Pyne v. Knight

• Decision Date: 09 March 1906
• Citation: 130 Iowa 113,106 N.W. 505
• Parties: PYNE v. KNIGHT ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

130 Iowa 113

106 N.W. 505

PYNE

v.KNIGHT ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 9, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Bremer County; Clifford P. Smith, Judge.

Suit in equity for the correction and reformation of a deed upon the ground of mutual mistake. Defendants' answer was practically a general denial. Decree dismissing plaintiff's petition, and she appeals. Reversed.Sager & Sweet, for appellant.

Bibson & Dawson and Mitchell & Mattison, for appellees.

DEEMER, J.

Prior to the execution of the deed which is sought to be reformed, plaintiff, the widow of Wm. H. Mores, deceased, was the owner of various pieces of property in the city of Waverly, including what is known as “Lot 2,” the property which it is claimed was included in the deed which she seeks to have reformed for mutual mistake. Mitchell and Mattison were by plaintiff appointed agents for the sale of her property as well as some other matters. They were, it is claimed, instructed not to sell that part of lot 2 upon which the barn stood, as she desired to retain it as a part of her homestead, which was adjacent thereto. Defendants Knight and Levy were partners in the manufacture of brick, and desiring a new location they opened negotiations with plaintiff's agent looking to the purchase of a new site for their works. These were first conducted with defendant Levy, who went upon the property, and plaintiff's agent pointed out the property which she desired to sell, excluding the barn and the strip of land in controversy. It is claimed that these negotiations were abandoned, and that Knight then took the matter up, and finally bought the property. A deed was executed to Knight and Levy, Knight paying the money therefor; and it is claimed that Knight thereafter sold an interest in the property to Levy taking his check for one-half the purchase price. It is claimed by plaintiff that her agents who conducted the negotiations and who drew the deed did not know that the barn was upon and the strip to be reserved was a part of lot 2; but supposing that it was not a part thereof, they described the property in the deed to defendant as lot 2, which covered the barn and the property in dispute. This action is to correct the deed, so that it will not cover the barn or the strip of ground intended to be reserved. There is some dispute, regarding the authority plaintiff conferred upon her agents, and with reference to most of the material matters in controversy. Defendants contend that the purchase of the property was made by Knight, that Levy abandoned all his negotiations therefor, and that thereafter Knight sold an interest in the property to Levy, who had no knowledge of the claimed mistake in the deed. They also contend that Knight had no knowledge of any reservations; that he purchased the whole of lot 2, and that as to him there was no mistake. They also claim that plaintiff was negligent in signing the deed; that she was fully informed as to its contents, and knew that it covered lot 2 when she signed it. The law of the case is well settled. To justify reformation there must have been a mutual mistake, or mistake on the part of one party coupled with fraud on the part of the other; and the evidence showing this mistake must be clear, satisfactory and free from reasonable doubt. The party asking reformation must also be free from negligence. It is likewise the rule that notice to one purchaser is not notice to others who become tenants in common with him, even though they become such by one and the same purchase. Parker v. Kane, 4 Wis. 17, 65 Am. Dec. 283.

With these rules in mind we now go to the record for the facts. Plaintiff's homestead laid immediately south of her barn, which barn, as we have said, was upon lot 2. East of her homestead is what is known as Court street, and west of it Harmon street, both terminating at the south line of lot 2; that is to say they run no farther north than the south line of lot 2. South of the homestead is an alley. The strip upon which the barn is situated, and which it is claimed was erroneously included in the deed is .90 chains deep north and south and 3.90 chains long on the north line, and 5.69 chains on the south. At the time in question the north line was marked by a fence. This strip did not extend entirely over Harmon street, but did seem to cover the north end of Court street. There was no fence between the homestead and this strip of ground, at the time material to our inquiry, and the barn when occupied at all was used in common with the homestead. Plaintiff says that she directed her agents to sell only that part of lot 2 north of the fence above described; that she did not know the lines of lot 2, but told them to sell only that part of the property lying north of the barn; that when the deed was presented to her for signature she did not know that it included the strip in question--the deed on its face including all of lot 2--and that she did not intend to convey it; that she relied upon her agents making the deed so as to cover only the property she had intended to convey; and that she was informed of the mistake only a few weeks before she brought her suit. The record leaves no doubt in our minds that neither plaintiff nor her agents intended to convey the strip of land in dispute; and that so far as these parties are concerned, the inclusion thereof in the deed was by mistake and oversight. There is also no doubt that had Levy bought the property directly he did not intend to, nor did he think that he was purchasing that part in dispute. He was shown the south line of what was supposed to be lot 2, which did not include the part upon...