Quanah, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cooper
Decision Date | 21 December 1921 |
Docket Number | (No. 1865.) |
Citation | 236 S.W. 811 |
Parties | QUANAH, A. & P. RY. CO. v. COOPER et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Hardeman County; J. A. Nabers, Judge.
Action by the Quanah, Acme & Pacific Railway Company against A. J. Cooper and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Jno. P. Marrs, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.
Bouldin & Surles, of Mineral Wells, for appellees.
The Quanah, Acme & Pacific Railway Company sued A. J. Cooper and others on a contract whereby the defendants, called subscribers, undertook to pay the railway company a bonus and secure certain right of way for its line of road. It was alleged that the subscribers had failed to secure right of way through two tracts of land included within the terms of the contract, and the railway company brought the suit to recover the amounts which it had paid in securing such right of way. A trial before the judge resulted in judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appeals.
The contract referred to was in writing, dated July 15, 1912, and the provisions thereof material to this decision are as follows:
The railway company built its road within the prescribed time to the station on section 29, and the town located there was called Roaring Springs. It did not stop on section 29, however, but built the road on to McBain, 3½ miles beyond Roaring Springs. McBain was also in Motley county, and was itself several miles distant from the county line. The subscribers did not secure for the railway company right of way through two tracts of land over which it thus built. One tract is called the Collett tract, and the other the Hale tract. The railway company secured the right of way over said tracts at a cost of $1,737.63 for the right of way over the Collett tract and $105 for that over the Hale tract. A decision of the right to recover on the two separate claims calls for a conclusion as to different contentions in the application of the contract to different facts, and we will consider them from now on separately, taking up first the issues as to the Collett tract.
The Collett tract of land was between Roaring Springs and McBain, and the subscribers contended that they were not bound by the contract to secure the right of way beyond section 29. The railway company contended that the contract bound the subscribers to secure the right of way through, meaning thereby from side to side, of Motley county. The contract was drawn by the general attorney for the railway company, and he, in behalf of the railway company, conducted the negotiations leading up to its execution. Evidence was offered to the effect that in such negotiations nothing was said about building the road beyond Roaring Springs; that said attorney had a meeting with the interested parties, and stated in a speech at such meeting that "the purpose of the meeting was getting a bonus of $15,000 to build that road from Paducah to section 29 in Motley county"; that the parties were asked to meet such attorney and railway officials "to discuss building a railroad from Paducah to section 29 in Motley county"; that in such meeting The trial judge made this finding of fact:
"I find that at the time the contract dated July 15, 1912, was entered into nothing was said by any of the parties about the said railway being built any further than section 29, nor was it contemplated by the subscribers that said road should be built any further, nor did they know that it would be built further, until some time in 1913, and that said extension beyond said section 29 was not a matter in contemplation of the said subscribers at the time said contract was made, nor did they ever agree to secure any right of way for said company free of charge west of said section 29."
The judge concluded as a matter of law:
We do not think there was any error in the admission of the oral testimony referred to or in the construction placed by the court on the contract. In the case of Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Mercer, 170 U. S. 602, 18 Sup. Ct. 792, 42 L. Ed. 1160, it is said:
We apprehend that the same observations might be made as to the word "across." Does the context qualify the primary meaning of the words "through and across," as used in this contract? There is a qualifying clause in the same sentence — the subscribers contract to procure "right of way for its line as herein provided, through and across Motley county." Does the clause "as herein provided" refer to the "line of railway through and across Motley county," or does it refer to the character of the right of way to be provided, and thus relate to the second subdivision of the contract?
"The strict rule of grammar would probably require that the qualifying clause in the sentence should be held to modify the nearest word to which it is applicable in the context." Lemp v. Armengol, 86 Tex. 692, 26 S. W. 942.
So, by a strict grammatical construction the clause would perhaps be taken as referring to the line of road for which right of way was to be procured. As the contract only provides for a line of road from Paducah, in Cottle county, to section 29 in Motley county, its meaning if this clause is to have the relation indicated, would require the subscribers to furnish the right of way through and across Motley county to section 29, and no violence would...
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