Purdy v. Public Adm'r of Westchester County

• Decision Date: 31 May 1988
• Citation: 530 N.Y.S.2d 513,72 N.Y.2d 1,526 N.E.2d 4
• Parties: , 526 N.E.2d 4 George W. PURDY, Appellant-Respondent, v. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, as Administrator of the Estate of Emily Shaw, Deceased, Respondent, et al., Defendant, and Bethel Methodist Home, Respondent. George W. PURDY, Appellant-Respondent, v. Elio ARGENZIANO, Respondent. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, as Administrator of the Estate of Emily Shaw, Deceased, Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant, v. Elio ARGENZIANO, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 513

530 N.Y.S.2d 513

72 N.Y.2d 1, 526 N.E.2d 4

George W. PURDY, Appellant-Respondent, v. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, as

Administrator of the Estate of Emily Shaw,

Deceased, Respondent, et al., Defendant,

and Bethel Methodist Home, Respondent.

George W. PURDY, Appellant-Respondent, v. Elio ARGENZIANO, Respondent.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, as Administrator of the Estate of Emily Shaw, Deceased, Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant, v. Elio ARGENZIANO, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 31, 1988.

Raymond J. Keegan, White Plains, and Norman Bard, Garden City, for George W. Purdy, appellant-respondent

Carol Ann Weinman, Roger P. McTiernan and Michael Close, New York City, for Public Adm'r of Westchester County, respondent and third-party plaintiff-respondent-appellant.

Kevin M. Loftus and Carolyn A. Chieco, White Plains, for Bethel Methodist Home, respondent.

Timothy P. Coon, White Plains, for Elio Argenziano, respondent and third- defendant-respondent.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Michael S. Buskus, O. Peter Sherwood and Peter H. Schiff, Albany, of counsel), for the State of N.Y., amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALEXANDER, Judge.

In November 1979, plaintiff, while a customer at a gas station in Brewster, New York, was struck by a speeding car that crashed into the gas station and seriously injured him. The car was owned and operated by Emily Shaw, ¹ who on the date of the accident, was a 73-year-old voluntary resident of the defendant Bethel Methodist Home with a medical condition that left her susceptible to fainting spells and blackouts. The issue presented on this appeal is whether defendants Bethel and the facility's admitting physician, Dr. Argenziano, owed to plaintiff--an unidentified member of the public--a duty either to prevent Shaw from driving or to warn her of the dangers of driving given her medical condition. We hold that in the circumstances presented, defendants were under no duty to prevent Shaw from operating a motor vehicle off the premises, or to warn her of any danger of her so doing.

I.

Defendant, Bethel Methodist Home (Bethel), operates as a health-related facility, required by statute to provide its residents with "lodging, board and physical care including, but not limited to, the recording of health information, dietary supervision and supervised hygienic services" (Public Health Law § 2801 10 NYCRR 414.1); health-related facilities afford to residents some degree of institutional care and services, but not the degree required of a hospital or a skilled nursing facility (see, Public Health Law § 2801 10 NYCRR 414.1). Shortly before her admission to Bethel on October 10, 1979, Shaw had been hospitalized for a stroke which left her susceptible to fainting spells and blackouts: indeed, it is not now disputed that the accident was a consequence of her having blacked out at the wheel of her automobile. Pursuant to her contract with Bethel, Shaw became a voluntary resident of the facility and consented to routine medical treatment and inoculations and restraints as ordered by the facility's physician. She further agreed to allow Bethel "to act in any emergency, in any way it deems necessary for the benefit of the resident", but insofar as she was a voluntary resident, she did not relinquish general autonomy.

Upon admission to Bethel, Shaw was examined by defendant, Dr. Elio Argenziano, Bethel's medical director and the physician responsible for overseeing the health care of all the residents. Pursuant to regulations, Dr. Argenziano took Shaw's medical history and conducted the admission examination (see, 10 NYCRR 741.1). Dr. Argenziano thereafter issued an order authorizing Shaw to leave Bethel unaccompanied. He did not question her as to whether she owned a car, whether she knew how to drive, or whether she intended to drive while a resident at Bethel.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injury against Shaw, Bethel and Dr. Argenziano. The crux of plaintiff's claim against defendants Bethel and Dr. Argenziano is that both were negligent in failing to prohibit Shaw from operating a motor vehicle when they knew or had reason to know that Shaw might, because of her medical condition, black out at the wheel. Plaintiff also claimed that defendants, and particularly Dr. Argenziano as Shaw's attending physician, were negligent in failing to warn her of the danger of her driving in her condition. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and apportioned liability in the amount of 10% to the estate of Shaw, 30% to Bethel and 60% to Dr. Argenziano. With respect to defendants Bethel and Dr. Argenziano, the Trial Judge set aside the verdict and directed judgment in their favor, concluding that plaintiff had failed to establish that the breach of any duty owed was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained. The Appellate Division affirmed, 127 A.D.2d 285, 514 N.Y.S.2d 407, holding that neither defendant owed a duty to plaintiff--a member of the public--either to prevent a resident from, or to warn her against, operating a motor vehicle off the facility's premises. The appeal is here by leave of this court, and we now affirm.

II.

The question of whether a member or group of society owes a duty of care to reasonably avoid injury to another is of course a question of law for the courts (Eisemen v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 187, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128; De Angelis v. Lutheran Med. Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 1055, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626, 449 N.E.2d 406). In the ordinary circumstance, common law in the State of New York does not impose a duty to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from causing injury to others; liability for the negligent acts of third persons generally arises when the defendant has authority to control the actions of such third persons ( D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 88-89, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 896; see, Eiseman v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 191, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128, supra; Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 783, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 358 N.E.2d 1019; see generally, Restatement of Torts §§ 314, 315). This is so, we have said, even where "as a practical matter" defendant could have exercised such control ( D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 88, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 896, supra; Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 784, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 358 N.E.2d 1019, supra ).

Of course, there exist special circumstances in which there is sufficient authority and ability to control the conduct of third persons that we have identified a duty to do so. Thus, we have imposed a duty to control the conduct of others where there is a special relationship: a relationship between defendant and a third person whose actions...