Pybas v. Paolino

• Decision Date: 21 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 14858-7-II,14858-7-II
• Citation: 73 Wn.App. 393,869 P.2d 427
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Deborah P. PYBAS, Edmund Hill, and Royal Insurance Company, Ltd., a foreign corporation, Respondents, v. Joseph PAOLINO, Appellant.

Page 393

73 Wn.App. 393

869 P.2d 427

Deborah P. PYBAS, Edmund Hill, and Royal Insurance Company Ltd., a foreign corporation, Respondents, v. Joseph PAOLINO, Appellant.

No. 14858-7-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 2.

March 21, 1994.

Jan Elizabeth Brucker, Attorney At Law, Civil Div., Tort Section, Seattle, for respondents.

Charles Joseph Sinnitt Sinnitt & Sinnitt Inc. PS, Timothy R. Gosselin, Burgess, Fitzer, Leighton & Phillips PS, Tacoma, for appellant.

JOHN A PETRICH, Judge, Pro Tem. ¹

Joseph Paolino appeals an order vacating a judgment entered on a mandatory arbitration award. The vacation order had the effect of extending the time period during which Edmund Hill, a co-plaintiff, could obtain a trial de novo.

The question presented is whether a superior court judge, lacking the authority to extend the time for requesting a trial de novo to supersede an arbitration award, abuses his discretion by allowing entry of judgment on the award and, thereafter, vacating it, pursuant to CR 60(b), on the basis of excusable neglect. We hold that the superior court's authority to vacate such a judgment is limited to those cases that involve such extraordinary circumstances that a vacation is necessary in order to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice. Applying this standard to the case before us, we conclude that the superior court abused its discretion and we reverse its decision.

On May 13, 1987, Paolino, Hill, and Deborah Pybas collided while driving southbound on Interstate 5 through Pierce County. Pybas and Hill sued Paolino, claiming his negligence caused the accident. The case went before an arbitrator pursuant to RCW 7.06 and the superior court Mandatory Arbitration Rules (MAR). On May 21, 1990, the arbitrator's award in favor of Pybas and Hill was filed with the clerk of the Pierce County Superior Court together with proof of service on the parties.

Hill was dissatisfied with the amount of the award and chose to file a request for a trial de novo. The deadline for filing this request was 20 days after the date of the filing of the arbitration award; Monday, June 11, 1990. On Friday, June 8, 1990, Hill's attorney asked a staff member of her office to have a private messenger service serve the request for trial de novo on opposing counsel and file the request together with proof of service with the Clerk of the Superior Court. The messenger service picked up the request that same day, advised the staff member of the attorney's office that special handling instructions were not necessary, and assured the staff member that the request would be served and filed before the deadline.

Although the request was served on opposing counsel within the deadline, the request for a trial de novo was not timely filed with the Superior Court Clerk. On June 12, Hill's attorney learned that the legal messenger service had not filed the request. On June 13, 2 days after the filing deadline, the messenger service filed the request with proof of service with the Superior Court Clerk.

On December 14, 1990, the Superior Court, on Hill's motion to extend the time for making the request, ruled that it had no such authority. ² Nevertheless, the court determined that it could vacate the judgment under CR 60(b)(1) if it found the judgment had been entered because of Hill's excusable neglect. ³ On March 20, 1991, the court entered the judgment, which it vacated on March 29, 1991, on the basis of Hill's excusable neglect. It also allowed the case to "proceed with a trial de novo."

Paolino appeals to this court, contending the Superior Court erred in finding excusable neglect under the facts of this case. Thus, we must determine when a superior court can use CR 60(b) to circumvent the deadline for filing a request for a trial de novo of a mandatory arbitration proceeding.

The Legislature empowered counties to authorize mandatory arbitration for certain civil actions. RCW 7.06. The purpose of the legislation was to alleviate court congestion and to reduce the delay in hearing civil cases. Christie-Lambert Van Storage Co. Inc. v. McLeod, 39 Wash.App. 298, 302, 693 P.2d 161 (1984); 4 A. Orland and Tegland, Washington Practice, § 5871, at 19 (1990). The legislation authorized the Washington Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure for arbitration cases. RCW 7.06.030.

The Legislature provided a method of appealing from an arbitration award and, if no appeal was taken, a method for reducing the arbitration award to judgment:

Following a hearing as prescribed by court rule, the arbitrator shall file his decision and award with the clerk of the superior court, together with proof of service thereof on the parties. Within twenty days after such filing, any aggrieved party may file with the clerk a written notice of appeal and request for a trial de novo in the superior court on all issues of law and fact. Such trial de novo shall thereupon be held, including a right to jury, if demanded.

If no appeal has been filed at the expiration of twenty days following filing of the arbitrator's decision and award, a judgment shall be entered and may be presented to the court by any party, on notice, which judgment when entered shall have the same force and effect as judgments in civil actions.

RCW 7.06.050.

Two of the rules the Supreme Court promulgated are relevant here: MAR 7.1 and 6.3. MAR 7.1 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Service and Filing. Within 20 days after the arbitration award is filed with the clerk, any aggrieved party not having waived the right to appeal may serve and file with the clerk a written request for a trial de novo in the superior court along with proof that a copy has been served upon all other parties appearing in the case. The 20-day period within which to request a trial de novo may not be extended....

(b) Calendar. When a trial de novo is requested as provided in section (a), the case shall be transferred from the arbitration calendar ... in a manner established by local rule.

MAR 6.3 provides:

If within 20 days after the award is filed no party has sought a trial de novo under rule 7.1, the prevailing party on notice as required by CR 54(f) shall present to the court a judgment on the award of arbitration for entry as the final judgment. A judgment so entered is subject to all provisions of law relating to judgments in civil actions, but it is not subject to appellate review and it may not be attacked or set aside except by a motion to vacate under CR 60.

It is this latter rule the Superior Court viewed as giving it authority to vacate the judgment under CR 60(b). Paolino argues that the 20-day time limit to request a trial de novo under MAR 7.1 is mandatory and jurisdictional and may not be extended. He argues that a CR 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment is not a substitute for a timely request; that in light of the policy of achieving finality in legal disputes, relief from a judgment by a CR 60(b) motion should apply only when extraordinary circumstances exist as demonstrated by the limited application of the rule to cases involving an untimely notice of appeal; and that no such extraordinary circumstances exist here.

Hill disputes Paolino's jurisdictional thesis, pointing out that Hill's cited authorities involve attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of an appellate court by an untimely notice of appeal, a question not at issue here as the Superior Court had jurisdiction of the controversy and the parties. Further, he argues that the applicable rules and statutes should be interpreted so as to allow consideration of the substantive issues raised; that CR 60(b) should be liberally applied here as it is in cases concerning vacation of default judgments; that his reliance on the private messenger service's representations was excusable neglect; that Paolino suffered no prejudice; and that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the judgment and ordering a trial de novo.

The limits on a superior court's authority to vacate a judgment, entered on an arbitration award from a mandatory arbitration proceeding, have not been defined and present an issue of first impression. We note first that the current state of the law is to interpret rules and statutes to reach the substance of matters so that substance prevails over form. Weeks v. Chief of State Patrol, 96 Wash.2d 893, 896, 639 P.2d 732 (1982) (court of appeals properly extended the time for filing a notice of appeal in order to serve the ends of justice and addressed the merits of the controversy, even though the timely notice of appeal was filed with the court of appeals rather than the superior court). We also note, however, that the relevant statutes and rules here contain explicit constraints on the procedures for reviewing an arbitration award.

For example, the review of an arbitrator's award is carefully circumscribed. The rules specifically prohibit an extension of the 20-day time period for requesting a trial de novo. MAR 7.1(a). Furthermore, a judgment on the award is not subject to appellate review, nor subject to attack or vacation except by a motion to vacate under CR 60. MAR 6.3. The objectives behind these rules are clearly apparent: promoting the finality of disputes; alleviating court congestion, and reducing the delay in having civil cases heard.

While the rules provide limited relief from a judgment on an arbitration award, CR 60 cannot be used merely to circumvent the time constraints of other rules. Edwards v. Velvac Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504, 507 (E.D.Wis.1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 942, 77 S.Ct. 1397, 1 L.Ed.2d 1537 (1957); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice § 2858, at 169 (1973). See also M L Park Place Corp. v. Hedreen, 71 Wash.App. 727, 743, 862 P.2d 602 (1993) ("CR 60 motion to set aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award can only be brought on the grounds of a defect inherent in the judgment itself or in the means (i.e., 'the court proceedings') by which it was obtained.")...