Pyle et all v. Henderson et al
| Decision Date | 23 February 1904 |
| Citation | 55 W.Va. 122 |
| Parties | Pyle et all v. Henderson et al |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Parties Beneficiaries necessary to bill in equity.
Where a trustee brings a suit in equity for the benefit of those he represents, the latter ordinarily are necessary parties to such suit. (p. 123).
2. Parties Co-tenants.
In a controversy between two sets of lessees under two several leases, co-tenants interested under either one or both such leases should be made parties to a bill in equity filed to settle such controversy, (p. 124).
3. Parties Lessor.
The lessor or landlord is a necessary party to a bill in chancery filed by subsequent lessees to enforce the forfeiture of, set aside and annul a prior lease covering the same subject matter, (p. 125).
Appeal from Circuit Court, Tyler County. Bill by C. E. Pyle and others against J. W. Henderson and others. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.
Reversed.
V. B. Archer, Wm. Beard, and F. D. Young, for appellants.
T. P. Jacobs, W. N. Miller, and 0. W. 0. Hardman, for appellees.
C. E. Pyle and others filed their bill and their supplemental and amended bill in chancery in the circuit court of Tyler County against J. W. Henderson and others for the purpose of having declared forfeited and cancelled as a cloud on their title a certain lease made by Thomas Bunfill and wife on the 3rd day of February, 1897, to A. B. Campbell and J. W. Swann and for the purpose of enjoining the defendants from interfering with plaintiffs in the enjoyment of the property included in the lease.
On a hearing of the cause on bills, demurrer thereto for want of equity and proper parties, answers, general and special replications, depositions and exhibits, the plaintiffs were decreed the full relief prayed for by them and the defendants'' lease was declared forfeited and cancelled. From this decree defendants appeal. The first question presented by the demurrer is the want of proper parties. The first objection under this head is that one of the plaintiffs sues as W. S. Miller, trustee, without naming the beneficiaries of the trust for which he is acting. If such Miller is acting in the capacity of trustee for others and not in his individual capacity, such others are necessary parties that they may be bound by the decree entered, and that the defendants, if successful, may not again be compelled to relitigate the same matters with the beneficiaries in such trust, who not being parties to the suit would not be bound by such decree.
The second objection is that the Singledecker heirs, who are entitled to the one-eighth of the one-ninth interest in the gas and oil under the plaintiffs' lease, but have no arrangement with the defendants, have such interest in the result of this litigation that they should be made parties. They certainly should be parties to this controversy, for their rights may be materially affected by the success of the defendants.
It is next objected that Thomas Bunfill, the lessor who executed the two leases in controversy, was not made either party plaintiff or defendant. He is certainly an indispensable party to this litigation, for his rights may be greatly affected thereby. He is interested in the rents and royalties under both leases if nothing more, while the facts disclosed by the pleadings and depositions bring forward prominently several questions of law for consideration in the proper decision of which his interests are greatly involved. These facts show that his lease to the defendants covered the whole of the tract of land but afterwards it was discovered that he only owned the seven-ninths undivided interest. That the lessees insisted that he should obtain for them under the implied covenants of his lease the other twoninths undivided interests and set about to help him to do so. After sometime one-ninth was acquired of John Bunfill which left the other one-ninth outstanding in the Singledecker minor children. Claiming that he had not sufficient means the lessor refused, to secure this, and the lessees set about to do so to make their lease good, as they could not enjoy it under the decision of Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, until they could do so. While they were engaged in this laudible undertaking for the benefit of the lessor, as well as for themselves, as it was to make good the implied covenants of his lease, Knolls v. McGregor, 47 W. Va. 566, (35 S. E. 899), the three months expired in which they were...
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