Putter v. Montpelier Public School System

• Decision Date: 06 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-419,96-419
• Citation: 697 A.2d 354,166 Vt. 463
• Parties: , 120 Ed. Law Rep. 203 David PUTTER v. MONTPELIER PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 354

697 A.2d 354

166 Vt. 463, 120 Ed. Law Rep. 203

David PUTTER v. MONTPELIER PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al.

No. 96-419.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

June 6, 1997.

Joshua R. Diamond, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

Douglas D. LeBrun of Dinse, Erdmann, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for defendants-appellees

Before AMESTOY, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY and MORSE, JJ.

MORSE, Justice.

Plaintiff David Putter appeals from a judgment of the Washington Superior Court dismissing as untimely his action to invalidate a municipal election, but allowing him to proceed with his claim for other forms of relief. We conclude that the judgment was correct, although for reasons different from those stated by the trial court, and affirm.

I.

On March 5, 1996, voters in the City of Montpelier approved the annual operating budget proposed by the Board of School Commissioners, as well as a multi-million-dollar bond proposal for the construction of various school improvements. Four weeks after the election, plaintiff filed this action against the Montpelier Public School System, claiming that the election had been tainted by the Board's funding, publication and distribution, shortly before the election, of a newsletter entitled "Class Acts." The newsletter's lead article focused on the reasons underlying the proposed 2.4% operating budget increase and school bond proposal. It stated that "[s]tudent learning will remain the focus for our schools for the immediate future if our operating budget and facility bond proposals are supported," and warned that without the increased funding some reduction in programs, services and educational opportunities would occur.

The twelve-page newsletter contained two other articles relating to the upcoming election. One addressed the proposed budget in a question-and-answer format, explaining that approval was necessary to avoid further cuts in services and programs and to maintain the current student-to-teacher ratio; the article also contained graphs and charts illustrating the respective local, state and federal shares of the budget. Another story addressed the bond proposal, describing the current shortcomings in existing school facilities and detailing how and where the bond monies would be spent. Each of the foregoing articles contained a subcaption and a cartoon urging readers to "Vote Yes" on the ballot proposals. In addition to the materials referenced in the complaint, plaintiff claims to have subsequently discovered that defendant also distributed leaflets and promotional stickers advocating passage of the school bond.

Plaintiff alleged that by expending public funds and resources in a "partisan" fashion, defendant had "improperly influenced the election on Article 13" (the bond proposal). In five separate counts, he claimed that defendant had thereby: (1) exceeded its lawful authority; (2) conferred a government "emolument" upon the private citizens who created the articles in violation of Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution; (3) violated the guarantee of a republican form of government set forth in Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, and contravened Chapter I, Articles 6 and 8 of the Vermont Constitution, which provide, respectively, that all officers of government are the "trustees and servants" of the people and that "all elections ought to be free and without corruption"; (4) engaged in "viewpoint discrimination" in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and its equivalent in the Vermont Constitution; and (5) compelled plaintiff to endorse a political position he opposed, contrary to the free speech clauses of the United States and Vermont Constitutions.

The allegations of federal constitutional law were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which confers a private federal right of action for damages and injunctive relief against state actors who deprive any citizen of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." In these, as in the other counts, plaintiff sought a variety of remedies, including a declaration that the election approving the bond proposal was invalid; an order enjoining defendant from utilizing public resources to advocate a partisan position; reimbursement for all funds illegally expended; and damages and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that the suit was untimely under 17 V.S.A. § 2603. Under that section, "[t]he result of an election for any office, other than for the general assembly, or public question may be contested by any legal voter entitled to vote on the office or public question to be contested." Id. § 2603(a). A contest is initiated by filing a complaint in superior court alleging that errors were committed in the conduct of the election, that there was fraud in the electoral process, or "that for any other reason" the election was invalid. Id. § 2603(b). The complaint must be filed within fifteen days after the election, or, if there is a recount, within ten days after a court issues its judgment on the recount. Id. § 2603(c).

Plaintiff opposed the motion claiming that suit under § 1983 is governed by the local statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, which in Vermont is three years. See 12 V.S.A. § 512(4). The trial court selected the limitations period most analogous to the specific forms of relief sought, applying the fifteen-day period to plaintiff's effort to invalidate the election, and the three-year period to the extent that plaintiff was seeking relief for other injuries. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed as untimely the challenge to the election result, but otherwise allowed the action to proceed. Finally, finding no reason for delay, the trial court ordered entry of final judgment with respect to the order dismissing the challenge to the election result. See V.R.C.P. 54(b).

II.

Whether the trial court properly applied the fifteen-day limitations period of 17 V.S.A. § 2603(c) to the federal claims presents an interesting question, but not one that the Court must decide in this matter. The United States Supreme Court has held, to be sure, that a single state statute of limitations applies to "all § 1983 claims," and that the most appropriate limitations period is that applicable to personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1946, 1949, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The high court has reaffirmed this rule on several occasions. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 143, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2309, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988) (holding that application of 120-day notice-of-claim rule to § 1983 actions was "incompatible with the compensatory goals of the federal legislation"); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 54-55, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2932, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) (application of six-month limitations period for employment discrimination claims was inadequate to accommodate complexities of federal civil rights actions).

The Supreme Court has not considered, however, whether a state may, for good and sufficient reasons, apply a shorter limitations period to one particular equitable remedy available under § 1983, such as election invalidation, as opposed to the § 1983 claim in its entirety. Strong arguments could be advanced on either side of the question. On the one hand, where the constitutional infringement is sufficiently egregious, it could be argued that denial of the new-election remedy is tantamount to a denial of the right itself. On the other hand, the state's interest in finality of elections may be sufficiently compelling to justify a shorter limitations period where other remedies exist to cure the infirmity.

As noted, however, we need not resolve this particular issue. For the judgment, as explained below, may be affirmed on a separate ground.

III.

Even assuming that plaintiff's § 1983 suit was timely, the fundamental question remains whether plaintiff has stated a claim for which the extraordinary equitable remedy of election invalidation can be granted. Although not raised below, the issue was briefed by the parties on appeal, and is dispositive of the matter.

Invalidation of an election requires more than merely a claim of election irregularity, even one of constitutional dimensions. As one author has explained, "The fact that the invalidation power is rooted in equity is the key to the usefulness of this remedy, for it means that the determination of illegality in the electoral process does not automatically invoke the new-election remedy. The ... judge sitting ... in equity may detect malfeasance, perhaps of an egregious nature, but nonetheless stay his hand in providing full relief." K. Starr, Federal Judicial Invalidation as a Remedy for Irregularities in State Elections, 49 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1092, 1099 (1974) (footnote omitted); see also Gjersten v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 791 F.2d 472, 478 (7th Cir.1986) (court need not exercise equitable power of invalidation in response to all unconstitutional election practices).

Voiding an election and ordering a new one represents one of the more extreme remedial measures available to a court sitting in equity. Nothing is so profoundly destabilizing to the local political process; budgets or projects debated during the campaign and approved by the electorate must invariably be delayed or postponed, and lame-duck incumbents may be unable as a practical matter to conduct the public business for which they were elected. See Gjersten, 791 F.2d at 479; McGill v. Ryals, 253 F.Supp. 374, 376 (M.D.Ala.), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 19, 87 S.Ct. 212, 17 L.Ed.2d 17 (1966); Starr, supra, at 1105-06, 1128.

As a result, courts reviewing election challenges under federal law have established a high threshold for what one court has described as the "[d]rastic, if not staggering" equitable remedy of election invalidation. Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.1967...