Quinlan v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1896
• Citation: 34 S.W. 738
• Parties: QUINLAN v. HOUSTON & T. C. RY. CO.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

34 S.W. 738

QUINLAN v. HOUSTON & T. C. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 19, 1896.

Error to court of civil appeals of Third supreme judicial district.

Trespass to try title by the Houston & Texas Central Railway Company against W. J. Quinlan. There was a judgment for plaintiff, which was affirmed by the court of civil appeals (24 S. W. 693), and defendant brings error. Reversed.

J. A. Buckinham and Rector, Thomson & Rector, for plaintiff in error. T. D. Cobbs, R. C. Walker, E. H. Graham, and Farrar, Jonas & Kruttschnitt, for defendant in error. Clark & Bolinger and R. H. Harrison, amicus curiæ. C. A. Culberson, Atty. Gen., and R. L. Batts, Asst. Atty. Gen., by permission of the court, filed printed argument on behalf of the State.

GAINES, C. J.

The defendant in error, the Houston & Texas Central Railway Company, brought this suit to recover of the plaintiff in error, Quinlan, five sections of land which had been located and surveyed by virtue of certificates issued to the Waco & Northwestern Railroad Company. The defendant in the trial court claimed title to five other sections, which had been located and patented by virtue of other certificates, and disclaimed as to any land sued for by plaintiff that was not embraced in such patented surveys. The trial developed a question of the legality of the survey, as well as a question of boundary, and of a conflict between the defendant's surveys and those claimed by the plaintiff, both of which were resolved by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff. It was agreed between the parties that the certificates under which the plaintiff claimed were valid; but, before going to trial, this agreement was so far modified as to permit the defendant to show that they were invalid. This left the case as if no agreement had been made. The certificates were, prima facie, valid, and the burden was upon the defendant to show their invalidity, in order to maintain that ground of defense. The title of the plaintiff to the certificates, by virtue of which the lands claimed by it were located, was also contested. All these questions were determined by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, and judgment was rendered for it. The court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment, and this writ of error is prosecuted from the judgment of affirmance. The questions presented by the petition for a writ of error are two: (1) Are the certificates which were issued to the Waco & Northwestern Railroad Company valid? And (2) if valid, did the plaintiff company have title to such certificates? We will dispose of these questions in the order in which we have stated them.

By a special act of the legislature, passed August 6, 1870, the charter of the Waco Tap Railroad Company was amended, and its name changed to that of the Waco & Northwestern Railroad Company. Sp. Laws, 1870, p. 112. The Waco Tap Railroad Company was incorporated by virtue of a special act approved November 5, 1866. Section 18 of that act reads as follows: "That there be extended to this company all the grants, provisions, immunities and privileges of an act entitled `An act to encourage the construction of railroads in Texas, by donations of lands,' approved January 30, 1854; that this charter is granted subject to all the provisions of the general railroad laws as they now exist, or as they may hereafter be altered or amended." Sp. Laws 1866, p. 257. The defendant in error claims that the certificates issued to the Waco & Northwestern Railroad Company are valid, both by virtue of the provision quoted, as well as by the inherent force of the general law of January 30, 1854. The plaintiff in error, however, claims, not only that section 18 is inoperative, because it is in conflict with section 25 of article 7 of the constitution then in force, but also that the act of 1854 applied only to railroad companies then chartered. The latter question comes first in logical order; but, in the view we take of the case, its determination is probably not necessary to a decision. However, the construction of the act of 1854 tends, we think, to throw light upon the subsequent legislation in regard to grants of lands to railroad companies, and we therefore express our views upon the question. It is sufficient for our purpose to quote only certain parts of the statute. Section 1 reads as follows: "Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Texas, that any railroad company chartered by the legislature of this state, heretofore or hereafter, constructing within the limits of Texas, a section of twenty-five miles or more of railroad, shall be entitled to receive from the state a grant of sixteen sections of land for every mile of road so constructed and put in running order." Laws 1853-54, p. 11. The following is a copy of section 12: "That the provisions of this act shall not extend to any company receiving from the state a grant of more than sixteen sections of land, nor to any company for more than a single track road, with the necessary turnouts; and any company now entitled by law to receive a grant of eight sections of land per mile for the construction of any railroad, accepting the provisions of this act, shall not be entitled to receive any grant of land for any branch road; provided, this act shall not be so construed as to give to any company now entitled by law to receive eight sections of land, more than eight additional sections; provided, that no person or company shall receive any donation or benefit under the provisions of this act, unless they shall construct and complete at least twenty-five miles of the road contemplated by their charter within two years after the passage of this act; and such donations shall be discontinued in every case where the company or companies shall not construct and complete at least twenty-five miles of the road contemplated by their charter, each year after the construction of said first mentioned twenty-five miles of road; and further provided, that the proviso herein contained shall not extend to any railroad the terminus of which is not fixed on the Gulf coast, the bays thereof, or on Buffalo Bayou, and that nothing in this section shall be so construed as to extend the duration of any existing charter; and further provided, that the certificates for land issued under the provisions of this act, shall not be located upon any land surveyed or titled, previous to the passage of this act; and further provided, that this act shall continue in force for the term of ten years from the time it shall take effect and no longer." The word "chartered," in the absence of other words indicating that it was used in the future-perfect tense, applies to past transactions. It is true that the language of statutes is frequently elliptical, and that the context may constrain the courts to insert words that are obviously intended to be supplied. But we find nothing in the act which tends to show that it was the purpose of the legislature to confer the privileges therein granted upon companies thereafter to be chartered. On the contrary, the proviso contained in the twelfth section, that no company should receive any benefits of the act, unless it should complete 25 miles of its road "within two years after the passage of the act," is inconsistent with the idea that it was intended to apply to future companies. There was, then, no general law for the incorporation of railroad companies, and it would have been practically impossible for any company chartered even by the next legislature to comply with that proviso. If it had been intended that the act should apply to companies thereafter to be chartered, the proviso would have been made expressly applicable to existing companies only, and a provision would have been made that, as to new companies, the two-years limitation should commence to run from the grant of their charters. The legislation of that era for the encouragement of the construction of railroads makes it manifest, we think, that the legislative policy was, as to companies then chartered, to confer by general laws the privilege of earning lands, and, in granting new charters, to make such provisions for the companies thereby created as should be demanded by such special conditions as should exist at the time of the grant. That such was the policy of the legislature which passed the statute in question is shown by the subsequent legislation at the same session. There were seven special charters granted in 1854, in all of which special provisions were made for land grants. The same policy and practice were pursued by subsequent legislatures while the act of 1854 continued in force. We are aware that, in Railroad Co. v. Kuechler, 36 Tex. 382, it was held that the statute applied to companies thereafter to be chartered, as well as to those previously chartered; but we think that ruling clearly erroneous, and cannot assent to it.

Since we hold that the general law of 1854 applied only to companies in existence at the date of its passage, it must be held that whatever rights the Waco & Northwestern Railroad Company acquired under it were derived from that section of the special charter of the Waco Tap Railroad Company which attempted to confer upon the latter company the benefits of that law. But it is insisted that the law of 1854 was in conflict with section 25 of article 7 of the constitution then in force. That section is as follows: "No law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the act revised, or section amended shall be re-enacted and published at length." Const. 1845, art. 7, § 25. It is quite clear that section 18, quoted above from the special charter, is in no sense a revision of the act of 1854. It extends the operation of that act, so as to make it apply to a company to which it did not apply before. If this may be deemed an amendment, in any sense of that word, it is evident that it was not such an amendment as was contemplated by the section...