Quick v. Jones
Decision Date | 03 July 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-3921,83-3921 |
Citation | 754 F.2d 1521 |
Parties | Joseph QUICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary JONES, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Joseph Quick, in pro per.
Carol A. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington.
Before SKOPIL and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and COYLE ***, District Judge.
Joseph Quick, a Washington state prisoner, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for Jones, the chairman of the prison disciplinary committee. The basic facts as set forth in Jones' motion for summary judgment and in the supporting exhibits are not in dispute. In reviewing a summary judgment against Quick, we view the materials in the light most favorable to him. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
Quick was on furlough from state prison in March 1982, when he was arrested for violation of the terms of his furlough. When his parole officer informed him that his furlough was suspended, Quick fled. A county sheriff, Anson, and a second parole officer, Erdahl, pursued Quick without identifying themselves as officers. During an ensuing scuffle, Erdahl's watch band was broken and Anson's glasses and clothing were damaged.
Once back at prison, Quick was charged with a major infraction under Wash.Admin.Code R. 275-88-030 (525) for violating conditions of furlough. He was found guilty in a disciplinary hearing conducted pursuant to chapter 275-88 of the Washington Administrative Code. In its infraction report, the three-person committee, chaired by Jones, stated that it based its finding of guilt on the furlough violation report filed by Quick's parole officer. In addition to imposing sanctions relating to the conditions of Quick's confinement, the disciplinary committee directed Quick to make restitution to Erdahl for $25 damage to his watch band and to Anson for $41 damage to his clothing and glasses. Quick appealed to the prison superintendent; the superintendent issued a memorandum affirming that Quick was guilty of the infraction, and stating that sanctions increasing custody and requiring a hearing before the Parole Board would stand. The superintendent's memorandum said nothing about restitution. Thereafter, as funds became available, prison personnel withdrew a total of $66 from Quick's prison account and sent it to Erdahl and Anson.
Quick filed a pro se complaint in the district court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Quick alleged that Quick further alleged that "I was never afforded a 'due process' hearing as the law requires." Jones, represented by the state Attorney General, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the prison hearing and appeal constituted all the process due to Quick to support a disciplinary sanction. The district court entered summary judgment for Jones and also awarded Jones attorney's fees in the amount of $148.31, stating that Quick had seriously misrepresented the facts by claiming that he was not afforded a due process hearing and by claiming that Jones had "taken it upon himself" to order restitution. Quick timely filed this pro se appeal.
Summary judgment may be granted when the moving party shows not only that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, but also that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir.1981). Here, the district court erred in concluding that Jones was entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
There is no question that Quick's interest in the funds in his prison account is a protected property interest. See, e.g., Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372, 378 (9th Cir.1983); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir.1974). Once a protected interest is found, the court must then decide what process is due. This is a question of law. Belnap v. Chang, 707 F.2d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir.1983).
Quick argues on appeal that the permanent and final withdrawal of money from his prison account was punitive and was done in the absence of authority under the prison regulations and in violation of a state statute. Under Washington law, a court may order restitution following a criminal conviction for injury to or loss of property occurring during the commission of a criminal offense. See Wash.Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 9.94A.140. Thus restitution for injury occurring during a criminal offense can only be ordered by a court after a full criminal trial in which the defendant's constitutional due process rights are preserved. Alternately, private persons may seek recovery of damages or compensation from one causing them injury by means of a civil tort action. Id. Sec. 9.94A.140(4).
Jones argues that the sanction of restitution is authorized by Wash.Admin.Code R. 275-88-105(2). That section provides that for serious infractions of institutional regulations, the disciplinary committee may order sanctions, including Id. Sec. 275-88-105(2)(k).
By deducting money from Quick's prison account, Jones and the prison committee, in the guise of an internal disciplinary sanction, transferred Quick's property to two private individuals, Erdahl and Anson. This was done without a determination of either civil or criminal responsibility. Restitution was ordered without a hearing on the issue of whether Quick is responsible for damage to Erdahl's watch band and Anson's glasses and clothing. On these...
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