Puszkarska v. Chicago Transit Authority
Decision Date | 01 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 1-00-1782.,1-00-1782. |
Citation | 748 N.E.2d 755,322 Ill. App.3d 75,255 Ill.Dec. 51 |
Parties | Jozefa PUSZKARSKA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY and Jessica Jordan, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Corey A. Benjamin, Benjamin and Shapiro, Ltd., Chicago, for Appellant.
Duncan G. Harris, General Counsel of the Chicago Transit Authority, Chicago (Thomas J. Bamonte, First Deputy General Counsel, and Cheryl K. Lipton, Senior Attorney, of counsel), for Appellees.
Plaintiff Jozefa Puszkarska filed a complaint alleging she was injured on a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) bus when the driver stopped the bus suddenly, causing her to fall. Defendant CTA filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)), contending that plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998)). The trial court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that she cannot be held to the strict notice requirements of section 41 because the CTA did not provide her with a copy of section 41 when it received written notice of her injury from her attorney. We agree and reverse.
Section 41 reads as follows:
Absent a claimant's strict compliance with the section 41 notice requirements, a cause of action will be dismissed. Bonner v. Chicago Transit Authority, 249 Ill.App.3d 210, 212, 188 Ill.Dec. 301, 618 N.E.2d 871, 872 (1993). "The written notice must contain each of the required elements set forth in the statute and is insufficient if one or more of the essential elements is omitted." Yokley v. Chicago Transit Authority, 307 Ill.App.3d 132, 137, 240 Ill.Dec. 358, 717 N.E.2d 451, 455 (1999), citing Thomas v. Chicago Transit Authority, 29 Ill.App.3d 952, 954, 331 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1975). The legislature added the second paragraph of section 41 in a 1998 amendment. Pub. Act 90-451, eff. July 1, 1998 (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1994)) .
In this case, the alleged injury occurred on June 18, 1999. On October 6, 1999, the CTA received plaintiffs written notice that she would bring an action for damages. In numbered paragraphs, the notice listed each element required by section 41. Paragraph 3 listed: "The date and hour of the accident," but only provided the date, not the hour. The notice was signed by plaintiffs attorney and stated: "This notice [is] filed in accordance with the Provisions of Section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act."
On its face, the notice shows plaintiffs familiarity with the notice requirements set out in the first paragraph of section 41. It was filed within the six-month limitations period. Its only defect is the omission of the hour the accident occurred.
Plaintiff argues that the notice should be considered written notice to the CTA that she was injured, triggering the second paragraph of section 41, which requires the CTA to furnish a copy of section 41 to plaintiff. The second paragraph further provides: "In the event the Authority fails to furnish a copy of Section 41 as provided in this Section, any action commenced against the Authority shall not be dismissed for failure to file a written notice as provided in this Section." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). The CTA responds that, because the notice was filed by plaintiffs attorney and not plaintiff herself, it was not a written notice that triggered the requirement that the CTA send plaintiff a copy of section 41. The CTA further argues that the notice clearly shows that plaintiff, or her attorney, was already aware of section 41's formal notice requirements and did not need a copy of section 41 from the CTA. The trial court, apparently, agreed with the CTA's argument.
We review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619 of the Code. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill.2d 112, 116, 189 Ill.Dec. 31, 619 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1993). Statutory construction is a question of law to be decided by the reviewing court without deference to the judgment of the trial court. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill.2d 1,12, 223 Ill.Dec. 1, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1015 (1996). "The primary rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature." People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin, 154 Ill.2d 193, 197, 180 Ill.Dec. 738, 607 N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (1992). A court should consider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy and the objects and purposes to be obtained. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill.2d 431, 435, 212 Ill.Dec. 664, 657 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (1995). If the statutory language is clear, we need not look further to construe the statute. In re D.L., 191 Ill.2d 1, 9, 245 Ill.Dec. 256, 727 N.E.2d 990, 994 (2000). But if the language is ambiguous, we may look to the legislative history. People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill.2d 36, 40, 196 Ill.Dec. 632, 630 N.E.2d 797, 799 (1994).
We first look to the language of section 41 itself. The second paragraph begins, "Any person who notifies the Authority that he or she was injured or has a cause of action shall be furnished a copy of Section 41 * * *." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). The CTA argues that this means that only the person who was injured may notify it and be furnished with a copy of section 41. The CTA contends that if the legislature had intended to allow agents or attorneys to notify the CTA and receive a copy of section 41 on a claimant's behalf, the legislature would have plainly said so, as it did in the first paragraph of section 41: "either by himself, his agent, or attorney."
We note that the second paragraph of Section 41 also states: "Compliance with this Section shall be liberally construed in favor of the person required to file a written statement." 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998). In Yokley, 307 Ill.App.3d at 139,...
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