Pulaski Co. Equalization Board Cases

• Decision Date: 19 November 1887
• Citation: 6 S.W. 1
• Parties: PULASKI CO. EQUALIZATION BOARD CASES. BAIRD and another <I>v.</I> WILLIAMS and others. KAHN <I>v.</I> VAUGHAN and others. STIFFT <I>v.</I> SAME.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 1

6 S.W. 1

PULASKI CO. EQUALIZATION BOARD CASES.

BAIRD and another v. WILLIAMS and others.

KAHN v. VAUGHAN and others.

STIFFT v. SAME.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

November 19, 1887.

Appeals from chancery court, Pulaski county; D. W. CARROLL, Chancellor; and from circuit court, Pulaski county; J. W. MARTIN, Judge.

E. W. Kimbell, John M. Moore, Cohn & Cohn, J. M. Rose, and John McClure, for appellants. Dan. W. Jones, Atty. Gen., and Blackwood & Williams, for appellees.

COCKRILL, C. J.

These appeals have been argued as one cause. Each of the appellants is a tax-payer of Pulaski county, the assessment of whose personal property, as made out by him and returned by the county assessor, has been increased by the county board for the equalization of taxes. Kahn's assessment as returned by the assessor, was $4,450. It was increased by the board to $12,450; Stifft's raised from $5,150 to $12,150, and Baird & Bright's, from $5,000 to $10,000. The cases of Kahn and Stifft are appeals from the Pulaski circuit court, one originating in an application to that court for a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the board as far as they relate to his property, while the other was heard there on appeal from the county court where an application, in the nature of an appeal from the finding of the board, to reduce the assessment, had been considered. The case of Baird & Bright is an appeal from a decree of the Pulaski chancery court dismissing their bill to enjoin O. Williams, as county clerk, from extending the assessment of their property as raised by the board upon the tax-books of the county. The action of the board was sustained in each instance, and the cases have been brought here through different channels to avoid, as counsel agree, all contest about the mode of procedure to raise the substantial questions at issue.

The validity of the act of the legislature which authorizes the appointment of the board is assailed. The argument is that the constitution directs the election of one assessor by the electors of each county, while the act in question attempts to authorize the governor to appoint three persons whose duties, as prescribed by it, are such as the framers of the constitution contemplated should be performed by the assessor, and thus undertakes to establish an agency for ascertaining the value of property for taxation in violation of the constitution. The chief provision of the constitution upon the subject of taxation is as follows: "All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value; that value to be ascertained in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, making the same uniform throughout the state. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal value. * * *" Section 5, art. 16. The governing idea of this provision is that the burden of taxation shall be equally and uniformly laid upon property in proportion to its value. As a means to the attainment of this end assessments for taxation should be made by the same standard, and as near the actual value of the property assessed as possible. It is a violation of the mandate contained in this provision to return any property for assessment at less than its value. If the law is enforced, every person will contribute to the public revenue in proportion to the value of the property owned by him. Neither of the appellants here complain that the valuation fixed by the board of equalization exceeds the value of his personal property subject to taxation. There is no showing that the action of the board has worked injustice to any one. The argument is simply that the return of the county assessor is a finality, and concludes all further inquiry as to valuation, notwithstanding his return may state the value of the property of a particular individual at only a half, or it may be a hundredth, part of its true value, when all other property is fairly assessed. The statement of the proposition shows its want of conformity to the constitutional mandate of equality and uniformity, and the existence of the discrepancies disclosed by the record, taking the findings of the board as correct, demonstrates the necessity for the legislative attempt to give practical operation to the constitution by the creation of boards for the correction of such inequalities. That inequalities exist, and will continue to exist, is inherent in the effort to adjust the value of all property to a common standard. No degree of care and diligence on the part of the most competent assessor can attain perfect equality, or perhaps prevent striking mistakes and oversights in assessments. A near approximation to correctness is the most that can be expected. The difficulty of preserving a just relation between the different parts of the same county, or even the several wards of a city, is enhanced by the necessity of delegating the power of fixing values to the different individuals who act as assistant or deputy assessors. Experience has taught, and the framers of the constitution must have known, that, in a populous and wealthy county like Pulaski, the assessor, unaided, could not perform the duties of his office so as to approximate uniformity and equality; and the legislature, recognizing the necessity, have continued the practice that prevailed prior to the adoption of the present constitution of providing assistant assessors to aid in the work. Their returns of the same class of property may be widely divergent. The necessity of the case, in view of the immense labor to be performed, commonly forces the assessor to take their returns as correct. If the legislature is powerless to undertake the correction of these discrepancies and the obvious errors that creep into the system, then the most important security that has been devised for the benefit of the tax-payer may be rendered useless. An under assessment for taxation, whether arising from an honest intention and belief on the part of the assessor, or from a concealment or misrepresentation of facts by the tax-payer, is an injury to the public. The burden of every other tax-payer is increased to make up the deficit. An overvaluation is an oppression to the individual. Both are violations of the constitutional provision above quoted; and if the legislature is restrained, as is contended, from exercising the power of properly adjusting the burden between the tax-payers, the provision containing the inhibition must be very plainly irreconcilable with the constitutional command of equality and uniformity in the contributions demanded for the public service.

Is the provision relied upon inconsistent with the power to equalize the assessments? It seems clear to us that it is not. The provision is as follows: "The qualified electors of each county shall elect one sheriff, who shall be ex officio collector of taxes, unless otherwise provided by law; one assessor, one coroner, one treasurer, who shall be ex officio treasurer of the common school fund of the county, and one county surveyor, for the term of two years, with such duties as are now or may be prescribed by law, provided that no per centum shall ever be paid to assessors upon the valuation or assessment of property by them." Section 46, art. 7. The duties now performed by the county assessor were well understood and performed in this state long before the office found a place in the present constitution. The office existed under the first organic law of the state, though it was not created by it. The functions were sometimes performed by an officer known as the assessor, and sometimes by the sheriff and collector of taxes. But, by whomsoever performed, the assessments were left open to attack in the county court by any one who felt himself aggrieved. Gould, Dig. c. 148, § 35. The constitution of 1868 made the office a constitutional one as far as real estate was concerned. The provision reads: "Real estate shall be appraised at least once in five years, by an appraiser to be provided by law." Article 10, § 2. But the policy of regarding the assessor's returns as open to correction was adhered to. Boards of equalization were created, and their functions performed under the revenue laws of that instrument. The validity of a state board of equalization was affirmed by this court under that constitution. Van De Griff v. Haynee, 28 Ark. 270. See, too, Edrington v. Mathews, 30 Ark. 665. The framers of the constitution of 1874 were therefore familiar with the practice of correcting and revising the assessments of county assessors, whether the office was created by the legislature or the constitution; but they have nowhere made their returns conclusive, or prohibited the creation of boards to revise and equalize them. It was, however, known that all the departments of government had sanctioned the practice under the previous constitution when the office was created by it. The departure from the constitution of 1868, as to this office, was only in making it elective, and in cutting off the temptation to the incumbent to oppress the tax-payer by an overvaluation of his property, by prohibiting the practice then in vogue of allowing the assessor a per cent. upon the valuation returned by him. These features do not affect the functions of the office. The legislature had always possessed the power to authorize an investigation into, and a change of, the assessor's returns and if it had been the intention to prohibit this, it is reasonable to suppose that that departure also would have been plainly expressed. Adsit v. Lieb, 76 Ill. 200; Baker v. State, 44 Ark. 134. But instead of prohibiting the practice, one of the sections quoted expressly leaves the assessor's duties subject to legislative control, and the other prescribes that the value of property for the purposes of taxation shall be ascertained in such manner as the general assembly shall direct. These are grants of power which...