Quinn's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 14 October 1952
• Docket Number: No. 48081,48081
• Citation: 55 N.W.2d 175,243 Iowa 1271
• Parties: In re QUINN'S ESTATE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 175

55 N.W.2d 175

243 Iowa 1271

In re QUINN'S ESTATE.

No. 48081.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 14, 1952.

Messer, Hamilton, Cahill and Bartley, of Iowa City, and L. J. Kehoe, of Washington, for appellants.

John C. Owen, of Washington, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

This case represents another controversy in the estate of Robert Louis Quinn and is a companion to 55 N.W.2d 172. The facts are identical and may be found in the opinion in the above numbered case.

The litigation here grows out of an application for a widow's allowance made by Florence J. Quinn, the surviving spouse of Robert Louis Quinn. James L. Quinn and Jean Q. Mooney, children of Robert Louis Quinn and sole heirs-at-law, filed a resistance, alleging first, that Florence J. Quinn is not the surviving spouse or widow within the meaning and intent of section 635.12 of the 1950 Code, I.C.A.; and second, that the said Florence J. Quinn is not entitled to an allowance under the terms and conditions of said section in that she cannot establish that her position and condition entitles her to the relief asked.

The application for allowance alleged the value of the estate as being at least $75,000, with debts of about $7,600; that the applicant, Florence J. Quinn, had no property of her own of any kind; that she was 53 years of age, not skilled in any profession or trade; that she had been working in a rest home for $150 per month, less taxes, and that she had been compelled to borrow money to return from California to Washington, Iowa.

We do not understand that these allegations are controverted. It is appellants' contention the appellee was not at the time of the death of Robert Louis Quinn his widow within the meaning of section 635.12, the Code section which provides for allowances to a surviving widow for her support for the period of administration, not exceeding twelve months. This is said to be because she had left him in August, 1949, and had not lived with him from that date until his death, on December 24, 1951.

Appellants assume this desertion was wrongful, that Florence J. Quinn had abandoned the duties and responsibilities of the marital relation without just cause, and they refer to her as an 'adventuress whose only interest in marriage was and is to capitalize on the empty title she enjoyed at the time of decedent's death.'

We agree with appellants that it is the duty of this court to construe the statutes of Iowa in order to determine the disclosed meaning and intent of the legislature. But, in so construing section 635.12, we find nothing to support their contention. There is no evidence that appellee's cessation of marital relations with decedent, her leaving of the family home, was without reasonable cause. The divorce action brought by decedent upon the ground of desertion was still pending, untried, at the time of his death. What showing appellee might have made therein we do not know; and in any event, we are clear that it was not incumbent upon the probate court to determine it. We said, in Caldwell v. Caldwell, 192 Iowa 1157, 1160, 186 N.W. 58, 60:

'To determine such question would be practically trying a divorce suit between these parties after one of them is dead. We are not disposed to do that.'

It is our conclusion that the statute expresses no legislative intent that the merits of matters pertaining peculiarly to the divorce court should be inquired into upon...