Quiles v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11 CIV. 5613(FM).,11 CIV. 5613(FM).
• Citation: 978 F.Supp.2d 374
• Parties: Eladio QUILES, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant/Third–Party Plaintiff, v. Moose Boat International, Third–Party Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

978 F.Supp.2d 374

Eladio QUILES, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant/Third–Party Plaintiff,

v.Moose Boat International, Third–Party Defendant.

No. 11 CIV. 5613(FM).

United States District Court,

S.D. New York.

Oct. 23, 2013.

John Paton James, Bernard D. Friedman, Friedman, James & Buchsbaum LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Monica Kelly, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, Thomas Michael Hoey, Jr., Corporation Counsel, Yonkers, NY, for Defendant/Third–Party Plaintiff.

Carl Anthony Formicola, Lewis, Johs, Avallone & Aviles, LLP, New York, NY, for Third–Party Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

FRANK MAAS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Eladio Quiles (“Quiles”), a former New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officer assigned to the Harbor Unit was injured on October 8, 2008, while attempting to disembark from a “Moose Boat” that the NYPD was testing. In this personal injury action brought pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, Quiles claims that his employer, Defendant/Third–Party Plaintiff City of New York (“City”), was negligent in failing to provide a reasonably safe place to work. Quiles further alleges that the Moose Boat was unseaworthy. After Quiles served his complaint, the City filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer of the vessel, Moose Boat Inc. (“MBI”), ¹ seeking indemnification or contribution for any losses incurred by the City as a result of Quiles' claims.

The City has filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of Quiles' complaint on the grounds that: (1) he was not a “seaman” within the meaning of the Jones Act at the time of his injury; (2) the City was not negligent; and (3) the Moose Boat was seaworthy. In addition, MBI has moved for summary judgment against the City arguing that the third-party complaint should be dismissed because: (1) Quiles' inability to sue MBI directly under the Jones Act precludes the City from seeking to recover from MBI based on Quiles' claim; (2) MBI did not have control of the Moose Boat on the date of Quiles' injury and, thus, cannot be held liable; and (3) the Moose Boat was seaworthy.

For the reasons set forth below, the City's motion (ECF No. 29) is denied, as is MBI's motion (ECF No. 25).

I. Factual Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed:

Quiles joined the NYPD in October 1990. (ECF No. 31 (Affirm. of Ass't Corp. Counsel Thomas M. Hoey, dated Feb. 19, 2013 (“Hoey Affirm.”)), Ex. B (“Quiles Dep.”) at 14, 25–26). In 2003 the NYPD reassigned Quiles to the Harbor Unit where he served as a deckhand. ( Id. at 29–34). This position required that he go through one month of training at the Harbor Charlie station house in Brooklyn. ( Id. at 29–30, 32–34). As a deckhand, his responsibilities included cleaning boats, moving equipment, and throwing lines. ( Id. at 34). He was instructed to use dock staircases when entering vessels, and to exit vessels “safely and carefully.” ( Id. at 34). In particular, he was told to step onto the staircase and then onto the dock when exiting a 30–foot launch. ( Id. at 35). When a 30–foot launch docked at a location without a staircase, however, it was “common practice” to alight by jumping from the side of the boat onto the dock. ( Id. at 37–38).

During his time with the Harbor Unit, Quiles was assigned to Harbor Charlie, although he at times would be sent to two other station houses, Harbor Adam and Harbor George. ( Id. at 40). As a deckhand, “almost all of [his] time was spent piloting or crewing various police launches.” (ECF No. 36 (Affirm. of John P. James, Esq., sworn to on Mar. 11, 2013 (“James Affirm.”)), Ex. 1 (“Quiles Decl.”) ¶ 4). The NYPD also trained Quiles as a navigator, engineer, and pilot. (Quiles Dep. 64–65).

In approximately 2008, the NYPD assigned Quiles to be the plant manager at Harbor Charlie. ( Id. at 41–42). This position required him to maintain the interior of the station house. ( Id. at 42–44). Once Quiles took over as plant manager, he no longer had any responsibility for maintenance of the vessels or docks. ( Id. at 44). Instead, his responsibilities were “strictly within the walls of the station house at Harbor Charlie.” ( Id. at 44–45).² He was still assigned as plant manager on October 8, 2008, the date of his injury, and it had been a “couple of weeks” since he last had been on an NYPD vessel. ( Id. at 45).

On October 8, a supervisor assigned Quiles to pilot a 30–foot NYPD launch from Harbor Charlie to the launch repair shop at Randall's Island. ( Id. at 63–64). After he did so, Sergeant Thomas Horvath (“Horvath”), Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Joseph Grosso (“Grosso”), and a third Harbor Unit officer were to transport Quiles and a fellow officer, via the Moose Boat, from Randall's Island to Harbor Charlie. ( Id. at 64). The NYPD had obtained the Moose Boat from MBI approximately one week earlier and was using it to conduct sea trials. ( Id. at 164).

When Quiles arrived at the launch repair shop, he stepped from the side of the launch onto the dock to tie it up. ( Id. at 71–72). After he returned to the launch, the Moose Boat approached bow-to-bow so that he could transfer to it. He did so by first stepping over a three-inch metal lip on the hull of the 30–foot launch. ( Id. at 75). He then stepped on to a rubber non-skid area on top of the Moose Boat gunwale and then onto its deck, one foot at a time. ( Id. at 77, 83–84). He had no difficulty accomplishing this even though there was no handrail on the Moose Boat and no one had assisted him. ( Id. at 82–83). The Moose Boat's gunwale was “much higher” above the water at both the bow and stern than the gunwales on the 30– and 36–foot launches to which Quiles was accustomed. ( Id. at 68–69). This was Quiles' first time on the Moose Boat, and he had not received any training or written materials concerning its operation. ( Id. at 67, 70).

Quiles and the other Harbor Unit officers then traveled via the Moose Boat to Harbor Charlie. ( Id. at 79). Quiles had no specific assigned duties on the return trip, but nevertheless considered himself part of the crew. ( Id. at 88; Quiles Decl. ¶ 12).

At Harbor Charlie, the Moose Boat pulled into a floating dock that lacked a staircase for disembarking. (Quiles Dep. 89). Although some of the other docks at Harbor Charlie were equipped with steps, the crew docked the Moose Boat at that floating dock because “the marina was pretty much full.” ( Id. at 96). It was “fairly common” for a vessel to pull into a Harbor Charlie dock that lacked stairs. ( Id. at 95–96). Nevertheless, Harbor Charlie was not equipped with any portable stairs, nor did it have a shore crew to help crew members on a vessel as they disembarked. ( Id.).

Horvath and Grosso were the first to leave the Moose Boat. (Hoey Affirm., Ex. C (“Horvath Dep.”) 33–34). Horvath did so by stepping on the gunwale and jumping onto the dock. (Quiles Dep. 90). Quiles was the third person to disembark from the Moose Boat. ( Id.). He stepped onto the gunwale and stood on it with both feet facing the floating dock. There was nothing obstructing the space between his toes and the edge of the gunwale. ( Id. at 91, 97). He then jumped from the gunwale, over the vessel's flotation collar or “bumper,” ³ and landed on the floating dock. ( Id. at 91, 98). As he landed on the dock, his left foot rolled over, injuring his left ankle, and he fell. ( Id. at 91, 165).

As Quiles was alighting from the Moose Boat, the floating dock was moving from side to side and up and down due to the waves, but there was no liquid or other substance on it. Quiles never asked anyone for assistance or for a box or staircase, nor did he hold on to anything as he jumped down. ( Id. at 91–92, 95, 164–65). Quiles had jumped from other vessels the same way, although those vessels had a cutout in the rubber molding that allowed someone to step right onto the dock, a feature the Moose Boat lacked. ( Id. at 99). According to Quiles, on the Moose Boat, “there was no other way ... to get from the top of the gunwale down to ... the dock.” ( Id. at 169).

II. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” based on supporting materials in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is genuine if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ ” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and must draw all permissible inferences ... in favor of that party.” Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.1996)). To defeat a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, however, the non-moving party cannot simply rely upon allegations contained in the pleadings that raise no more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, the party opposing summary judgment must offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505;see also FDIC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir.2010)(non-moving party cannot simply rely on “conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation”).

Assessments of credibility, choosing between “conflicting versions of the events,” and “the weighing of evidence are matters for the jury, not for the [C]ourt.”...