Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission

• Decision Date: 15 September 1936
• Docket Number: 27056.
• Citation: 66 P.2d 1097,179 Okla. 479,1936 OK 516
• Parties: PURE OIL CO. v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

66 P.2d 1097

179 Okla. 479, 1936 OK 516

PURE OIL CO. v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION et al.

No. 27056.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

September 15, 1936

Rehearing Denied March 23, 1937.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The definition of "inter city" contained in article 12 c. 20, Sess.Laws 1935 (47 Okl.St.Ann. § 161), describing transportation from one incorporated city or town to or through another incorporated city or town, or through two thereof, regardless of the point of origin or destination and provision that the act applies to such traffic only, are neither discriminatory nor arbitrary in classification as against private carriers transporting their own property for profit in an industrial pursuit, and do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

2. Exemption of trucks used in transportation of farm products and logs and rough lumber from taxation for using public highways is not arbitrary discrimination against industrial pursuits using highways and subject to tax, or in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

3. The real purpose of article 12, c. 20, Sess.Laws 1935 (47 Okl.St.Ann. § 161), being to regulate the use of public highways, provision therein requiring payment of tax or license fee for use of highway in furtherance of industrial pursuits is only incidental to real purpose, and the act is not a revenue raising measure such as to render it void under section 33, art. 5, of the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma, prohibiting revenue bills from being passed during the last five days of the legislative session.

4. Title of act, stating that act defined and classified motor carriers, held sufficient to include definition of "inter city" and "commercial purposes" within body of act, subjecting such traffic in industrial pursuits to license tax.

Original action for a writ of prohibition by the Pure Oil Company against the Oklahoma Tax Commission.

Writ denied.

BAYLESS V. C.J., WELCH and GIBSON, JJ., dissenting.

Alvin Richards, of Tulsa, for petitioner.

C. D Cund, C. W. King, and Wendell Barnes, all of Oklahoma City, for respondents.

PHELPS Justice.

This is an original action by the Pure Oil Company, as petitioner, against the Oklahoma Tax Commission, as respondent, seeking a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Oklahoma Tax Commission from collecting motor vehicle taxes from petitioner upon certain motortrucks owned and operated by it upon the highways of the state, which trucks are being designated by respondent as class "C" motor carriers under the provisions of article 12, c. 20, p. 27, Session Laws 1935 (47 Okl.St.Ann. § 161).

The facts are the same as in Pure Oil Company v. Cornish et al., 174 Okl. 615, 52 P.2d 832. However, that case involved the question of whether petitioner was engaged in a private "commercial" enterprise within the meaning of chapter 156, § 1, Session Laws 1933 (47 Okl.St.Ann. § 161), and it was held that the petitioner was not so engaged and was not liable for the tax. That case was founded upon the 1933 law, which was amended by the 1935 Legislature so as to include industrial pursuits within the meaning of "commercial enterprises." This amendment, including industrial pursuits, is the reason by which the Oklahoma Tax Commission has been computing the tax, since Pure Oil Company v. Cornish, supra, was limited to the terms of the 1933 act. The pertinent portions of the 1935 act, supra, are as follows (the new portions, which were not contained in the 1933 act, or which were changed, are italicized):

"An Act amending Section 3700, Oklahoma Statutes, 1931, as amended, by Section 1, Chapter 156, Session Laws of 1933, defining and classifying motor carriers; defining the word 'Market' as used in this Act, and declaring an emergency.

Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oklahoma:

Section 1. Motor Carriers-Definitions. Section 3700, Oklahoma Statutes, 1931, as amended by Section 1, Chapter 156, Session Laws of 1933, is hereby amended to read as follows:

'Section 3700. (a) The term "motor vehicle" when used in this Act shall mean any automobile, truck, truck-tractor, trailer of semi-trailer or any motor bus or any self-propelled vehicle not operated or driven upon fixed rails or tracks.

(b) The term "motor carrier," when used in this Act, means any person, firm, business, trust or corporation, lessee or trustee or receiver, operating any motor vehicle upon any public highway for the transportation of passengers or property for compensation or for commercial purposes, doing an inter city business and not operating exclusively within the limits of an incorporated city or towns within this State, and, for the purposes of this Act, motor carriers shall be divided into three classes as follows:

(1) Class "A" motor carriers shall include all motor carriers operating as common carriers, of persons or property between fixed termini or over a regular route, even though there be periodic or irregular departures from said termini or route; and

(2) Class "B" motor carriers shall include all other motor carriers not operating as Class "A" or "C" motor carriers, whether as private carriers for hire or common carriers for hire, of persons or property; and

(3) Class "C" motor carriers shall include all other persons, firms or corporations, their trustees or receivers, engaged in the transportation of property in furtherance of any private commercial enterprise and not operating as a private carrier for hire or as a common carrier for hire, provided, however, the provisions of this Act shall not apply to transportation of livestock and farm products in the raw state, logs and rough lumber and which raw state shall include cotton, whether in the seed or ginned, cotton seed, hay, whether loose or baled, corn, wheat, oats, and all other articles produced on the farm, from farm to market, nor to trucks hauling road materials, or from market to farm where it is incident to the transportation of said articles from farm to market for his own use, where driven by the owner of said truck or an employee.

The word "Market" as used in this section is hereby declared to mean the point at which such aforesaid livestock and farm products in the raw state, logs and rough lumber were first delivered by the producer of such aforesaid livestock and farm products in the raw state, logs and rough lumber, upon his sale thereof; provided, that the terms of this paragraph shall not apply to motor vehicles operated as class C carriers, the unladen weight of which is 3,500 pounds or less. * * *

(d) The term "inter-city" as used in this Act is defined as describing transportation of either passengers or property, when such transportation is from one incorporated city or town to or through another incorporated city or town or through two or more incorporated cities or towns, regardless of the point of origin or destination.'

(e) The term 'commercial purposes' as used in this Act is defined as describing all undertakings entered into for private gain or compensation, including all industrial pursuits, whether such undertakings involve the handling or dealing in commodities for sale or otherwise."

Petitioner's motortrucks are operated over the highways of the state solely for the purpose of carrying oil field equipment; as a general rule they carry their own property, such as bits, tools, and oil field supplies, from one warehouse or lease to another warehouse or lease owned by them, and in making such trips the trucks usually pass through two or more incorporated cities or towns.

Petitioner's first contention is that the application of the 1935 act or amendment would deny it the equal protection of the law, as guaranteed to it under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In this connection it is urged that the act is unconstitutional because it is discriminatory, arbitrary, indefinite, and impracticable of application.

The point most seriously urged as basis for the claim that the act is arbitrary and discriminatory is that it prescribes a criterion of measurement as to applicability, in the definition of the word "inter-city," which has no reasonable relation to the subject thereof; in other words petitioner cites the familiar rule that classification of persons or businesses as affected must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act...