Quick Shops, Inc. v. Oldham

• Decision Date: 27 October 1959
• Docket Number: No. 37858,No. 1,37858,1
• Citation: 111 S.E.2d 920,100 Ga.App. 551
• Parties: QUICK SHOPS, INC. v. OLDHAM et al
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 920

111 S.E.2d 920

100 Ga.App. 551

QUICK SHOPS, INC. v. OLDHAM et al.

No. 37858.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Oct. 27, 1959.

Syllabus by the Court.

The court erred in charging the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.

Mrs. Mamie Oldham brought suit in Superior Court, Richmond County, Georgia, against Quick Shops, Inc. trading as Bridgham & Brigham's Super Markets, as first defendant, and C. C. Reynolds as second defendant, alleging that on August 22, 1957, she was entering a grocery store operated by the defendant, Quick Shops, Inc. t/a as Brigham & Brigham's Super Markets in a building owned by the defendant, C. C. Reynolds, for the purpose of purchasing groceries and other items for sale by the defendant, Quick Shops, Inc. That as petitioner approached the entrance way, she reached forward with her right hand to open the right-hand door and took hold of said door by the handle provided and pulled same towards her, to her right; that when said door was opened sufficiently wide for her to enter said store, petitioner stepped forward toward the entrance way of said store with her left foot at which time said right-hand door pulled out of her hand and sprung back toward the store with terrific speed and force, catching the great toe of petitioner's left foot under the door, causing the injury which plaintiff received; that said door is provided with a spring type implement at the top of said door near the far right-hand side of said door which is designed to keep said door closed except when in use, and also designed to close said door after it is opened; that the faulty operation of said springing instrumentality is the direct and proximate cause of petitioner's injuries. Plaintiff then detailed the operation of the springing instrumentality and further alleged that at and during the time of the occurrence set out in the petition, the spring in the instrumentality had been tightened too tightly and the valve spring on the door cylinder was not fixed in such a manner that it would cause the door, with the spring in its tightened condition, to close slowly; that the valve screw was negligently placed in such a position that it did not properly control the speed with which the door closed; that consequently said instrumentality was maintained on the aforesaid door in a negligent, careless and dangerous manner. That both the first and second defendant knew of this dangerous condition. The plaintiff further alleged that the first defendant knew that the aforementioned spring on said door was in a dangerous condition and was creating a hazard to those who lawfully used it; that even though he knew of such condition, he continued to invite people into said entrance way of the aforesaid premises while knowing the dangerous condition and was negligent while knowing the dangerous condition of said door, in not notifying those people who were invited into first defendant's store for the purpose of trading with the first defendant. That the first defendant was further negligent in failing to use ordinary care to keep said premises and the approaches thereto safe; that notwithstanding this knowledge on the part of the first defendant, he continued to operate said store and invited the general public into the store, including you petitioner, without warning them of the dangerous That the first defendant knew that the spring on said door as hereinabove described had been installed and was being maintained in such a manner that when said door was opened for the purpose of entering said store, terrific force and pressure was put on the aforesaid springing instrumentality designed to keep the door shut and to apply pressure on said door to keep it in a closed condition, when said door was opened, this instrumentality which was negligently maintained, caused pressure to be placed on the said springing instrumentality and on the said door and caused it to close and shut with tremendous force and speed which was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The defendants, Quick Shops, Inc. t/a Brigham & Brigham's Super Markets and C. C. Reynolds, by their answers denied the material allegations of the petition. The case went to trial on November 20, 1958, and the plaintiff, Mamie Oldham, sought to prove the allegations of her petition by the following testimony. She testified that she went to Brigham's store to trade with them and she started to go in to get some groceries; that she caught the door with her right hand and started to go into the store; that as she opened the door wide enough to enter, and before she could get out of the way of the door, it came back and caught her foot--the door caught her foot and hurt it; that when she approached the door of Brigham's store, it was closed; that she opened the door wide enough to enter and stepped forward with her left foot, which was the foot that was injured; that the door did not strike her foot when she opened it and she did not know what caused the door to come closed--it came plunging back; that she still had it with her hand and when it came back it knocked her hand away and the door caught her in it; that after she called Dr. Wylie, she continued shopping and picked up a couple of items.

James L. Dye, called by the plaintiff, for the purpose of cross-examination, testified that he was the president of the defendant, Quick Shops, Inc., and that plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, introduced in evidence is a fair representation of the front of Brigham's store--the doors to the store. He further testified: 'I might...