Quarterman v. City of Walthourville

• Decision Date: 04 August 2022
• Docket Number: CV420-006
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
• Parties: BERNIE QUARTERMAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WALTHOURVILLE, GEORGIA; MAYOR DAISY S. PRAY, In her Official & Individual Capacity; CITY CLERK MELISSA JONES, In her Official & Individual Capacity; CITY ATTORNEY. JEFFERY ARNOLD, In his Official & Individual Capacity; and CITY ATTORNEY ANDREW JOHNSON, In his Official & Individual Capacity; Defendants.

BERNIE QUARTERMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF WALTHOURVILLE, GEORGIA; MAYOR DAISY S. PRAY, In her Official & Individual Capacity; CITY CLERK MELISSA JONES, In her Official & Individual Capacity; CITY ATTORNEY. JEFFERY ARNOLD, In his Official & Individual Capacity; and CITY ATTORNEY ANDREW JOHNSON, In his Official & Individual Capacity; Defendants.

No. CV420-006

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division

August 4, 2022

ORDER

WILLIAM T. MOORRE JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Before the Court is Defendants City of Walthourville, Georgia ("Walthourville"), Melissa Jones, Jeffery Arnold, and Andrew Johnson's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint. (Doc. 64.) Also before the Court is Defendant Daisy S. Pray's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint. (Doc. 65.) Plaintiff Bernie Quarterman has opposed both motions. (Docs. 67, 69, 71.) For the following reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. 64, 65) are GRANTED.

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BACKGROUND^[1]

This case stems from Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants retaliated against him for reporting the criminal conduct of Walthourville's former mayor Defendant Pray while Plaintiff was serving as Walthourville's Chief of Police. (Doc. 62 at 7-9.) According to Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint,^[2] at some point

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during his tenure as Chief of Police,^[3] Defendant Pray demanded that Plaintiff plant drugs in another city councilmember's car. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.) Defendant Pray also allegedly "threaten[ed] to shot [sic] the Plaintiff in the head[.]" (Id. at ¶ 35.) Plaintiff reported Defendant Pray's misconduct to District Attorney Tom Durden ("D.A. Durden") and insisted on a formal investigation. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also alleges he filed an "OSHA Whistleblower Complaint[,]" but fails to elaborate on the contents of the complaint or when it was sent. (Id. At ¶ 35.)

On an unalleged date, presumably after Plaintiff's whistleblowing activities, Defendant Arnold, a city attorney for Walthourville, announced at a meeting with all Defendants present that D.A. Durden had agreed not to pursue an investigation into Defendant Pray if Defendants "[got] rid of [Plaintiff.]" (Id. at ¶ 34.) Defendant Arnold and Defendant Johnson, also a city attorney, then represented Walthourville at administrative hearings that resulted in Plaintiff's termination. (Id. at ¶ 42.) Defendant Pray was the adjudicator of the administrative hearings, and Defendant Jones, the Walthourville City Clerk, was the only witness at the hearings. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 43.) Defendant Pray and

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Defendant Jones allegedly "colluded to create allegations of wrongdoing against the Plaintiff" at these hearings. (Id. at ¶ 43.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings the following claims against Defendants: (1) a claim for Defendants' failure to pay overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); (2) a retaliation claim under the FLSA; (3) a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (4) a procedural due process "Fair Procedure" claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) a procedural due process claim for deprivation of liberty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[4] (Id. at ¶¶ 28-51, 55-61.) Now, Defendants Walthourville, Jones, Arnold, and Johnson move jointly to dismiss Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 64 at 1.) Additionally, Defendant Pray has a filed a separate motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). (Doc. 65 at 1.) Plaintiff has opposed both motions.^[5] (Doc. 67, 69, 71.) As explained below, the Court finds that both motions to dismiss (Docs. 64, 65) are due to be granted.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). For a claim to have facial plausibility, the plaintiff must plead factual content that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted),

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abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012). Plausibility does not require probability, "but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief." '" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966). Additionally, a complaint is sufficient only if it gives "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268 (quotation omitted).

When the Court considers a motion to dismiss, it accepts the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true. Id. at 1260. However, this Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Moreover, "unwarranted deductions of fact in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of [plaintiff's] allegations." Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268 (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)). That is, "[t]he rule 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary

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element." Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 127 S., Ct. at 1959).

ANALYSIS

As stated previously, Defendants Walthourville, Jones, Arnold, and Johnson filed a joint motion to dismiss (Doc. 64), while Defendant Pray filed a separate motion to dismiss (Doc. 65). However, many of the defenses Defendant Pray raises in her motion to dismiss mirror the defenses the raised in the joint motion to dismiss. Additionally, Defendants all contend that Plaintiff's complaint is due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 64, Attach. 1 at 3; Doc. 65 at 3.) In the interest of efficiency, therefore, the Court will often analyze the motions to dismiss, and Plaintiff's responses thereto, simultaneously. The Court will now discuss whether Plaintiff's claims should survive Defendants' motions to dismiss.

I. PLAINTIFF'S OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS PRAY, JONES, ARNOLD, AND JOHNSON ARE REDUNDANT

The Court will first address the argument raised in both motions to dismiss that Plaintiff's official capacity claims against the individual defendants should be dismissed because they are redundant due to Plaintiff's claims against Walthourville. (Doc. 64, Attach. 1 at 9; Doc. 65 at 3, n.l.) Plaintiff does not address this argument in any of his responsive briefs.

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The Eleventh Circuit has held that when a plaintiff brings a § 1983 action against a local government official in his or her official capacity, "the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). As the Eleventh Circuit explained, "[b]ecause suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local government units can be sued directly . . . ." Busby, 931 F.2d at 776 (citations omitted). This same reasoning has been applied to claims brought under the FLSA and Title VII. See, e.g., Thrower v. Peach Cnty., Ga., Bd. of Educ., No. 5:08-CV-176 (MTT), 2010 WL 4536997, at *4- (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2010) (finding FLSA claim against individual defendant sued in official capacity was redundant because of claim against employer defendant); Burnett v. Walker Cnty. Comm'n, No. 6:12-cv-01506-HGD, 2014 WL 12820099, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2014) ("[S]ince the Walker County Commission remains as a defendant[,] . . . any [FLSA] claim against the individual Commissioners in their official capacities would be redundant[.]"); Wheeles v. Nelson's Elec. Motor Servs., 559 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2008) ("[W]hen

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a [Title VII] plaintiff names both the employer and the individual supervisor in his official capacity, the supervisor may be dismissed from the action." (citing Taylor v. Alabama, 95 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2000)).

In this case, Plaintiff brings official capacity claims against Defendants Pray, Jones, Arnold, and Johnson under the FLSA, Title VII, and § 1983. Because Plaintiff alleges that these individuals were...