Quigley v. United States
| Decision Date | 05 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. DKC 11–3223. |
| Parties | Lynne C. QUIGLEY, et al. v. UNITED STATES of America, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Robert G. McGinley, Law Offices of Robert G. McGinley PC, Bowie, MD, Mark Andrew Towery, Blankingship and Keith PC, Fairfax, VA, Jeffrey D. Raden, Law Offices of Jeffrey D. Raden LLC, Silver Spring, MD, Amy M. Orsi, Stephen Allen Markey, III, Law Offices of Stephen A. Markey III PC, Towson, MD, for Plaintiffs.
Alex S. Gordon, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, Russel Lee Beers, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Laurel, MD, Paul F. Leonard, Jr., Rockville, MD, Michael T. O. Bryant, Lipshultz and Hone Chtd, Silver Spring, MD, for Defendants.
Presently pending and ready for review in this consolidated tort action are three motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (“WSSC”). (ECF Nos. 13, 22, 27). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.
Three cases are consolidated in this action: Quigley v. United States, No. DKC 11–3223; Ochoa v. United States, No. DKC 11–3224; and Barbosa v. United States, No. DKC 11–3225. The allegations contained in the complaints for the three cases are largely identical and describe the same accident. ( See ECF Nos. 1, 21, 26). The following allegations are taken from the original complaint filed by Plaintiffs Lynne C. Quigley, Miles C. Quigley, and the estate of Joseph Quigley (ECF No. 1), unless otherwise indicated.
At some point during the overnight hours of January 19, 2009, a water main maintained by WSSC burst under Ridge Drive near the intersection of 64th Street in the Bethesda area of Montgomery County, Maryland. After the main ruptured, WSSC increased the water pressure, which amplified the flow of water.1 Water from the main escaped into the street, where it collected and flowed into a storm drain at the intersection of Ridge Drive and 64th Street. The storm drain was maintained by Defendant Montgomery County (“the County”). Due to a breach in the storm drain, the water made its way down a hillside onto the adjacent Clara Barton Parkway (“the Parkway”), a limited access urban freeway maintained by Defendant United States through its Department of the Interior and National Park Service.
On January 20, 2009, the temperature in the vicinity was below freezing. As a result, the water from the burst main that had collected on the Parkway froze into ice. The ice covered both westbound lanes of the Parkway for approximately 200 yards. There was no other appreciable rain, sleet, snow, or other precipitation in the area.
Around 5:24 a.m. that day, decedent Joseph Quigley was driving eastbound on the Parkway. At about the same time, Defendant Marcelo Pepe was driving westbound. Plaintiff Adriana Ochoa and Plaintiff Pollyana Barbosa were passengers in Mr. Pepe's vehicle. (ECF No. 21, at 3; ECF No. 26, at 3). Mr. Pepe encountered the ice caused by the burst main, lost control of his vehicle, crossed the median into the eastbound lanes, and collided with Mr. Quigley's vehicle. Mr. Quigley sustained injuries from which he eventually died. In Mr. Pepe's vehicle, Ms. Ochoa sustained injuries. (ECF No. 21 ¶ 32). Ms. Barbosa, who was originally in the back seat, was ejected from the vehicle and landed on top of the burning exhaust system of the vehicle, all of which caused injuries and first-, second-, and third-degree burns. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 32, 35).
On November 11, 2011, Plaintiffs Lynne C. Quigley and Miles C. Quigley, individually and as personal representatives of the estate of Joseph Quigley (“the Quigley Plaintiffs”), brought a wrongful death and survival action against Defendants in this court.2 Their original complaint contains six counts: (1) strict liability against WSSC; (2) negligence against WSSC and a Doe Defendant employee of WSSC; (3) strict liability against the County; (4) negligence against the County and a Doe Defendant employee of the County; (5) negligence against the United States; and (6) negligence against Mr. Pepe.3 Separately, Ms. Ochoa and Ms. Barbosa filed complaints asserting identical counts.
On December 13, 2011, WSSC filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it in each of the three actions. (ECF Nos. 13, 22, 27).4 The Quigley Plaintiffs, Ms. Ochoa, and Ms. Barbosa, respectively, opposed WSSC's motions. (ECF Nos. 19, 25, 34). The three cases were consolidated for all purposes by court order on January 4, 2012. (ECF No. 20). On January 18, 2012, WSSC filed one omnibus reply to all three oppositions. (ECF No. 31). 5
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir.2006). A plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). That showing must consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, the court must consider all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993)). In evaluating the complaint, the court need not accept unsupported legal allegations. Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.1989). Nor must it agree with legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.1979); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not ‘show[n] ... that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
WSSC moves to dismiss the three complaints on largely identical bases. As to Ms. Barbosa's claims, however, WSSC advances one additional argument regarding the sufficiency of her notice to WSSC under the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). That argument will be addressed first, and then WSSC's substantive arguments as to Plaintiffs' claims will be addressed.
WSSC seeks dismissal of Ms. Barbosa's claims against it on the ground that she failed to comply with the notice requirements of the LGTCA. (ECF No. 27–1, at 11–12). The Barbosa complaint recites that:
Notice of the Plaintiff's tort claims against WSSC was duly presented at the same time as notice was presented by a passenger in Marcello Lucio Pepe's car, Adriana Ochoa on July 9, 2009. A follow up notice was provided by letter dated October 2, 2009. WSSC denied the claims as untimely despite having actual notice of the claim filed by other victims of the accident.1
Although strict compliance with the statute may not always be required, it does not appear that any Maryland court has yet relaxed the basic requirement that notice be delivered “by the claimant or the representative of the claimant” or that the notice specifically refer to the claim of the Plaintiff. Ms. Barbosa has not alleged any sort of legal relationship between herself and her co-plaintiffs that would overcome this critical hurdle. It is required by the law that she or her agent must take an affirmative step towards preserving her rights under the statute. See Faulk, 371 Md. at 299, 808 A.2d 1262 . Accordingly, Ms. Barbosa's attempt to piggyback on the timely efforts of others is insufficient to find compliance, substantial or otherwise, with the LGTCA.
2. Good Cause
The notice requirement of the LGTCA may be waived for good cause and lack of prejudice to the defendant. Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–304(d) (). The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently explained:
By the language of the statute, the burden is on the claimant first to show “good cause.” Then, if the local government cannot “affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced by lack of required notice,” the court “may” hear the case despite the faulty notice. This “good cause” exception leaves the courts some discretion in enforcing the notice requirement, and allows a court, in certain circumstances, to avoid an unjust result.
Prince George's Cnty., Md. v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 467 (2011) (quoting Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–304(d)).
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