Quarles v. French, 80-226
| Decision Date | 23 February 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-226,80-226 |
| Citation | 611 S.W.2d 757,272 Ark. 51 |
| Parties | Alfred QUARLES and Florence Quarles, his wife, Appellants, v. Larry Thomas FRENCH and Patricia Quarles French, his wife, In the Matter of the Adoption of Tony Dewayne French and Charles Waylon French, Minors, Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Gene E. McKissic, Pine Bluff, for appellants.
Thurman Ragar, Jr., Pine Bluff, for appellees.
The issue raised by this appeal is whether grandparents who have been granted visitation rights pursuant to Ark.Stat.Ann. § 57-135 (Supp.1979) have standing to intervene in proceedings for the adoption of their grandchildren, children of their deceased son. The trial court held that they did not. We have concluded that they do have limited standing to be heard and we reverse.
The appellants, Alfred and Florence Quarles, are the natural grandparents of Tony Dewayne Quarles (French) and Charles Waylon Quarles (French), children of Patricia Quarles French and Jeffery Quarles, whose death occurred after he and Patricia had divorced. The appellants were awarded full custody of the two boys for a period of some nine months under an order of the chancery court. Custody was returned to Patricia Quarles French in July, 1977, but the order granted weekend visitation rights to the appellants.
Patricia Quarles later married Larry Thomas French and in August 1979 they filed a petition for the adoption of the two boys by Mr. French. Notice was given to appellants who responded with a motion challenging the fitness of the appellees and relying on the visitation rights granted by the chancery court. Appellants' motion was treated by the probate court as a motion to intervene, which was denied and a final decree of adoption was entered. On appeal, appellants urge that they were entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings, were entitled to intervene and further, that their right of visitation has been abolished without the opportunity to be heard in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process, also raised below. Without adopting the exact arguments of the appellants, we agree that in the attenuated circumstances of this case the appellants have not been afforded the opportunity to be heard due them under the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, it is evident that under the Arkansas Revised Uniform Adoption Act the appellants are not "persons required to consent to adoption." Ark.Stat.Ann. § 56-206 (Supp.1979), and our holding is not intended to alter this provision. Since their consent is not required, the question remains whether the appellants otherwise have standing to intervene in the proceeding. More precisely, do the visitation rights previously granted them by the chancery court confer a sufficient interest in the adoption proceeding that appellants have standing to intervene? We think they do. It has been held at least twice in this jurisdiction that grandparents standing in loco parentis have a sufficient interest in the adoption of natural grandchildren to entitle them to intervene. Appellants have not only stood in loco parentis to these children, but have the added element of court ordered visitation rights. Cotten v. Hamblin, 234 Ark. 109, 350 S.W.2d 612 (1961); Nelson v. Shelly, 268 Ark. ---, 600 S.W.2d 411 (Ark.App. 1980).
At common law, a grandparent could not maintain an action for visitation rights to a grandchild except as a party to a custody proceeding. See, Veazey v. Stewart, 251 Ark. 334, 472 S.W.2d 102 (1971). Cf. Parks v. Crowley, 221 Ark. 340, 253 S.W.2d 561 (1952). Visitation rights are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the chancery courts. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 57-135 (Supp.1979). But in this case, unlike Veazey, the appellants were parties to the earlier custody proceeding and have specific visitation rights granted by the chancery court. However, the decree of adoption, if granted, will effectively extinguish the visitation rights, since adoption under Ark.Stat.Ann. § 56-215(a)(1) terminated the relational status between adopted individuals and their relatives, which is the legal foundation for the visitation rights granted to grandparents under § 57-135. This was the effect of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Adoption of Schumacher, In re
...884; Lee v. Kepler (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1967), 197 So.2d 570; see Wilson v. Wallace (1981), 274 Ark. 48, 622 S.W.2d 164; Quarles v. French (1981), 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757; In re Fox (Okl.1977), 567 P.2d 985; see contra Reeves v. Bailey (1975), 53 Cal.App.3d 1019, 126 Cal.Rptr. 51.) Further,......
-
Bethany v. Jones
...evidence on whether adoption would be in their grandchild's best interest. Id. We distinguished our decisions in Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 (1981), and Cox v. Stayton, 273 Ark. 298, 619 S.W.2d 617 (1981), in which we held that grandparents had standing to intervene in ad......
-
Skelton v. Davis
...a grandchild except as a party to a custody proceeding. Reed v. Glover , 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729 (1994) (citing Quarles v. French , 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 (1981) ). We have often relied on our rule that any right that a grandparent possesses must be either derived from statutes or ......
-
Robinson v. Ford-Robinson
...evidence on whether adoption would be in their grandchild's best interest. Id. We distinguished our decisions in Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 (1981), and Cox v. Stayton, 273 Ark. 298, 619 S.W.2d 617 (1981), in which we held that grandparents had standing to intervene in ad......