Queets Band of Indians v. State of Wash.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-3644,83-3646,s. 83-3644
• Citation: 765 F.2d 1399
• Parties: QUEETS BAND OF INDIANS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants-Appellants. MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1399

765 F.2d 1399

QUEETS BAND OF INDIANS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 83-3644, 83-3646.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 2, 1983.

Withdrawn from Submission Sept. 2, 1983.

Resubmitted July 24, 1984.

Decided July 17, 1985.

Michael P. O'Connell, Colville Confederated Tribes, Nespelem, Wash., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Timothy R. Malone, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, Wash., for defendants-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

Before WRIGHT, SKOPIL and POOLE, Circuit Judges.

SKOPIL, Circuit Judge:

We are asked to decide if the State of Washington's refusal to grant licensing reciprocity to vehicles owned and licensed by two Indian tribes violates the federal Constitution. The district court permanently enjoined the state from enforcing its motor vehicle licensing and registration requirements on vehicles licensed and registered by the tribes, reasoning that each tribe was a "jurisdiction" as defined in Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 46.85.020(2), for the purposes of reciprocal immunity from those requirements as provided in Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 46.85.080.

We certified to the Washington Supreme Court the question of whether the state legislature intended to include Indian tribes as jurisdictions eligible for vehicle registration and licensing reciprocity. Queets Band of Indians v. State of Washington, 714 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1983). The Washington Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, concluded that the relevant statutes were not intended to include Indian The Washington Supreme Court's decision brings into question the constitutionality of the legislation, a question not reached below and thereafter raised but reserved. The tribes contend that the state's refusal to recognize tribally issued license plates is (1) a denial of equal protection; (2) a violation of the commerce clause and (3) prohibited by the supremacy clause. We agree that the tribes' ordinances are sufficiently preemptive under supremacy clause analysis to require the state to extend reciprocity to the tribes.

                tribes.   Queets Band of Indians v. State, 102 Wash.2d 1, 682 P.2d 909, 911-12 (1984).  We are bound by the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of state law.  See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 104 S.Ct. 378, 382, 78 L.Ed.2d 187 (1983) (views of state's highest court regarding state law are binding on federal courts)
                

FACTS

The Quinault Indian Nation (Queets) and the Muckleshoot Band of Indians (Muckleshoots) are federally recognized Indian tribes that govern reservations in the state of Washington. In 1974 the Queets requested the state to provide license plates for tribal vehicles at the nominal fee charged to state agencies and local governments. The state refused. Thereafter, the Queets adopted its own licensing and registration system. The Muckleshoots enacted their motor vehicle licensing ordinance in 1977.

The tribal license and registration ordinances apply only to tribal vehicles engaged in government services. Their respective license plates are standard size, consecutively numbered and bear identifying tribal legends. Registration is carried on each vehicle with copies on file with the respective tribes and with the Washington Department of Licensing. The tribal ordinances provide for automatic reciprocity within the reservations for vehicles registered and licensed by other jurisdictions if such other jurisdictions afford similar reciprocity.

Washington law generally makes it unlawful for any person to operate a vehicle on a public highway within the state without a valid vehicle license and registration. Wash.Rev.Stat. Sec. 46.16.010. The state's reciprocity statutes provide for recognition of license and registration issued by other jurisdictions provided those licensing authorities grant similar privileges to Washington vehicles. Wash.Rev.Stat. Secs. 46.85.010-110. Other "jurisdictions" is defined to include a "state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign country and a state or province of a foreign country." Wash.Rev.Stat. Sec. 46.85.020(2). The definition does not include Indian tribes. Queets, 682 P.2d at 911-12.

The Queets brought this action shortly after a tribal garbage truck carrying validly issued tribal plates and operating on a federal highway within the reservation was cited by Washington authorities for not displaying a state license plate. The Muckleshoots filed their action after the state informed the tribe that it would not recognize tribal license plates. The tribes and the state agreed to a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from interfering with the operation of tribally licensed vehicles. The district court's permanent injunction continues in force.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

During the long course of litigation between the tribes and the state, various issues were eliminated either by intervening decisions or by stipulation of the parties. The state has agreed that the tribes have licensing authority for on-reservation purposes. The state also dropped its claims that tribal vehicles were subject to state use and excise taxes. The Queets withdrew from consideration their argument that they qualified for the nominal fee license available to local governments. See Wash.Rev.Stat. Sec. 46.16.020. By virtue of the Washington Supreme Court's decision, it has been decided that the state's reciprocity statutes do not extend to Indian

tribes. The remaining issue is the constitutionality of that exclusion.

DISCUSSION

A. Tribal Authority.

We begin by determining whether Indian tribes possess the authority to license and register governmental vehicles. If they do not possess such powers, there can be no legitimate claim that the state unconstitutionally denied recognition.

It has been long understood that Indian tribes possess inherent sovereign powers. E.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). While we have departed from the broad tribal sovereignty principles of Worcester, we continue to accord tribes traditional sovereign powers necessary to regulate internal and social affairs. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1085, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). Present day reservation Indians enjoy the right "to make their own laws and be ruled by them...." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1284 n. 11 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959)).

Whether a particular tribal activity is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign powers depends upon the activity's relationship to traditional tribal self-government or internal relations. United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1257, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). For example, there is no tradition of tribal sovereign power or inherent self-government in favor of liquor regulation by Indians. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 722, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 3298, 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983). In contrast, a tribe has the inherent power to impose taxes on non-Indians as a part of its authority to govern and to pay the costs of self-government. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137, 102 S.Ct. 894, 901, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982).

We conclude that Indian tribes possess the sovereign authority to license and register tribal vehicles. See, e.g., Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 311 Minn. 241, 248 N.W.2d 722, 725 (1976). We have no cause to believe that the tribes have been implicitly divested of that power by virtue of their dependent status. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 2384, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983). In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.1981), amended 665 F.2d 1390, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 230, 74 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982), we recognized that the doctrine of tribal government "specifically prohibits state action that impairs the ability of a tribe to exercise traditional governmental functions such as ... vehicle registration." Moreover, Indian tribes' power to issue license plates has been expressly recognized in at least three states, all of which offer reciprocity to tribal governmental vehicles. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa, supra (Minnesota); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 28-317 (Arizona); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. Sec. 32-5-42 (South Dakota). See also N.M.A.G. Opinion No. 335 (March 5, 1956) (Navajo Tribe entitled to exempt state licenses).

Our conclusion that the Queets and the Muckleshoots possess the power to issue license plates for their respective tribal vehicles is only a starting point in our analysis. Washington apparently does not dispute the tribes' power to license government vehicles. It concedes that the tribes possess the sole licensing authority within the reservation. The state does contend, however, that it is not obligated to offer reciprocity to tribally licensed vehicles once outside the borders of the reservation and can legitimately require such vehicles to be double licensed. The tribes argue that Washington, by virtue of its reciprocity statutes, is constitutionally required to honor their licensing and registration authorities.

B. Equal Protection.

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that "all persons similarly circumstanced ... be The tribes argue that a more penetrating review is required because the state's classification, while ostensibly neutral on its face, is nevertheless a racial classification. We agree that racial classifications are subject to more exacting scrutiny and must be justified by a compelling state interest and be necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose. Palmore v. Sidoti, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L.Ed.2d...