Pyles v. Gaetz
| Decision Date | 09 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:11-cv-378-MJR |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER PYLES, # R-43795, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN GAETZ, DR. FAHIM, and WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Christopher Pyles, an inmate in Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on incidents that occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Menard. Plaintiff is serving a life sentence for murder. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Plaintiff's amended complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this action are subject to summary dismissal.
The facts below are taken from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. 13). Plaintiff, on June 21, 2009, sent a grievance to Defendant Gaetz describing a dangerous staircase, stating that a certain flight of stairs are "wet/slick . . . during the duration 'shower lines' are ran." Furthermore, Menard had an "unwritten policy/practicerequiring inmates to only wear 'shower shoes'" while walking to and from the showers. On July 25, 2009, Plaintiff slipped while walking down this flight of stairs, sustaining injuries to his neck and spine. Officers transported Plaintiff to Chester Memorial Hospital (Chester), and from there airlifted him to St. Louis University Hospital where he remained until July 30, 2009. Chester performed a CAT scan and an M.R.I. upon Plaintiff.
On July 30, 2009, Chester released Plaintiff to Menard, where Defendant Fahim (Medical Director at Menard) treated his injuries. Defendant Fahim "[c]ontinually refused to allow the plaintiff to see a specialist or receive an M.R.I.," motivated by his desire to reduce costs. Plaintiff states that the injuries he sustained on July 25, 2009, have caused him severe and worsening pain within his lower spine, for over two years, and that Defendant Fahim's prescription of pain medication did not alleviate these symptoms. Defendant Fahim's treatment of Plaintiff is a result of Defendant Wexford's "written policy to save money". Defendant Fahim denies Plaintiff certain treatments because his employer, Defendant Wexford, provides monetary incentives to Defendant Fahim in exchange for cost savings.
Plaintiff requests an injunction to receive an M.R.I. and back exam by specialists. Further, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages totaling $1.5 million. Finally, Plaintiff requests a trial by jury and an injunction transferring Plaintiff to Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois.
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro se action into four (4) counts. The parties and the Court will use thesedesignations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gaetz was deliberately indifferent to a hazardous condition at Menard that led to Plaintiff's injuries. The Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been a means of improving prison conditions that were constitutionally unacceptable. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994). As the Supreme Court noted in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981), the amendment reaches beyond barbarous physical punishment to prohibit the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Id., (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). The Constitution also prohibits punishment that is totally without penological justification. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
Not all prison conditions trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny - only deprivations of basic human needs like food, medical care, sanitation, and physical safety. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346; See also James v. Milwaukee Cnty., 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992). In order to prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy the objective and subjective components applicable to all Eighth Amendment claims. McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The objective componentfocuses on the nature of the acts or practices alleged to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). The objective analysis examines whether the conditions of confinement exceeded contemporary bounds of decency of a mature civilized society. Id. The condition must result in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs or deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); accord Jamison-Bey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir 1987).
In addition to showing objectively serious conditions, a plaintiff must also demonstrate the subjective component to an Eighth Amendment claim. The subjective component of unconstitutional punishment is the intent with which the acts or practices constituting the alleged punishment are inflicted. Jackson, 955 F.2d at 22. The subjective component requires that a prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994). In conditions of confinement cases, the relevant state of mind is deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he also must draw the inference. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); DelRaine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1994). The deliberate indifference standard is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that the prison official acted or failed to act despite the official's knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. A failure ofprison officials to act in such circumstances suggests that the officials actually want the prisoner to suffer the harm. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to state a claim that Defendant Gaetz was deliberately indifferent to the "unwritten policy/practice" that made a particular flight of stairs unsafe. While prisons have an obligation to keep their residents physically safe, "conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). As such, a prison's failure to maintain dry stairwells at all times cannot be considered cruel and unusual in light of contemporary standards. Specifically, there is nothing cruel or unusual about walking on wet stairs after taking a shower.
Furthermore, to state an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendant Gaetz acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Plaintiff's assertions that Defendant Gaetz was deliberately indifferent to an unsafe condition are groundless, as the same wet staircase would also be used by guards and other officials, and thus, not a condition unique to confinement. See Tunstall v. Rowe, 478 F.Supp. 87, 89 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Plaintiff has failed to allege conditions unique to his confinement, conditions that are objectively cruel and unusual, or facts supporting the inference that Defendant Gaetz was deliberately indifferent. Therefore, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Gaetz shall be dismissed with prejudice.
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