Wheeles v. Nelson's Elec. Motor Services

• Decision Date: 06 June 2008
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:07-cv-1006-TFM [WO].
• Citation: 559 F.Supp.2d 1260
• Parties: Patricia WHEELES, Plaintiff, v. NELSON'S ELECTRIC MOTOR SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

559 F.Supp.2d 1260

Patricia WHEELES, Plaintiff, v. NELSON'S ELECTRIC MOTOR SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:07-cv-1006-TFM [WO].

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division.

June 6, 2008.

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Bishop Derrick Blythe, Derrick Blythe, Attorney at Law, Alexander City, AL, for Plaintiff.

William Larkin Radney, III, Barnes & Radney, P.C., Alexander City, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TERRY F. MOORER, United States Magistrate Judge.

This action is assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings and order entry of judgment by consent of all the parties (Docs. 19, filed January 23, 2008) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the brief in support thereof (Docs. 21-22, filed April 2, 2008), Plaintiff's Response In Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24, filed April 22, 2008), and Defendants' Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27, filed April 29, 2008).

I. PARTIES

Plaintiff is Patricia Wheeles ("Plaintiff or "Wheeles") a resident of Tallapoosa County, Alabama, within the Middle District of Alabama.

Defendant Nelson's Electric Motor Services ("Nelson's Electric") is a business located and doing business in Tallapoosa County and Lee County, Alabama. Defendant Gary Nelson ("Nelson") is the owner of Nelson's Electric and was also Wheeles supervisor at the time of the alleged events. Defendants Louise Partika ("Partika") and Renea Morgan ("Morgan") were an employees with Nelson's Electric at the time of the alleged events. All three individual defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities. Collectively Nelson's Electric and the individual employees shall be referred to as "Defendants."

II. JURISDICTION

The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Title VII), and 29 U.S.C. § 626 (Age Discrimination and Employment Act). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support both.

III. NATURE OF THE CASE/FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The underlying facts of this case are necessarily viewed in favor of the nonmovant plaintiff. Wheeles was employed in an office information position at Nelson's Electric from August 1999 to August 2006. See Doc. 1 ¶ 12, Complaint. On or about May 5, 2005 Defendant Morgan was hired. Id. at ¶ 14. Defendants Nelson and Morgan allegedly began an interpersonal relationship that caused Wheeles to endure a hostile working environment because of her religious beliefs. See Doc. 24 at p. 3 ¶¶ 7-8. After the hiring of Defendant Morgan, Wheeles also avers her position and job duties were delegated to Defendant Morgan which eventually resulted in her dismissal from Nelson's Electric. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 15. Defendants allegedly told Wheeles the company could no longer support three office personnel; however, a third office worker was hired after Wheeles' termination. See Doc. 24 at p. 2 ¶ 6. Prior to her termination, Wheeles was allegedly informed she might be moved from the Alexander City shop to the Opelika shop. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Instead, she was terminated on August 16, 2006. See Doc. 22 at p. 2 ¶ 1.

Wheeles filed her EEOC claim on December 14, 2006.¹ See Doc. 22, Exhibit F, EEOC Notice of Charge of Discrimination. On August 27, 2007, Wheeles received her Right to Sue letter from the EEOC. See Doc. 24 Exhibit 1, Dismissal and Notice of Rights. Wheeles filed her complaint on November 15, 2007. See Doc. 1. In her Complaint, Wheeles asserts the following claims: (1) termination due to religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); (2) a hostile work environment for religious and gender/sex discrimination in violation of Title VII; and (3) termination due to her age in violation of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act ("ADEA"). See Docs. 1 and 24. Defendants deny the allegations in their Answer filed December 6, 2007. See Doc. 6, Answer.

IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment and brief in support on April 2, 2008. See Docs. 21-22. In the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert they cannot be held liable as Wheeles cannot establish claims under Title VII and the ADEA. Specifically, Defendants state Title VII and the ADEA do not permit individual liability for discrimination, therefore Defendants Nelson, Partika, and Morgan merit dismissal as a matter of law. Next, Defendants assert Wheeles cannot establish the necessary elements to sustain a Title VII claim for hostile work environment. Finally, Defendants assert Wheeles cannot establish the legal requirements to sustain an ADEA claim for age discrimination. See Doc. 22.

Plaintiff timely filed her response on April 22, 2008 to which Defendants replied on April 29, 2008. See Docs. 24-25, and 27. The motion was fully submitted as of April 29, 2008.

V. SUMMARY JUDGEMENT STANDARD

A party in a lawsuit may move a court to enter summary judgment before trial. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a) and (b). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir.1998). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At the summary judgment juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely "determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249,106 S.Ct. 2505. Only disputes about the material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law," and a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also Slomcenski v. Citibank, N.A., 432 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1344-45 (11th Cir.2003)) ("In determining whether an issue of fact is `genuine' for the purpose of defeating summary judgment, we ask whether the evidence is `such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"). Thus, the initial burden of proof rests on the movant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; Gonzalez, 161 F.3d at 1294. This burden is satisfied when the movant shows that if the evidentiary record were reduced to admissible evidence at trial, it would be insufficient to permit the non-movant from carrying its burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. The admissibility of evidence is subject to the same standards and rules that govern admissibility of evidence at trial, demons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 n. 5 (11th Cir.1982) (citing Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 556 (5th Cir.1980)).

Once the movant meets its burden under Rule 56, the non-movant must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts, presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment are likewise insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n. 6 (11th Cir.1997) (conclusory assertions in absence of supporting evidence are insufficient to withstand summary judgment). The party opposing summary judgment must respond by setting forth specific evidence in the record and articulating the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim, and my not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(e); Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir.2001). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted). Thus, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (citations omitted).

In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003); Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1242-43. Further, "all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513; see also McCormick, 333 F.3d at 1243 (the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant). If the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. In other words, summary judgment is proper after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

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