Queen Anne Courts v. City of Lakeville, Civ. No. 3-87-568.
| Decision Date | 08 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 3-87-568. |
| Citation | 726 F. Supp. 733 |
| Parties | QUEEN ANNE COURTS, a Minnesota general partnership, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LAKEVILLE, City of Lakeville General Council: Duane R. Zaun (Mayor), Nancy Enright, Robert L. Nelson, Elizabeth L. Sindt, and Patrick G. Harvey; City of Lakeville Administrator/Clerk Patrick E. McGarvey; City of Lakeville Development Director James A. Robinette; Northwest Associated Consultants, Inc.; and David R. Licht, President Northwest Associated Consultants, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Lauren Lonergan of Briggs and Morgan, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.
Roger N. Knutson of Grannis, Grannis, Farrell & Knutson, South St. Paul, Minn., for defendants.
Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss or in the alternative motion for summary judgment. The Court held a hearing on these motions on March 8, 1989. The Court addressed several of defendants' arguments in a bench ruling, but took two issues under advisement. Those issues are (1) has plaintiff stated a claim for a violation of procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?; and (2) has plaintiff stated a claim for a violation of substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? Plaintiff has also provided unsolicited argument in its posthearing brief as to plaintiff's taking claim, an issue dealt with by the Court in its bench ruling. The Court will also address this taking issue in its memorandum.
Plaintiff Queen Anne Courts is a Minnesota general partnership that owns three parcels of land in Lakeville, Minnesota. The three parcels are adjacent to one another. The middle parcel has on it a mobile home park operated by Queen Anne. The parcels on either side of the park are undeveloped.
Defendants are the City of Lakeville, and also various city officials including the mayor, the city council, the city administrator and city clerk, and the Community Development Director. Also named as defendants are Northwest Associated Consultants, Inc., the city's land use consultant, and its president, David R. Licht.
This dispute arises out of the City of Lakeville's refusal to allow Queen Anne to expand its mobile home park onto the undeveloped parcels adjoining the mobile home park. The land is currently under a zoning classification that prohibits mobile home parks. The existing mobile home park predates the zoning ordinance, and is therefore a non-conforming use. The City of Lakeville has made various changes in the zoning classification over the years, but none of the various classifications has allowed for mobile home development.
Plaintiff has attempted several times to obtain permission from the city to expand its mobile home park. Queen Anne has filed applications to rezone the land, and has applied for conditional use permits. The city has denied all of its applications to change the zoning of the land to allow for expansion of the mobile home park.
Plaintiff commenced this action on August 18, 1987. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by taking plaintiff's property without just compensation, and by denying plaintiff both substantive and procedural due process of the laws.
Plaintiff also alleges defendants conspired to deprive Queen Anne of equal protection of the laws under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and that certain defendants failed to prevent the conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated Minn.Stat. § 462.01, a zoning statute, and Minn.Stat. § 471.705, the open meeting statute.
Count II of plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendants' "unfair and dilatory procedures" denied plaintiff procedural due process. In order to establish a claim for a violation of procedural due process under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that it has a constitutionally protected property interest. Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir.1986). Next, the plaintiff must show that it is entitled to a predeprivation hearing, and that defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived plaintiff of its property without providing such a hearing. Id. at 599-603.
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to state any facts to support its procedural due process claim. Plaintiff has only made the bare allegation in its complaint that the city's procedures were "unfair and dilatory." Procedural due process requires that the city provide plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The record reflects that plaintiff had notice of each hearing concerning its land, and in fact appeared and was heard.
Plaintiff argues that it has stated a procedural due process claim by virtue of the fact that the City Council had prepared the findings of fact it adopted in denying plaintiff's rezoning request prior to the meeting. Plaintiff concludes that this fact shows that the City Council had made up its mind prior to the meeting, and hence plaintiff was denied its right to a hearing.
Defendants argue that they prepared the proposed findings, which were based on the Planning Commission's recommendation, only for convenience sake. Defendants argue that the City Council was at liberty to reject or amend the proposed findings after hearing plaintiff's arguments at the meeting, but that they simply chose not to do so. Defendants contend that the preprepared findings do not establish that the council prejudged plaintiff's application.
The Court does not believe that the preparation of proposed findings of fact prior to the City Council meeting is sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact as to a deprivation of procedural due process. As long as the City Council was free to reject or amend those findings after hearing plaintiff's arguments, plaintiff received a fair hearing.
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the City Council members would not have rejected or amended the Planning Commission's conclusions if they had been swayed by plaintiff's arguments at the Council meeting. That the City Council ultimately concurred with the Planning Commission's view of the facts does not show that plaintiff's application had been irrevocably prejudged, and the City Council meeting a mere sham. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff's claim for deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process.
Plaintiff also alleges that the City of Lakeville's refusal to rezone its property was arbitrary, capricious, and based on legally insufficient reasons. Plaintiff asserts that the City's actions amount to a denial of substantive due process.
The City argues that plaintiff cannot make out a claim for a violation of substantive due process. First, the City urges the Court to extend the reasoning employed by the United States Supreme Court in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) to substantive due process cases.
In Parratt, the Court held that in cases where the random and unauthorized act of a state employee causes a deprivation of property, procedural due process is not denied if the state provides an adequate post-depravation remedy. 451 U.S. at 541-42, 101 S.Ct. at 1916. The City argues that this reasoning is equally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of substantive due process. The City argues that an adequate remedy is available to plaintiff in state court, and therefore plaintiff has not been deprived of property without due process of law.
The Eighth Circuit has recently addressed the City's argument that the Parratt rule should be extended to substantive due process cases. In Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400 (8th Cir.1989), the court stated that "in situations where procedural due process claims alleging property deprivation are prohibited in Section 1983 actions by Parratt, claims based on the same actions but alleging denial of substantive due process should be barred as well." 870 F.2d at 1406.
However, the Weimer language does not apply in this case. The Weimer court's statements make clear that it is only willing to extend the Parratt rule to substantive due process claims in cases where Parratt would apply to a procedural due process claim based on the same actions. As previously noted, Parratt only applies in cases where the state action is random and unauthorized.
Where, as in this case, the alleged deprivation is the result of otherwise lawful state action by a state decision making body acting within the scope of its authority, the Parratt rule would not apply to a procedural due process claim. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541-42, 101 S.Ct. at 1916. See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1157-58, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). It follows that under the Weimer reasoning, there is no basis for extending the Parratt rule to plaintiff's substantive due process claim in this case. Weimer, 870 F.2d at 1406. Therefore, the fact that adequate state remedies may exist for plaintiff in this case does not preclude plaintiff's substantive due process claim.
Defendants also argue that plaintiff's allegations fail to state a substantive due process claim as a matter of law in light of Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469 (8th Cir.1987) (en banc). Plaintiff alleges that defendants' refusal to rezone its property was arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and based upon legally insufficient reasons. Previously, such allegations, if substantiated, would have entitled plaintiff to bring a substantive due process claim under Section 1983. Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.1986).
However, the continuing validity of Littlefield in the substantive due process context is questionable in light of Lemke. In Lemke, the Board of Commissioners of Cass County, Nebraska, reversed an earlier zoning decision, and denied plaintiffs' request to...
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