L. Baumgartner, Asst. Corp. Counsel, and C. V. Hoard, all of Seattle, Wash., for appellee.

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal under section 237 of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 344) from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, 172 Wash. 668, 21 P.(2d) 727, 728, sustaining a municipal license or excise tax, assailed by appellant as infringing the Fourteenth Amendment and the contract clause of the Federal Constitution (Article 1, § 10, cl. 1).

An ordinance of the city of Seattle of May 23, 1932, imposes an annual license tax upon the privilege of carrying on the business of selling or furnishing electric light

Page 621

and power to consumers. The tax is 3 per cent. of the gross income from the business 'in the city' during the fiscal year next preceding the tax year for which the license is required. The suit, brought to recover an installment of the tax already paid and to enjoin the collection of future installments, was heard and decided upon demurrer to appellant's complaint.

Both appellant, a Massachusetts corporation, acting under a municipal franchise, and appellee, the city of Seattle, acting by state authority, are engaged and actively compete in the business of furnishing electric light and power to consumers for hire. By state law the city is given plenary power to fix rates for the electric current which it distributes, and its rates are not subject to regulation and control by the Public Service Commission, as are those of appellant. Section 10390, Remington's Rev. Stat. of Washington. Revenues of the city from its electric light business are required by the city charter, article VIII, § 9, to be deposited in a special 'city light fund,' separate from the general funds of the city, and transfer from one fund to the other, except by direction of the city council, is forbidden by the city charter. Article IX, § 17. Section 6 of the ordinance, in terms, imposes the same tax on the city 'so far as permitted by law,' as that levied on appellant. But it appears that the city, acting under a state statute, section 9491, Remington's Rev. Stat. of Washington, enacted before the taxing ordinance, has issued bonds, the payment of which, both principal and interest, is secured by the revenue of its electric light business. Appellant contends that, by the statute, municipal ordinance, and the terms of the bonds themselves, this pledge is superior to all other charges upon the gross revenue, and that the city cannot lawfully pay the tax. It appears that in fact the city has not paid the tax or made any provision for paying it. The state court, in passing on this question, said:

Page 622

'The city has not allocated, and probably cannot allocate, any of the revenues of its power and light business to the payment of such a tax. Bonds have been issued in excess of $30,000,000 against the revenues from that business; and those bonds are a prior lien on the entire income from it—taking precedence even over operating charges. Conceding that the city's light and power revenues could be subjected to the tax, no machinery is set up in the ordinance to accomplish such an end. Furthermore, in making up its budget for 1932, no provision was made for the levy of general taxes to cover the excise provided for in the ordinance. So the problem must be met as though section 6 had been omitted from the ordinance. * * *'

Whether by this statement the Court intended to decide that the city could not lawfully pay the tax, or assumed that to be the case for the purpose of the decision, it is unnecessary to determine, for appellant further insists that, even though the tax were paid by the city to itself, it would impose no actual burden.

Asserting that no effective tax is imposed with respect to the business carried on by the city, appellant argues that the taxation of its competing business is a denial of equal protection and deprives it of its property without due process. The tax is also assailed because the measure of it is vague and uncertain, and because, by imposing a license tax upon the privilege of doing the business, the ordinance impairs appellant's franchise contract which gave it the right to conduct the business.

In sustaining the constitutionality of the tax, the state court found it unnecessary to ascertain whether, under the city charter and ordinances, and state law, the tax, if paid by the city, must be paid from its city light fund rather than from its general fund, or to what extent moneys may now or hereafter be transferred from one

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fund to the other, or how far the general fund raised by taxation may be used otherwise, either directly or indirectly, to aid the city's electric lighting business. We do not attempt to resolve these questions here. Decision that the city is not authorized by existing law to aid its light fund by taxation, without disposing of the constitutional question decided by the state court, would entail the decision of other questions, arising under the equal protection and contract clauses, not raised or considered in the case. Moreover, the appellant insists that in any case payment of the tax would neither relieve appellant of its burden nor impose a comparable burden on the city, since the same hand would both pay and receive the tax, and there is no constitutional limitation on the power of the city to use the tax when collected for the maintenance of the city's business. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 245, 207 N.W. 172, 208 N.W. 962, affirmed per curiam 275 U.S. 504, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed. 395. All the questions thus suggested are met and disposed of by decision of the constitutional question which the state court decided and which we decide here.

1. There is no contention that appellant's franchise or any contract relieves it generally from the duty of paying taxes. It is not contended that a state or municipality, merely because it fails or is unable to tax its own property or business, is prohibited from taxing like property or business. The contention here is that constitutional limitations are transgressed only because the tax affects a business with which the taxing sovereign is actively competing. For that reason it is argued that the taxation involves a forbidden discrimination and deprives appellant of its property without due process, since the combined power of the city to tax and to compete may be used to destroy appellant's business. As appellant asserts that the tax can impose no effective burden on the city, its

Page 624

contention is, in effect, that the city, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, upon entering the business, forfeited its power to tax any competitor.

In conducting the business by state authority, the city is exercising a part of the sovereign power of the state which the Constitution has not curtailed. The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that a state may, in the public interest, constitutionally engage in a business commonly carried on by private enterprise, levy a tax to support it, Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 40 S.Ct. 499, 64 L.Ed. 878; Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217, 38 S.Ct. 112, 62 L.Ed. 252, L.R.A. 1918C, 765, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 660, and compete with private interests engaged in a like activity, Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, supra; Madera Waterworks v. Madera, 228 U.S. 454, 33 S.Ct. 571, 57 L.Ed. 915; Helena Water Works Co. v. Helena, 195 U.S. 383, 25 S.Ct. 40, 49 L.Ed. 245.

We need not stop to inquire whether the equal protection clause was designed to protect the citizen from advantages retained by the sovereign, or to point out the extraordinary implications of appellant's argument when applied to expansions of government activities which have become commonplace. It is enough for present purposes that the equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination with respect to things that are different. The distinctions between the taxing sovereign and its taxpayers are many and obvious. The private corporation, whatever its public duties, carries on its business for private profit, and is subject to the obligation, common to all, to contribute to the expense of government by paying taxes. The municipality, which is enabled to function only because it is a tax gatherer, may acquire property or conduct a business in the interest of the public welfare, and its gains, if any, must be used for public ends. Hence equal protection does not require a city to abstain from taxing the business of a corporation organized for profit merely because in the public interest the municipality has acquired like property or conducts a like business.

Page 625

These differences are not lessened nor the constitutional exaction of uniformity increased because the city competes with a business which it taxes. Compare Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. Springfield, 257 U.S. 66, 42 S.Ct. 24, 66 L.Ed. 131; Hollis v. Kutz, 255 U.S. 452, 41 S.Ct. 371, 65 L.Ed. 727; Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union, 275 U.S. 415, 48 S.Ct. 198, 72 L.Ed. 345. The state may tax different types of taxpayers differently even though they compete. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S.Ct. 540, 75 L.Ed. 1248, 73 A.L.R. 1464; Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 41 S.Ct. 219, 65 L.Ed. 489; Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U.S. 331, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 985; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 32 S.Ct. 192, 56 L.Ed. 350. It could not plausibly be argued that a private nonprofit corporation distributing electric...

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65 practice notes
  • Goldrick v. Coal Mining Co, BERWIND-WHITE
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • January 29, 1940
    ...business to the advantage of another type of competing business which is left untaxed, see Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 625, 54 S.Ct. 542, 545, 78 L.Ed. 1025, and cases cited, it does not follow that interstate commerce may be similarly affected by the practical o......
  • New York Rapid Transit Corporation v. City of New York Brooklyn Queens Transit Corporation v. Same, Nos. 435
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • March 28, 1938
    ...L.Ed. 72. See, also, Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480, 491, 52 S.Ct. 424, 426, 76 L.Ed. 893; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 627, 54 S.Ct. 542, 546, 78 L.Ed. 1025. Not only is the corporation unable to point to an unmistakable exemption, but the contract itself c......
  • Crego v. Coleman, Docket No. 113485, Calendar No. 4.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • July 31, 2000
    ...on account of other, presumably more genuinely differentiating, characteristics. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 54 S.Ct. 542, 78 L.Ed. 1025 (1934). Moreover, even where the Equal Protection Clauses are implicated, they do not go so far as to prohibit the sta......
  • Town Of Warrenton v. Warren County, No. 163.
    • United States
    • North Carolina United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • March 29, 1939
    ...Treasurer, 140 Misc. 816, 252 N.Y. S. 146, and by the Supreme Court of the United States in Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 636, 54 S.Ct. 542, 78 L.Ed. 1025, 1036. It was also cited in 3 A.L.R. 1439, 1441-42, and in The Constitution of North Carolina, Annotated, Conn......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
65 cases
  • Goldrick v. Coal Mining Co, BERWIND-WHITE
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • January 29, 1940
    ...business to the advantage of another type of competing business which is left untaxed, see Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 625, 54 S.Ct. 542, 545, 78 L.Ed. 1025, and cases cited, it does not follow that interstate commerce may be similarly affected by the practical o......
  • New York Rapid Transit Corporation v. City of New York Brooklyn Queens Transit Corporation v. Same, Nos. 435
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • March 28, 1938
    ...L.Ed. 72. See, also, Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480, 491, 52 S.Ct. 424, 426, 76 L.Ed. 893; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 627, 54 S.Ct. 542, 546, 78 L.Ed. 1025. Not only is the corporation unable to point to an unmistakable exemption, but the contract itself c......
  • Crego v. Coleman, Docket No. 113485, Calendar No. 4.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • July 31, 2000
    ...on account of other, presumably more genuinely differentiating, characteristics. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 54 S.Ct. 542, 78 L.Ed. 1025 (1934). Moreover, even where the Equal Protection Clauses are implicated, they do not go so far as to prohibit the sta......
  • Town Of Warrenton v. Warren County, No. 163.
    • United States
    • North Carolina United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • March 29, 1939
    ...Treasurer, 140 Misc. 816, 252 N.Y. S. 146, and by the Supreme Court of the United States in Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 636, 54 S.Ct. 542, 78 L.Ed. 1025, 1036. It was also cited in 3 A.L.R. 1439, 1441-42, and in The Constitution of North Carolina, Annotated, Conn......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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