Pulley v. The Chicago
Decision Date | 08 January 1927 |
Docket Number | 26,954 |
Citation | 122 Kan. 269,251 P. 1100 |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Parties | R. E. PULLEY, Appellee, v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant |
Decided January, 1927.
Appeal from Wyandotte district court, division No. 3; WILLIAM H MCCAMISH, judge.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.
1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT -- Final Adjudication -- Compromise and Settlement Resulting in Judgment of Dismissal. An action was brought upon a claim for compensation and after issues had been joined, but before a trial was had, a compromise and settlement of the claim was effected and the compensation agreed upon was paid. Upon agreement of the parties a judgment of dismissal was entered with prejudice to any future suit or action. Held, the judgment amounted to a final adjudication on the merits, and until such judgment is reversed or set aside on appeal or in some direct proceeding brought for that purpose, it constitutes a bar to a future action on the claim so adjudicated.
2. SAME--Final Adjudication--Effect of Mutual Mistake. An averment of the plaintiff in a second action to recover compensation to the effect that the settlement was made through a mutual mistake as to the extent of his injuries, and that he was led to believe that he was not entitled to a greater sum than he had agreed to take, did not destroy the final effect of the judgment previously rendered.
Luther Burns, J. E. Du Mars, both of Topeka, and O. L. Miller, of Kansas City, for the appellant.
W. W. McCanles, of Kansas City, Mo., for the appellee.
In May, 1923, R. E. Pulley was an employee of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, which was operating under the workmen's compensation law, and while he was so employed he sustained an injury for which he claimed compensation. Alleging that he had proposed arbitration of the claim but that it was refused by the company, he brought an action alleging that he was so injured and disabled as to be entitled to compensation in the amount of $ 2,604. Before the trial of that action he entered into a compromise agreement with the company by which it was agreed that upon the payment of $ 250 full satisfaction would be acknowledged by plaintiff, and that amount was paid. The following stipulation was then signed:
"It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto, that the above case has been fully settled and the claim therein made fully paid and satisfied, and that said cause shall be and is hereby dismissed by the plaintiff with prejudice to any future suit or action at the cost of defendant."
The stipulation was presented to the court on September 26, 1923 and a judgment thereon was entered, dismissing the cause with prejudice in accordance with the stipulation. That judgment has not been appealed from, reversed or modified. Later and on May 13, 1925, he brought the present action setting forth the relation of the parties, the injuries sustained, the wages formerly paid for his services, and then sets forth that after he had instituted his suit in 1923, a settlement was made and a stipulation for dismissal of the suit which had been begun was entered into. This was followed by averments to the effect that it had been signed through a mutual mistake of fact, in that he did not know or realize the extent of the injury and had been led to believe by defendant's doctor that his injuries were temporary in character, whereas they are permanent and serious. As a further reason for signing the release and the stipulation to dismiss the action, he alleges that he had been told that he could not recover a larger sum than the defendant's wages and was not advised by anyone as to his rights or the amount that he was entitled to recover. He therefore offered to tender back $ 250, and asked for compensation in the sum of $ 2,443. A motion was made by the defendant for judgment upon the pleadings. The motion was denied and d...
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Odom v. Langston, 40207.
...adjudication upon the merits and became a bar to another suit. Civil Code, Sec. 101, Laws 1943, p. 385; Pulley v. Ry. Co., 251 Pac. 1100, 122 Kan. 269. (3) The trial court had power, as a court of equity, to grant an injunction to prevent vexatious relitigation of matters which had been adj......
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Odom v. Langston
... ... merits and became a bar to another suit. Civil Code, Sec ... 101, Laws 1943, p. 385; Pulley v. Ry. Co., 251 P ... 1100, 122 Kan. 269. (3) The trial court had power, as a court ... of equity, to grant an injunction to prevent vexatious ... ...
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Keane v. Allen
... ... plaintiff and is res judicata of all questions which might ... have been litigated in the suit. Pulley v. Chicago, R. I ... & P. Ry. Co., 122 Kan. 269, 251 P. 1100; Maib v ... Maryland Casualty Co., 17 Wash.2d 47, 135 P.2d 71, 74; ... Bank of ... ...
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Mick v. Mani, 61428
... ... See Mars v. McDougal, 40 F.2d 247 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 282 U.S. 850 [51 S.Ct. 28, 75 L.Ed. 753] (1930); Pulley v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Rly. Co., 122 Kan. 269, 251 Pac. 1100 (1927); James & Hazard, Civil Procedure § 6.6 (3d ed.1985) ... ...