Quinlon v. Rogers

• Citation: 12 Mich. 168
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Decision Date: 05 December 1863
• Parties: John Quinlon v. Ebenezer H. Rogers

12 Mich. 168

John Quinlon v. Ebenezer H. Rogers

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 5, 1863

Heard May 26, 1863; May 27, 1863,

Error to Wayne Circuit, where Rogers brought ejectment to recover certain premises in the city of Detroit. These premises were sold in 1854 for delinquent state and county taxes of 1853 and bid in by the state, and were subsequently re-sold by the state in 1855 to the plaintiff, and a deed given therefor April 17, 1856. Under this deed, which was recorded in the office of the register of deeds April 24, 1856, the plaintiff claimed title. The suit was commenced more that two years after the recording of the deed.

On the trial in the Circuit Court Quinlon offered evidence to show that the amount of tax for which the land was sold was materially larger than was authorized by law; but the Circuit Judge held that it was inadmissible to controvert the plaintiff's title under the said deed; and the plaintiff had judgment in his favor.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

E. C Hinsdale, for plaintiff in error, argued the following positions:

1. That neither the 89th nor 124th section of the tax law of 1858 applies to to this deed, but only to such as should, after the passage of the act, be executed by the auditor-general.

2. If they do apply to deeds given before, they are so connected with section 101 of the same statute, which has been declared unconstitutional (Waldby v. Callendar, 8 Mich. 430), as to fall with it: 5 Ohio St. R., 497; 2 Gray 84, 99.

3. That the provisions in question are unconstitutional, because depriving owners of their property without due process of law: 2 Dall. 310; 18 Johns. 442.

4. They are also unconstitutional because an exercise of judicial power. They declare, first, in substance, that certain deeds of the auditor-general shall be perfect and indefeasible titles: and, second, that all opposing titles, from any other source, however valid and legal, shall be null and void. See 10 Yerg. 59; 1 Chip. 237; 5 Humph. 165.

Wells & Hunt and T. Romeyn for defendant in error, among other things, argued that section 124 establishes a new rule of evidence, giving to a recorded deed after the lapse of two years an effect as evidence that it had not before. This was clearly within the power of the legislature, whether the deed was recorded before or after the passage of the act: 3 Pet. 280; 2 Kern. 541; 13 How. 472; 15 Ark. 338; 7 Ark. 428; 21 How. 338; 1 Scam. 335; 2 Mich. 495; 2 Gilm. 473; 4 Gilm. 58; 39 N. H., 304; 14 La. An., 853; 18 Johns. 441; 11 Ill. 420; Har. Ch., 3. The section was an amendment to the law of 1853, and its effect is to give the defendant two years after the passage of the act within which to contest the legality of the auditor's deed: 1 Hill 324; 7 Ind. 91; 7 Ind. 468; 2 Doug. Mich., 307; 2 Ind. 486.

They also argued that section 101, which was declared unconstitutional, did not apply to lands which had been bid in by the state.

OPINION

By the Court

The legislature, in...