Quick v. Leatherman
| Citation | 96 So.2d 136 |
| Parties | Rosalie QUICK, formerly Rosalie Schrammel, Appellant, v. E. B. LEATHERMAN, as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Appellee. |
| Decision Date | 26 June 1957 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Samuel J. Rand and Leland B. Featherstone, Miami, for appellant.
Ward & Ward, Miami, for appellee.
Appellant Quick, who was plaintiff below, seeks reversal of a decree of the Chancellor dismissing her complaint in a proceeding for an accounting and payment of the surplus proceeds of a county tax sale.
The determining point is whether the appellee as Clerk of the Circuit Court properly disbursed a surplus remaining after the sale of a parcel of land for delinquent taxes.
The cause was heard on the complaint, the answer and a stipulation of facts. By the stipulation we are advised that appellant Quick was formerly married to one Frank Schrammel. During coverture they acquired title to the land in question as an estate by the entirety. They were divorced in 1949. The divorce decree incorporated the provisions of a stipulation by which the parties provided for the disposition of other properties held by them, but no specific mention was made of the lot referred to in this proceeding. The divorce decree also contained the following provision:
'The said Rosalie Schrammel hereby releases, relinquishes and waives any and all other claims, dower rights or other rights she might have against the plaintiff, Frank Schrammel.'
It was further stipulated that on September 20, 1955 the appellee Clerk sold the lot in question for delinquent taxes. Upon disbursing the proceeds of the tax sale by payment of taxes, costs and expenses, there remained a surplus of $2,250.98. On October 12, 1955 the appellee Clerk thereupon disbursed this surplus to Frank Schrammel, the former husband of appellant. The instant case was heard by the Chancelor on the basis of a stipulation between the parties whereby it was agreed that there was no dispute as to the facts and no genuine issue on any material fact. The stipulation then pin-pointed the issue presented to the Chancellor in the following language:
'10. That the sole issue in this cause is a question of law as to the legal effect of that certain paragraph, to-wit:
"The said Rosalie Schrammel hereby releases, relinquishes and waives any and all other claims, dower rights or other rights she might have against the plaintiff, Frank Schrammel.'
as contained in the Stipulation filed in this Court on April 7, 1949 in Chancery Cause No. 123268.
'11. That upon final hearing of this cause, if the Court finds that the portion of the said Stipulation quoted above, did not transfer, convey, or assign the interest of Rosalie Schrammel in said vacant lot (Lot 22, Block 49, etc.) to Frank Schrammel, then a Final Decree May be entered herein in favor of the Plaintiff.
The language quoted in paragraph 10 of the stipulation was the provision which had been incorporated in the divorce decree entered in the divorce proceeding between appellant and her former husband. The Chancellor apparently concluded that the quoted provision of the divorce decree justified the payment to the former husband of the appellant the entire surplus proceeds of the tax sale. He entered a decree on final hearing dismissing the complaint. Reversal of this decree is now sought.
The appellant contends that the provision in the divorce decree merely relinquished claims which she had against her former husband and did not transfer to him any rights which she enjoyed in her own property.
The appellee on the other hand...
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U.S. v. One Single Family Residence With Out Buildings Located at 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., Miami, Fla.
...spouse's interest comprises the whole or entirety of the property and not a divisible part; the estate is inseverable. Quick v. Leatherman, 96 So.2d 136, 138 (Fla.1957); Andrews, 21 So.2d at 206; Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So.2d 727, 728 (1941). "[N]either spouse can sell, forfeit o......
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...held only by a husband and wife. In this form of ownership, each spouse owns the "entirety" or the whole of the estate. Quick v. Leatherman, 96 So.2d 136, 138 (Fla.1957). The theoretical basis for this estate is that husband and wife are one person in the law. Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 2......
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...a unique estate in property held jointly by husband and wife. See Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So.2d 727 (1941); Quick v. Leatherman, 96 So.2d 136, 138 (Fla.1957). Each spouse is deemed to own and control the whole of the entireties property, and their interests are not severable. Id.......
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