Puhalla v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig.)

• Decision Date: 27 May 2020
• Docket Number: MDL No. 2599,Economic Loss No. 14-24009-CV-MORENO,Master File No. 15-02599-MD-MORENO
• Parties: IN RE TAKATA AIRBAG PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION Stephanie Puhalla, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Audi of America, LLC, and Volkswagen Group of America, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

462 F.Supp.3d 1304

IN RE TAKATA AIRBAG PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATIONStephanie Puhalla, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Audi of America, LLC, and Volkswagen Group of America, Defendants.

MDL No. 2599

Master File No. 15-02599-MD-MORENO

Economic Loss No. 14-24009-CV-MORENO

United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Division.

Signed May 27, 2020

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS BY MERCEDES-BENZ, AUDI, AND VOLKSWAGEN

FEDERICO A. MORENO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This multidistrict litigation consolidates allegations of economic loss and personal injury related to airbags manufactured by former-defendants Takata Corporation and TK Holdings (collectively, "Takata") and equipped in vehicles distributed by Defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Audi of America, LLC, and Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. The allegations are that Defendants’ vehicles were equipped with Takata airbags containing the chemical ammonium nitrate, which creates a small explosion to inflate the airbags during a crash. Plaintiffs, who are consumers of Defendants’ vehicles, contend that when exposed to high heat and humidity, the explosion is much more forceful and can cause significant injuries and even death.

The crux of Plaintiffs’ legal claims is that Defendants knew or should have known of the Takata inflator defect prior to installing the Takata airbags in their vehicles, and that Defendants concealed from, or failed to notify, the Plaintiffs and the general public of the full and complete nature of the inflator defect. Plaintiffs allege that as a result of Defendants’ concealment, Plaintiffs would not have purchased their vehicles or would not have paid as much for them as they did.

Defendants vigorously contest the sufficiency of the allegations supporting a myriad of claims remaining in the 55-count Complaint. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the allegations in the Complaint and the arguments in the parties’ moving papers. This Order resolves all remaining claims asserted by the Consumer Plaintiffs against Mercedes, Audi, and Volkswagen.

For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 2988) is GRANTED IN PART as follows:

• The nationwide-class Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim (Count 5) is DISMISSED in full;

• The statewide-class breach of implied warranty claims under the laws of Kentucky and South Carolina (Counts 26 and 48) are DISMISSED ;

• The statewide-class statutory consumer protection claims under the laws of Louisiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina (Counts 28, 40, 43, 46, and 47) are DISMISSED ;

• The fraudulent concealment claims (Counts 6 and 9) are DISMISSED as to all named-Plaintiffs and all putative class members whose claims are governed under the laws of California, Kentucky, and South Carolina;

• The negligence claims (Counts 7 and 10) are DISMISSED as to all named-Plaintiffs and all putative class members whose claims are governed under the laws of Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin;

• The unjust enrichment claims (Counts 8 and 11) are DISMISSED as to all putative class members whose claims are governed under the laws of Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, and also DISMISSED as to these named-Plaintiffs: Loretta Collier and Omeko Pearson (Alabama); Diana Myers (Arizona); Paulette Calhoun (Georgia); Holly Stotler and Delola Nelson-Reynolds (Illinois); Malia Moore (Indiana); Jeffery Reeves (Louisiana); Ericka Black, Robert Cervelli, and Shanella Prentice (Massachusetts); Trevor MacLeod and Michael McBride (Michigan); Bettie Taylor (Mississippi); Darren Boyd, Maureen Dowds, Alexander Lonergan, and Branko Krmpotic (New Jersey); Jody Dorsey, Heidi Elliot, Jennifer Wilmoth, and Deloris A. Jones (New York); Aaron Patillo (Tennessee); and Michael Farriss (Virginia); and

• All claims asserted by Plaintiff Brett Alters are DISMISSED .

Furthermore, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the following claims, which will proceed to summary judgment:

• The statewide-class statutory consumer protection and breach of implied warranty claims in Counts 12–25, 27, 29–39, 41–42, 44–45, and 49–55;

• Claims for fraudulent concealment (Counts 6 and 9) asserted by all named-Plaintiffs whose claims arise under the laws of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin;

• Claims for negligence (Counts 7 and 10) asserted by these named-Plaintiffs: Chloe Crater (Arkansas); Jeffery Reeves (Louisiana); and Theresa Marie Fusco Radican (Rhode Island); and

• Claims for unjust enrichment (Counts 8 and 11) asserted by these named-Plaintiffs: Sandra Herrell (Alabama); Chloe Crater (Arkansas); David De King (Arizona); Pren Gjuraj and Christine Palmer (Connecticut); Cheryl Butler-Adams, Michael Cahill, Debrah Henry, Scott Lusby, Justin Maestri, Kristen Nevares, and Marcela Warmsley (California); George O'Connor (Florida); Diego DelaCruz, Mirsad Gacic, and Melinda M. Harms (Illinois); Susan Knapp (Iowa); Charles Hudson, Shanetha Livingston, and Bassam Makhoul (Michigan); Edward J. Burki and Annette Montanaro (New York); Daphne Bridges, Desiree Jones-Lassiter, and Kenneth Melde (North Carolina); Randy Brown (Ohio); John F. Phillips, Nancy D. Phillips, and Curtis Scott (Oregon); Dave Battinieri, Lillian Johnson, and Christopher Michael Knox (Pennsylvania); Theresa Marie Fusco Radican (Rhode Island); Tiffany Bolton, Sherri Cook, Vernettia Davis, Sam Fragale, Julius Fulmore, Celeste Lewis, Nikki Norvell, and Maria de Lourdes Viloria (Texas); William Goldberg (Washington); and April Rockstead Barker (Wisconsin).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

A claim has facial plausibility when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Although legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Id. at 679. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). The factual allegations must be enough to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citations omitted).

Where a cause of action sounds in fraud, the allegations in the complaint must satisfy the particularity pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Under Rule 9(b), "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake"; although "conditions of a person's mind," such as malice, intent, and knowledge may be alleged generally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To comply with Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must allege: (1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in which these statements misled the plaintiffs; and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged fraud. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc. , 116 F.3d 1364, 1380–81 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam ) (citation omitted). In other words, a plaintiff is required to plead the "who, what, when, where, and how" pertaining to the underlying fraud. See Garfield v. NDC Health Corp. , 466 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The purpose of particularity pleading is to alert the defendants to their precise misconduct and protect them against baseless charges of fraudulent behavior. See Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs. , 847 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

Finally, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and accept well-pleaded facts as true. See St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am. , 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1986).

III. DISCUSSION

In a previous order, the Court resolved standing and personal jurisdiction challenges, and ruled on the sufficiency of the allegations supporting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims. See In re Takata Airbag Products Liab. Litig. , 396 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (S.D. Fla. 2019). After thoroughly reviewing the Complaint and the moving papers, the Court dismissed: (1) both the Foreign Defendants (Daimler AG, Audi Aktiengesellschaft, and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft) and the "Direct-File Actions" for lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) the RICO claims (Counts 1–4); and (3) all claims asserted by Audi owners or lessees against Volkswagen (and vice versa).

The Court will now resolve Defendants’ challenges to the claims remaining in the 55-count Complaint, which includes: a nationwide-class claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Count 5); nationwide-class common-law claims for fraudulent concealment, negligence, and unjust enrichment (Counts 6–11); and statewide-class claims alleging breach of implied warranty and violations of various state consumer protection statutes (Counts...