Queatham v. Modern Woodmen of America

• Decision Date: 05 April 1910
• Citation: 127 S.W. 651,148 Mo. App. 33
• Parties: QUEATHAM et al. v. MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

127 S.W. 651

148 Mo. App. 33

QUEATHAM et al. v. MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

April 5, 1910.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1910.

1. INSURANCE (§ 817) — MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE — ACTION ON CERTIFICATE — BURDEN OF PROOF.

A mutual benefit association, seeking to defeat recovery on a certificate of insurance on the ground that the member died while engaged in a prohibited occupation, has the burden of showing that the member came to his death as a direct result thereof.

2. EVIDENCE (§§ 215, 263) — ADMISSIONS — PROOF OF DEATH — EXPLANATION.

Proofs of death furnished by a beneficiary in a life policy to insurer in accordance with the policy are admissible in evidence against the beneficiary as admissions of the truth of the statements therein contained, but the admissions are only prima facie true, and may be explained on the trial.

3. EVIDENCE (§ 251) — ADMISSIONS BY GUARDIAN — EFFECT.

Generally, a guardian cannot make an admission contrary to the interest of his infant ward, and, as against the infant, everything must be proved.

4. EVIDENCE (§ 251) — LIFE INSURANCE — PROOFS OF DEATH — ADMISSIONS BY GUARDIAN — EFFECT.

A guardian furnishing proof of death of one insured in a life policy, payable to his infant wards, may not bind the wards by admissions beyond the actual requirements of the policy, and where the cause of death need not be stated in the proofs, and the coroner's inquest need not be furnished therewith, the act of the guardian in stating the cause of death in the proofs of death, and in furnishing therewith the coroner's inquest, is not binding on the infant beneficiaries.

5. INSURANCE (§ 789) — LIFE INSURANCE — PROOFS OF DEATH — REQUIREMENTS.

A mutual benefit certificate, stipulating that no action may be maintained thereon until proofs of death and of claimant's rights to benefits have been filed and passed on by the officers of the association, does not impose the duty to recite in the proofs of death the cause of death.

6. CORONERS (§ 22) — DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES AT CORONER'S INQUEST — ADMISSIBILITY.

Depositions of witnesses before a coroner are not admissible in evidence in litigation subsequently arising, touching the subject-matter of the coroner's inquest, unless expressly authorized by statute.

7. WITNESSES (§ 393) — IMPEACHMENT — CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS.

Depositions of witnesses before the coroner may be used for the purpose of contradicting the witnesses giving testimony in subsequent litigation touching the same subject-matter.

8. CORONERS (§ 22) — DEPOSITION OF WITNESSES BEFORE THE CORONER — ADMISSIBILITY.

Rev. St. 1899, § 6642 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 3299), providing that the evidence of witnesses before the coroner shall be preserved in writing, and shall in specified cases be returned to the court of the county having criminal jurisdiction, does not make depositions of witnesses before the coroner admissible in evidence to establish the cause of death in any case.

9. COURTS (§ 117) — JUDICIAL RECORDS — CONCLUSIVENESS.

Records of courts of competent jurisdiction are conclusive between the parties and privies, and, as a general rule, they import absolute verity.

10. INSURANCE (§ 818) — LIFE INSURANCE — PROOF OF DEATH — CORONER'S INQUEST — ADMISSIBILITY —"JUDICIAL OFFICER."

Under Const. art. 6, §§ 1, 34-37 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 212, 238-240), vesting judicial power in enumerated tribunals, not including the coroner, provided for in article 9, §§ 10, 11 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 262, 263), a coroner, though exercising discretion in determining whether an inquest shall be held, is not a judicial officer, and though Rev. St. 1899, §§ 6642, 6643 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 3299), require a coroner's verdict to be in writing, and to be signed by the coroner and the jurors, a coroner's verdict is not competent in an action on a mutual benefit certificate to prove the cause of death, though it may be competent as a part of the proof of his death.

11. INSURANCE (§ 819) — MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE — PROOF OF DEATH — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY.

In an action on a mutual benefit certificate, stipulating that there shall be no recovery if the death of the member occurred as a direct result of following a prohibited occupation, evidence held not to show that the member came to his death as a direct result of engaging in a prohibited occupation.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Louis County; John W. McElhinney, Judge.

Action by Clarence W. Queatham and others against the Modern Woodmen of America. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Tunnell & Hart, for appellant. John E. Turner, for respondents.

NORTONI, J.

This is a suit on a certificate of life insurance. The plaintiff recovered, and defendant prosecutes the appeal. The question for decision relates entirely to the sufficiency of the proof to sustain the verdict for plaintiff. In other words, it is urged the court should have directed a verdict for defendant on its affirmative defense that deceased came to his death as a direct result of his employment in an occupation prohibited by the contract of insurance. As the principal elements relied upon by defendant in support of its argument consist of admissions in the proof of death and the record of the coroner's inquest introduced by it, the competency and probative force to be accorded to these documents are subjects for consideration, as will hereafter more fully appear.

The defendant is a mutual benefit association, organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, and doing a life insurance business in Missouri. The plaintiff sues as the duly appointed and qualified guardian of several minors, who are the beneficiaries in the certificate of insurance involved. It appears that several years ago the deceased, David Queatham, father of the beneficiaries, became a member of the defendant order, and for a competent consideration it issued to him its certificate of insurance on his life to an amount not exceeding $2,000, which, after the decease of his wife, became payable to his children, the infant beneficiaries, for whom the guardian prosecutes this suit. The insured, David Queatham, died December 26, 1906, but just what occasioned his death was the question at issue in the trial, for, if it occurred as a direct result of his following the occupation of railroad brakeman or switchman, which was prohibited by the contract of insurance, no liability may be enforced against the defendant. At the trial, besides introducing the certificate of insurance and proving the right of the guardian to maintain the suit for the infant beneficiaries, plaintiff introduced a stipulation, executed by the defendant, to the effect that at the time of his death the insured was in good standing in the order, and had paid all of his assessments and dues thereto. The defendant, by its answer, admitted, as well, that insured had departed this life on the date mentioned, and due proof of his death had been furnished it in accordance with the stipulation of the contract.

A prima facie case having been thus made, the defendant sought to escape liability on the grounds the insured came to his death as a direct result from following the occupation of a railroad brakeman or switchman, which occupation was prohibited by the contract. The certificate of insurance stipulated that, if the insured should follow any employment or occupation mentioned in section 14 of the by-laws of the society, the contract of insurance should thereby become ipso facto null and void as to any claim for death benefits, if the death of the insured be directly traceable to such hazardous employment or occupation. Section 14 of the by-laws, in force at the time the certificate was issued and at all times thereafter, including the date of the death of the insured, denounced and prohibited the occupation of railroad brakeman on all trains except passenger trains using air brakes only, and further denounced and prohibited the occupation of a railroad switchman such as switching or coupling cars or braking thereon. And it was further stipulated in the contract that persons should be held to be engaged in such prohibited occupations when the work or duties incident to his employment required him occasionally or continuously during any part of the year to perform any of the work or duties of or incident to such prohibited occupations. The insured was in the employ of the Hydraulic Press Brick Company at the time of his death, and the duties of his employment required him to work both as a railroad brakeman and switchman about a locomotive engine and numerous cars on the tracks at the works of the press brick company. It is true he was not employed by the railroad company, nevertheless, he, together with his companions, worked daily about a standard locomotive engine and railroad cars operated by the press brick company at its works. The duties of the insured were to throw switches, give signals, couple cars, set brakes, ride on the freight cars and locomotive engine as on any railroad. It appears, too, the train and cars about which he worked were not a passenger train or cars using air brakes. Indeed, the evidence is conclusive to the effect that at the time of his death the insured was engaged in an occupation prohibited by the express terms of the contract of insurance, and if his death be directly traceable to such employment, then no liability therefor obtains against the defendant, for the reason such liability is expressly excluded by the provisions of the contract.

After setting forth the provision of the certificate and its by-laws touching such prohibited employment, the defendant affirmatively pleaded the insured came to his death by being crushed between the cab and the tender of a locomotive engine about which he was employed, and prayed to be discharged from liability on the ground that insured's death was directly traceable to such prohibited employment. There can be no doubt that the...