Pyles v. Nwaobasi

Decision Date21 July 2016
Docket NumberNo. 14-3289,14-3289
Citation829 F.3d 860
PartiesChristopher Pyles, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Samuel Nwaobasi, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Eimeric Reig–Plessis, Geoffrey P. Eaton, Attorneys, Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, DC, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Timothy Patrick Dugan, Alexander B. Chosid, Attorneys, Sandberg Phoenix & Von Gontard P.C., St. Louis, MO, for DefendantsAppellees.

Before Wood, Chief Judge, and Bauer and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.

Wood

, Chief Judge.

Christopher Pyles, a state prisoner at the Menard Correctional Center, brought a lawsuit alleging that Dr. Samuel Nwaobasi, Dr. Robert Shearing, and their employer, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., provided him constitutionally inadequate medical care. This appeal is about whether he can step up to the plate and take a cut at his case—something he may do only if he properly exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Two grievances are at issue. Pyles does not claim to have completed the grievance procedure for either one. Instead, he argues that his lack of compliance should be excused, in the first case because he had good cause for his actions, and in the second because he never received a response to his grievance. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge found that he had failed properly to exhaust both grievances and recommended summary judgment for the defendants. The district court agreed with that recommendation, but we do not, and so we reverse the district court's judgment in the defendants' favor.

I

According to Pyles's complaint, whose allegations we accept for present purposes, his problems can be traced to July 2009, when he fell down a wet staircase and injured his back while incarcerated at Menard. Since that time he has experienced numbness and radiating pain. On September 24, 2012, Pyles was seen by Dr. Samuel Nwaobasi, an employee of Wexford, the private company that furnishes medical care at Menard. Although Pyles complained that his current treatment regimen was ineffective, Dr. Nwaobasi refused to order additional testing or specialist care. Pyles saw Dr. Nwaobasi again on November 2, 2012. During that appointment, Pyles again questioned the effectiveness of Dr. Nwaobasi's approach. Dr. Nwaobasi told Pyles to “shut the hell up” and again refused to order additional testing or specialist care.

The Illinois Administrative Code sets out a three-stage grievance process that Pyles tried to invoke. He began by filing a grievance on November 13, 2012, with respect to both appointments with Dr. Nwaobasi. A grievance counselor received Pyles's grievance on November 30, 2012, and Pyles received the counselor's response on December 3, 2012. Fearing that the document setting forth his grievance might be lost in the administrative shuffle, Pyles wanted to photocopy his original document before filing it with a grievance officer. According to Pyles's uncontroverted testimony, copies could be made only by the law library, and it did not accept new photocopying orders until December 21, 2012. On that day, Pyles submitted his grievance to the law library for photocopying. By the time he received it back on January 3, 2013, the 60-day window for filing his grievance had passed. Pyles nonetheless submitted the grievance that day. On January 8, 2013, a grievance officer acknowledged receipt of Pyles's grievance against Dr. Nwaobasi. On January 13, 2013, Pyles filed a separate grievance against the library for its delay. Ironically, that grievance was lost in the prison administrative system.

On March 1, 2013, Pyles saw Dr. Robert Shearing, another Wexford employee. He again requested a change in treatment. Dr. Shearing told Pyles that there was [n]o showing of Neurological Deficit in the x-ray,” and that “if medication [didn't] help there [was] nothing [Shearing] could do.” Pyles requested an MRI and an examination by a specialist, but Dr. Shearing refused to approve or seek approval for either step, nor did he prescribe any medication that provided effective relief. Pyles filed a grievance against Dr. Shearing on March 27, 2013. On April 11, 2013, the grievance was timely received by the grievance officer. That grievance was denied on June 12, 2013. This time, Pyles says, the problem was that he never received word that the grievance was denied.

On July 30, 2013, Pyles filed this civil rights action in the Southern District of Illinois, alleging that Dr. Nwaobasi, Dr. Shearing, and Wexford violated his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. As directed by Pavey v. Conley , 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008)

, the magistrate judge conducted a hearing to determine whether Pyles had exhausted the administrative remedies available to him, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

At that hearing, Pyles testified that his grievance against Dr. Nwaobasi was untimely for reasons outside his control, namely, because of the law library's delay in copying and returning it to him. He testified that he actually submitted the grievance the same day it was returned to him: January 3, 2013. The library's delay, he contended, constituted good cause for his failure to file the grievance within the allotted time period, and that it therefore should have been considered under Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810(a)

. Unpersuaded, the magistrate judge found that he had not shown good cause under § 504.810(a).

Pyles also testified that he did not submit his grievance against Dr. Shearing to the Administrative Review Board because, after submitting it to the grievance officer on March 27, 2013, he never received a response. The defendants offered evidence that the grievance was received by the grievance officer on April 11, 2013, and denied on June 5, 2013; the chief administrative officer confirmed the grievance officer's denial on June 12, 2013.

The defendants, however, submitted no direct evidence that anyone sent the response to Pyles or that he received it. They relied instead on the assumption that Pyles's past practice of asking about the status of the grievances when they were not returned to him, and his failure to do so in this case, meant something. Pyles admitted that he had followed up on previous grievances. But this time, he explained, [a]fter three months having received no response, I just assumed that that was it, I wasn't going to receive a response, and filed the lawsuit.” Based only on this, the magistrate judge found it “implausible” that Pyles did not receive a response to his grievance against Dr. Shearing, and therefore held that Pyles had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

II

We review a dismissal for failure to exhaust de novo , construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Pyles. Hernandez v. Dart , 814 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2016)

(collecting cases). Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, it is the defendants' burden to show Pyles's failure to exhaust. See Maddox v. Love , 655 F.3d 709, 720 (7th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing a suit “with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 ... or any other federal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

. The exhaustion requirement is interpreted strictly; thus, a “prisoner must comply with the specific procedures and deadlines established by the prison's policy.” King v. McCarty , 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015). Unexhausted claims are procedurally barred from consideration. See Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006).

The PLRA does not, however, demand the impossible. Remedies that are genuinely unavailable or nonexistent need not be exhausted. A remedy becomes unavailable “if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole v. Chandler , 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006)

. In such cases, the prisoner is considered to have exhausted his administrative remedies. See Turley v. Rednour , 729 F.3d 645, 650 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).

State law determines the administrative remedies that a state prisoner must exhaust for PLRA purposes. King , 781 F.3d at 894

. As we noted, Illinois has created a three-stage process for its inmates. Step one requires the inmate to attempt to resolve the problem through his or her counselor. See Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810(a). If that does not resolve the problem, the inmate must invoke step two, which involves the filing of a written grievance with a grievance officer. Id. This written grievance must be filed within 60 days after discovery of the problem, unless the inmate can “demonstrate that [it] was not timely filed for good cause.” Id. Properly submitted grievances are considered by the grievance officer and the chief administrative officer. Id. § 504.830(d). Where doing so “is reasonably feasible under the circumstances,” the chief administrative officer must advise the grievant of the outcome within two months of having received the grievance. Id. If unsatisfied with the chief administrative officer's decision, the inmate may, within 30 days after the date of decision, appeal to the director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (step three). Id. § 504.850(a). If the director determines that further review is required, the Administrative Review Board evaluates the appeal. Id. § 504.850(b).

Pyles admits that he did not properly complete all three stages of the Illinois administrative procedure for either of the two grievances at issue here (the Nwaobasi grievance and the Shearing grievance—his grievance against the...

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