Quiggle v. Vining

• Decision Date: 23 March 1906
• Citation: 54 S.E. 74,125 Ga. 98
• Parties: QUIGGLE. v. VINING.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

54 S.E. 74

125 Ga. 98

QUIGGLE.

v.VINING.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 23, 1906.

1. Reformation of Instruments — Mutual Mistake.

Equity will not reform a written contract, unless the mistake is alleged and proved to be the mistake of both parties. Where the instrument does not really represent the truth of the agreement as understood by one of the parties, it will not be reformed on the ground of the misapprehension of one of the parties, though it may be rescinded.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 42, Cent. Dig. Reformation of Instruments, §§ 74-78.]

2. Landlord and Tenant — Lease — Construction.

Where the leased premises are described in the contract as "the lands near Marshallville, Ga., known as the C. S. Johnson place, ''the lessee is entitled, not only to the use of the cultivable land for the purpose of cultivation, but he is also entitled to the fruit of the trees on the rented premises maturing during the existence of the lease; and it was not error to instruct the jury that the contract should receive this interpretation, unless the contract should be reformed because, by mutual mistake, an exception of the fruit was omitted from the contract.

3. Trial—Instructions—Preponderance of Evidence.

The charge on the subject of preponderance of evidence was without substantial error.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Macon County; Z. A. Littlejohn, Judge.

Action by M. B. Qulggle against J. B. Vining. Judgment for defendant, and both parties bring error. Affirmed on main bill of exceptions; cross-bill of exceptions dismissed.

This was an equitable proceeding, one of the purposes of which was to reform a written contract in the form of a rent note given by the defendant to the plaintiff. The contention of the plaintiff was that under the agreement of rental the defendant was to have the privilege of cultivating such lands on what was known as the "C. S. Johnson Place" as were suitable for the planting of crops, upon the same terms of rental as had been agreed on between them for several years prior to 1900, viz., the payment of $50 by the defendant, who obligated himself to tend a valuable peach orchard on the place, the fruit of which was reserved by the plaintiff and was to be marketed for her exclusive benefit. The plaintiff charged the defendant with having practiced a fraud upon her in claiming the fruit crop for the year 1900, inasmuch as he so understood the agreement when he signed the rent note for that year, which contained no reservation of the fruit, but was similar to the rent notes given in past years by him upon this distinct understanding. He admitted that he had for a number of years rented the place on these terms, but he contended that he had explicitly given notice to the plaintiff's agents, in the fall of 1889, that he would not rent the place for 1900 unless he got the fruit from the orchard; and when the rent note for that year was sent to him by them for his signature and return he understood the contract to be as therein expressed, accordingly claimed the fruit when it matured, and refused to allow the agents of the plaintiff to gather it for her benefit. The evidence bearing upon the contested issue in the case was conflicting, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff's motion for a new trial was overruled, and she excepted. By cross-bill of exceptions, the defendant complains of the overruling of his demurrer to the plaintiff's petition as finally amended.

Hall & Wimberly, Greer & Felton, and J. E. Hall, for plaintiff in error.

M. Felton Hatcher, for defendant in error.

EVANS, J. (after stating the facts). 1. The original petition was open to the criticism that the plaintiff sought to modify by parol an apparently complete and valid written contract. Appreciating this infirmity, the plaintiff voluntarily amended the petition by alleging that both parties understood that the rent contract did not speak the true intention of the parties, and by praying that the writing be reformed so as to exclude the fruit from the operation of the contract of rent, and thus make the writing represent the contract as actually agreed upon by both parties. The plaintiff is not...