Putnam v. Bessom

• Citation: 197 N.E. 147,291 Mass. 217
• Parties: PUTNAM et al. v. BESSOM et al.
• Decision Date: 26 June 1935
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

291 Mass. 217

197 N.E. 147

PUTNAM et al. v. BESSOM et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

June 26, 1935

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Essex County.

Petition by Guy O. Putnam and others for a writ of mandamus to be directed to Philip E. Bessom and others to compel the selectmen of Swampscott to call a special town meeting to submit to all the voters by referendum ballot an article passed at a representative town meeting. On report.

Petition dismissed.

J. W Santry and D. Santry, both of Lynn, for petitioners.

H. D Linscott, of Lynn, for respondents.

RUGG Chief Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the selectmen of Swampscott to call a special town meeting in order to submit to all the voters by referendum ballot an article passed at a representative town meeting. The town of Swampscott has adopted St. 1927, c. 300, a special act authorizing representative town meetings, town meeting members, a referendum, and other matters. By section 8 provision is made for submitting to the registered voters of the town at large ‘ the question or questions so involved’ in a vote passed at a representative town meeting. One condition precedent for such submission is that ‘ a petition, signed by not less than two hundred registered voters of the town, containing their names and addresses as they appear on the list of registered voters,’ be filed with the selectmen within a specified time, asking that the question or questions so involved be submitted. A petition of that nature was filed with the selectmen within the time limited touching a vote passed at a representative town meeting. The issue to be decided is whether that petition was signed as required by the quoted words of section 8.

The case was referred to an auditor. It was heard upon the report of the auditor and a supplementary agreed statement of facts without other evidence. The relevant facts are these: The petition was signed with two hundred forty-six names. Of these, twenty-seven were not the names of registered voters, eight were not names of registered voters at the time of filing the petition although they subsequently became registered voters, and six names were signed not by the voters but by other persons without there being any disability on the part of such voters to prevent them from signing. Manifestly these forty-one could not rightly be considered as signers of the petition. Of the remaining two hundred five names, fourteen were not signed with addresses and fifty-four were not signed with the names as they appeared on the list of registered voters, the same person being included in five instances in both groups. Therefore, of the two hundred five names, sixty-three are in question because, as to these names and addresses on the petition, there are no identical corresponding names and addresses on the list of registered voters. As illustrative of these variations, there are five addresses on different streets and nine addresses of different numbers on the same street when compared with the addresses as they appear on the list of registered voters. The variations in names comprise numerous differences in, or omission of, the middle initial, differences in the spelling of the surname, differences in the spelling of the Christian name, in the omission of ‘ Junior’ and in the use of the initial instead of the first or middle given name, and in the use of the full first name or the full middle name instead of the initial. Subject to the exception of the respondents, the single justice drew the inference from the auditor's report that these signers whose names or addresses vary from those shown on the list of registered voters were in fact the registered voters designated in the auditor's report opposite the names of the signers respectively. The single justice reported the case for our determination, stating that so far as the matter rested in discretion he should not decide adversely to the petitioners.

The name of a person is the distinctive characterization in words by which he is known and distinguished from others. Description or abbreviation is not the equivalent of a name. Conners v. Lowell, 209 Mass. 111, 118, 95 N.E. 412, Ann.Cas. 1912B, 627; W. B. Manufacturing Co. v. Rubenstein, 236 Mass. 215, 219, 128 N.E. 21, 11 A.L.R. 1283; O'Brien v. Board of Election Commissioners, 257 Mass. 332, 340, 153 N.E. 553; Commonwealth v. Gedzium, 259 Mass. 453, 461, 156 N.E. 890. The middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person. Commonwealth v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598, 600, 169 N.E. 542, 68 A.L.R. 920; Anderson v. Qualey, 216 Mass. 106, 109, 103 N.E. 90; Terry v. Sisson, 125 Mass. 560, 561. See Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 147 U.S. 47, 58, 13 S.Ct. 217, 37 L.Ed. 72. It has been said that the term ‘ Junior’ is no part of the name of a person. Simpson v. Dix, 131 Mass. 179, 184; Commonwealth v. Parmenter, 101 Mass. 211, 213. However, it is used to describe and designate a person. Cobb v. Lucas, 15 Pick. 7; Boyden v. Hastings, 17 Pick, 200; Kincaid v. Howe, 10 Mass. 203. Where so used on the list of registered voters, the signature on a petition like the present must correspond.

The words of the governing statute already quoted are clear and unmistakable to the effect that...