Pukas v. Pukas
| Decision Date | 01 November 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 354-A,354-A |
| Citation | 247 A.2d 427,104 R.I. 542 |
| Parties | Frances PUKAS v. Anthony S. PUKAS. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This motion to modify a final decree of divorce entered by the family court in 1962 was brought in that court on November 17, 1966. A justice of that court, after hearing, granted the motion and on October 6, 1967, filed a written decision therein. On January 12, 1968, the court entered an 'Amended Final Decree.' However, on October 19, 1967, the respondent had filed an appeal prior to the filing of the so-called amended final decree but after the filing of the decision in which the motion was granted. The respondent now prosecutes that appeal in this court.
The appeal, as noted, was claimed after the filing of the decision in the family court, but prior to the filing therein of the amended final decree. It is true that equity speaks through decrees and that the entry of a decree is necessary to bring a cause before this court for consideration thereof. We have occasionally, however, in causes where a written decision has been filed by the subordinate tribunal, considered that written decision to partake of the nature of an interlocutory decree and given consideration to it on an appeal. Therefore, we will in this case construe the written decision filed on October 6, 1967, as constituting an interlocutory decree and proceed with the appeal. See Rogers v. Rogers, 98 R.I. 263, 201 A.2d 140.
The material facts are not in dispute. It appears from the record that petitioner was granted an absolute divorce from respondent on November 10, 1960. As we have noted, no interlocutory decree setting out the terms of this decision was ever filed, but, from a transcript certified by the reporter, the decision as given from the bench discloses that the court awarded custody of the three minor children of the parties to petitioner along with permanent use of the household furnishings. It further discloses that the court ordered respondent '* * * to pay $15 a week, it being the understanding of the Court that one of the children listed here is in college and without the State.' The petitioner specifically waived alimony, and, as we have noted, there is no dispute concerning the fact that no interlocutory decree was ever entered in the cause.
In 1962 petitioner, intending to remarry, caused a final decree to be entered on June 25 of that year, which read in pertinent part: In other words, the final decree contains no order or award for the support of the children.
The trial justice granted petitioner's motion to amend the final decree so that it would order respondent to pay $15 weekly for the support of the children and further made that decree retroactive to the oral decision of 1960. The respondent now contends, among other things, that the trial justice erred in thus giving a retroactive effect to the amended final decree.
A careful scrutiny of the record persuades us that the respondent is not questioning the authority of the court to amend the 1962 decree so as to make it conform to the actual judgment entered at that time. The sole issue raised by his appeal is whether the trial justice erred in giving retroactive effect to his amendatory order of the final decree of 1962 so as to make that order require respondent to pay $15 weekly for the support of his children effective as of 1962. It is clear that the trial justice, in attempting to extend the effect of his amendatory order to the decision of 1960, was attempting to extend the effect of that order beyond the time of the entry of the decree that it was amending. We know of no authority, nor has our attention been directed to any authority, that holds that the power of the equity court to enter orders nunc pro tunc extends to situations of this character.
We turn then to respondent's contention that the trial justice erred in granting the motion to amend the final decree entered in 1962 so as to set forth the order for support under consideration. There can be no doubt of the authority of the court in appropriate circumstances to amend its decree so as to correct error. The respondent does not contend otherwise. In MacDonald v. Barr, 51 R.I. 337, 154 A. 564, this court said that the right to allow amendment of its records is inherent in the court, inasmuch as these records are conclusive evidence of the facts recorded by the judgment, and it is the duty of the court to see to it that its records conform to the actual facts. According to this case, the authority to amend a judgment is within the sound discretion of the court having custody of the records. See Annot., 126 A.L.R. 956.
The respondent does, however, argue vigorously that the court erred in rejecting his contention that the relief sought by petitioner should have been denied on the ground of laches. In support of this argument he argues that petitioner had allowed four years to elapse before moving to correct the record and thus deprived respondent of an opportunity to move to modify the final decree by reason of any change in his or her circumstances that might have occurred during that four-year period.
The trial justice, however, in his decision refused to apply the doctrine of laches in this case after referring to the provisions of the statute, G.L.1956, § 15-5-16, which provide that each installment upon its accrual becomes a judgment enforceable in an action at law. It is apparent that he was under the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the doctrine of laches should not be applied to a motion to amend where its ultimate effect might be to impair the remedy at law available to the petitioner with respect to the...
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Tempest v. State, 2015–257–M.P.
...hold that a lower-court justice abused his or her discretion in rejecting a laches defense. See, e.g., Pukas v. Pukas, 104 R.I. 542, 548, 247 A.2d 427, 430 (1968). In my opinion, this is such a case. In this case, there has been an egregiously unreasonable delay that has resulted in such pr......
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Lopez v. State
...showing of “negligence to assert a known right, seasonably coupled with prejudice to an adverse party”); see also Pukas v. Pukas, 104 R.I. 542, 546, 247 A.2d 427, 429 (1968) (“As is well settled, laches does not arise out of delay alone but out of delay which, unexplained, operates to the p......
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Hackett v. Hackett
...(1969); as where, for example, the defendant is led to change his position with respect to the matter in question. Pukas v. Pukas, 104 R.I. 542, 545-46, 247 A.2d 427 (1968)." Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232, 239, 413 A.2d 834 (1979). "The burden of proof as to the existence of laches is on th......
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Hartley v. Ungvari
...of past child support expenditures. Although the facts are somewhat dissimilar, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Pukas v. Pukas, 104 R.I. 542, 247 A.2d 427 (1968), reasoned that such an unexplained delay in the assertion of a right by an ex-wife and the resultant large debt to the ex-hu......