Quadrini v. SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT DIVISION, ETC.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. No. B-74-81.
• Citation: 425 F. Supp. 81
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Barbra D. QUADRINI, as Executrix of the Estate of Frank D. Quadrini, Jr., Deceased, et al. v. SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT DIVISION, UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION.

425 F. Supp. 81

Barbra D. QUADRINI, as Executrix of the Estate of Frank D. Quadrini, Jr., Deceased, et al. v. SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT DIVISION, UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION.

Civ. No. B-74-81.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

January 6, 1977.

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Theodore Koskoff, Bridgeport, Conn., Kreindler & Kreindler, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Shaun S. Sullivan, David A. Reif and William H. Prout, Jr., Wiggin & Dana, New Haven, Conn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NEWMAN, District Judge.

The pending motions in this wrongful death action raise a host of challenging questions in the fields of federal jurisdiction, conflict of laws, contracts, and torts. The suit arises out of the death of two Marine Corps majors in the crash of a military helicopter that occurred in a federal enclave in North Carolina. The helicopter was manufactured by the defendant and sold to the United States in Connecticut.

Defendant has moved for partial judgment on the pleadings or partial summary judgment as to plaintiffs' claims based on breach of warranty and strict tort liability. Plaintiffs' claims based on negligence are not presently in issue. Defendant asserts that all of plaintiffs' claims should be adjudicated according to North Carolina substantive law, and that, under such law, the warranty claim fails for lack of privity and the strict liability claim fails because North Carolina does not recognize strict liability.

Jurisdiction is grounded both on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since the claims are alleged to arise under a federal statute governing wrongful deaths within a federal enclave, 16 U.S.C. § 457. The statute provides:

In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act of another within a national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior boundaries of any state, such right of action shall exist as though the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be; and in any action brought to recover on account of injuries sustained in any such place the rights of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries of which it may be.

Determining the applicable substantive law to be applied to each of the claims in this suit is complicated by the fact that jurisdiction is predicated on both diversity of citizenship and federal question. If this were only a diversity case, state law would apply, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), and the conflicts rules of the forum state, Connecticut, would determine which state's substantive law would apply, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). But because the claims also arise under a federal statute, an inquiry must be made to determine what the federal statute says or implies as to what substantial law is applicable: federal law or state law, and, if state law, which state. A federal statute can either (1) supply federal substantive law, (2) manifest a Congressional intention to have federal courts fashion federal common law, (3) direct, as a matter of federal law, the application of state law, or, (4) if it does none of these, leave the federal courts to apply state law directly. Both of the last two options would still require a decision as to whether a federal or state conflicts rule should be used to select the appropriate state law. I assume that whatever substantive law is found to be applicable in the exercise of this Court's federal question jurisdiction should govern the lawsuit, even though a contrary result might be reached if only diversity jurisdiction existed. It seems to be a fair inference from the Supremacy Clause that whatever decision a federal court is impelled to reach in the exercise of its federal question jurisdiction must prevail over contrary results that would be reached if the Court were functioning essentially as a state court in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction.

Analysis of § 457 can confidently begin with an assertion that it at least creates a cause of action that would not exist in the absence of the statute. Even if the federal statute provided no clue as to the content or source of applicable substantive law, a suit under § 457 would arise under federal law sufficiently to have jurisdiction supplied by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124-25 (5th Cir. 1952); see generally Macomber v. Bose, 401 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1968); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1959). The cause of action derives from the federal statute, see American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916); at a minimum an aspect of federal law is essential to plaintiffs' success, see Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41 S.Ct. 243, 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921). However, the search for the applicable substantive law to decide the case is more perplexing.

Plainly the statute does not itself supply standards of federal substantive law. Nor is there any sound basis for concluding that the statute was intended to authorize federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law to effectuate federal policies. Cf. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). If there were a federal interest in providing national uniform rules of decision for all wrongful deaths occurring on all federal enclaves, federal common law could be fashioned to govern the substantive liability of the parties. Cf. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974). There is no reason to believe that Congress intended such a result. The general rule is that the law existing at the time of the surrender of state sovereignty will be adopted by a court to govern the substantive rights of persons within a federal territory. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 5 S.Ct. 1005, 29 L.Ed. 270 (1885). If Congress had intended that federal courts develop a body of substantive common law to govern a wrongful death case without reference to the prior law of the state in which the enclave is located, it would have clearly expressed that desire. Furthermore, there is little, if any, federal interest to be served by subjecting a party whose acts took place in a federal enclave on one coast of the country to the same federally fashioned substantive rules of decision as another individual whose acts took place in a federal enclave at the other end of the country.

The third possibility is that the federal statute directs, as a matter of federal law, the application of state law. See e.g., International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). That is the position apparently assumed by the parties, although they differ as to how the federal statute accomplishes this result. Defendant argues that § 457 directs a reference to the substantive law of the state surrounding the enclave in which the injuries occur. Plaintiffs contend that § 457 directs a reference to the whole body of law of the state surrounding the enclave, including that state's conflict of laws principles. To resolve this issue the parties debate the pertinence of Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962), in which the Supreme Court construed a somewhat analogous provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). That section provides that the federal government is liable to the claimant "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." The Court concluded that this provision refers a court to the whole law of the state where the act or omission occurred, including its conflicts rules, and not just to the state's substantive law.

While Richards in all likelihood would provide the answer if § 457 were truly analogous to the Tort Claims Act, the fact is that the statutes, in wording and legislative history, reflect a key difference. The Tort Claims Act plainly applies state law, as a matter of federal law, to issues of liability by providing that the "liability" of the government to the claimant shall be "in accordance with" the law of the state of the tort. Section 457 says the "rights of the parties" shall be governed by the law of the state surrounding the enclave. While "rights of the parties" could refer to the standards for determining liability of one party to the other, the phrase could also refer only to the determination of which parties have the right to bring a wrongful death action. The legislative history supports the latter, more limited construction.

When the bill was introduced for floor consideration in the Senate, Senator Robinson of Arkansas asked for an explanation of the Act. Senator Walsh answered:

It is intended practically to make the application of what is known as Lord Campbell's Act to places within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Practically every State now has given a right of action to the legal representatives of the dependent relatives of one who has suffered a death by reason of the neglect or wrongful act of another, there being no such recovery, it will be recalled, at common law.

There are a great many places in the United States under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States — the national parks, for instance. If a death should occur within those places, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, there would be no right of recovery on the part of the representatives or dependents of the person who thus suffered death as a result of the wrongful

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