Purcell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1262.
| Decision Date | 26 March 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 1262.,1262. |
| Parties | PURCELL v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court; Providence and Bristol Counties.
Bill in equity by Phillip T. Purcell, as beneficiary, against the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company and another, for double indemnity under life policy. From an adverse decree, complainant appeals. On motion to dismiss appeal.
Appeal dismissed, and cause remanded.
Morris E. Yaraus, of Woonsocket, for complainant.
George Hurley, Walter V. Moriarty, and Walter V. Connly, all of Providence, for respondents.
This case is before us on the original respondent's motion to dismiss the complainant's appeal from a final decree of the superior court denying his claim of double indemnity under two policies of insurance issued by the respondent on the life of one Mary McGinnity. The complainant, who claims to be the present beneficiary under the policies, brought a bill in equity in which he alleged that the insured "died as the result of an accidental fall in her bedroom," and prayed that the court order the payment to him of double indemnity in accordance with the terms of the policies. The respondent insurance company filed an answer in the nature of a bill of interpleader, and joined the administrator of the estate of the deceased, who also made claim to the proceeds of the two policies, as a party respondent. The answer denied that the insured died as the result of an accident, and also denied that the respondent company was liable for double indemnity under the provisions of its policies.
The case was heard by a justice of the superior court upon bill, answer, and proof. At the end of the hearing, the trial justice found that the complainant was entitled to the proceeds of the policies and that the insurance company was not liable to pay double indemnity under the aforesaid policies. Upon the entry of a final decree to this effect, the complainant appealed to this court and now contends that the failure to award him double damages under each of the said policies was erroneous. The administrator did not claim an appeal from the final decree. No transcript of the oral testimony taken at the trial of the cause was filed with the clerk of the superior court or allowed by any justice of said court, nor was a request made by the complainant for such a transcript of testimony when this appeal was taken. The respondent company maintains that the complainant is not properly before this court, and moves to dismiss the appeal because of the failure by the complainant to file a transcript of the testimony in the cause.
The procedure to be followed in taking an appeal from a final decree of the superior court in an equity cause is found in sections 25, 26, 27, and 28 of chapter 339, General Laws 1923. Section 26 requires that the party taking an appeal shall "file with the clerk a transcript of the testimony taken orally in the cause, if any, or so much thereof as may be agreed by the parties." The statute then provides for the allowance of the transcript by the justice who heard the cause or by some other justice in his absence. It is admitted that the parties have not agreed to dispense with the transcript or any part thereof.
Counsel for the complainant admits that there is no precedent in this state for his action. He attempts to establish his contention by picking out certain words in sections 25, 26, and 27 and, irrespective of the context, construing them to mean that the statute does not require the filing of a transcript in every case of an appeal in an equity cause. We will therefore indicate in italics the language in these sections upon which he relies. Section 25 provides that the appellant "shall advance the estimated fees of the court stenographer for transcribing such testimony, as may be required""; section 26 calls for "a transcript of the testimony taken orally in the cause, if any"; and section 27 states that: "Upon an appeal being taken and such transcript of the testimony as may be required being allowed," certain other steps shall follow. The statute does not warrant even by implication the construction that the complainant seeks to place upon it. The words in...
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Letendre v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Co., 890.
...steps required to perfect an appeal in this court as a transcript of evidence would be in an equity appeal. See Purcell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 93, 183 A. 884; Austin v. Newport Trust Co., 65 R.I. 87, 13 A.2d 682; Plouffe v. Taft-Peirce Mfg. Co., 72 R.I. 487, 53 A.2d 529......
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Plouffe v. Taft-peirce Mfg. Co., 1786.
...in this court without a transcript of the testimony or so much thereof as may be agreed to by the parties. Purcell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 93, 183 A. 884; Corbett v. Penhall, 58 R.I. 185, 192 A. 171; Davis v. Perrino, 60 R.I. 145, 197 A. 393; Austin v. Newport Trust Co......
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Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Gilleney
...of a cause in equity which is heard by it upon an appeal from a decree entered by the superior court. See Purcell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 56 R.I. 93, 183 A. 884. It is difficult, if not impossible, for us to carry out our duties under the statute and make such a final dis......
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