Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1928
• Docket Number: 86
• Citation: 293 Pa. 152,141 A. 855
• Parties: Quinn, Appellant, v. American Spiral Spring & Manufacturing Co
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

141 A. 855

293 Pa. 152

Quinn, Appellant, v. American Spiral Spring & Manufacturing Co

No. 86

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 7, 1928

Argued March 21, 1928

Appeal, No. 86, March T., 1928, by plaintiff, from decree of C.P. Allegheny Co., Jan. T., 1927, No. 2748, dismissing bill in equity, in case of Patrick Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Manufacturing Co. Reversed.

Bill for injunction. Before McVicar, j/.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Bill dismissed. Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned, inter alia, was decree, quoting record.

The decree of the court below is reversed at the cost of appellee, and the record is remitted for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Thomas L. Kane, for appellant. -- The appropriate remedy for this purpose is an injunction: Penna. Lead Co.'s App., 96 Pa 116; Kramer v. Slattery, 260 Pa. 234; Keppel v Coal & Nav. Co., 200 Pa. 649; Gray v. C. & I. Co., 286 Pa. 11; Masson's App., 70 Pa. 26; Stokes v. R.R., 214 Pa. 415; Fell v. Bennett, 110 Pa. 181.

The operation of defendant's machinery is a private nuisance injurious to plaintiff: Phillips v. Donaldson, 269 Pa. 244; Alexander v. Bread Co., 21 Pa.Super. 526; Hustleton v. Park, 256 Pa. 255.

Want of negligence is no defense in an action for nuisance: Stokes v. R.R., 214 Pa. 415; Vautier v. Refining Co., 231 Pa. 8; Siwak v. Boro., 72 Pa.Super. 218.

Defendant is liable for all damages done special to plaintiff: Green v. Sun Co., 32 Pa.Super. 521; Hauck v. Pipe Line, 153 Pa. 366; Rogers v. Traction Co., 182 Pa. 473.

The court should not refuse an injunction on the ground that greater injury would be done by granting than by refusing it.

No laches can be imputed to plaintiff: Penna. Lead Co.'s App., 96 Pa. 116; Bright v. Allan, 203 Pa. 394; Columbia & M. Elec. Co. v. North Branch T. Co., 258 Pa. 447.

James Milholland, with him Alter, Wright & Barron, for appellee. -- The granting of an injunction is not a matter of right: Keeling v. Ry., 205 Pa. 31; Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324; Richard's App., 57 Pa. 105.

Where the properties affected are located, not in a residential district but in a heavy industrial district, equity will not interfere to enjoin the lawful operation of a legitimate industry: Krocker v. Planing Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143; Osthaus v. Robinson, 12 Pa. Dist. R. 25; Thoenebe v. Mosby, 257 Pa. 1; Elliott Nursery Co. v. Light Co., 281 Pa. 166; Richard's App., 57 Pa. 105; Straus v. Barnett, 140 Pa. 111; Andress v. Sturts, 35 Pa. C.C.R. 183.

If any injury has been done to appellant, his laches should limit him to his remedy at law.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON:

Prior to 1919 plaintiff became totally blind and unable to work, and since then he has been obliged to spend most of his time in his home. He had been a worker in manufacturing establishments, and knew that noise and vibration were caused by the use of heavy machinery. In 1919 he and his wife purchased, as tenants by the entireties, the residence property 5621 Butler Street, in the City of Pittsburgh; two years later the wife died and he became its sole owner. It has been his home constantly since its purchase. It was then, and is now, located in a manufacturing district, which has always contained, however, a number of other residences in the immediate vicinity of plaintiff's.

In 1924 defendants bought a vacant lot adjoining plaintiff's home, for the purpose of constructing thereon a plant for manufacturing iron and steel springs. Shortly thereafter, defendants' president called upon plaintiff and told him of their intention to build a plant "which would make a noise and racket, and perhaps would cause some annoyance to him," but would do him no harm. Nothing was said regarding the intended location of the various pieces of machinery therein. Defendants offered to buy his home and he refused to sell. They then constructed their plant, locating the largest and heaviest pieces of machinery unnecessarily close to plaintiff's dwelling. He was not told that this was to be done, nor did he know that it was being or had been done until after the plant was in actual operation. When this occurred he made a formal written complaint to defendants regarding the noise and vibration caused by the heavy machinery, but they would do nothing except offer to buy his property at its land value, without allowing anything for the building on it. This he would not accept, and some fourteen months later filed the present bill in equity.

It was shown at the trial that the vibration imparted to plaintiff's house by the operation of the heavy machinery, due to the place and manner of its location, was so great that pictures and other articles were shaken from tables, walls and mantle pieces, plaster fell from the walls and ceilings, and, on one occasion, a brick fell from the chimney. The injury to the house, as it weakens under the constant shaking, will become progressively worse. It was also found, as a fact, that "the vibrations and noises are unpleasant and at times cause a nervous shock to those living within the house, and they seriously interfere with the comfort and enjoyment of plaintiff's residence as a dwelling house." So great is the nuisance thus caused, that plaintiff cannot long remain in the house while the plant is being operated, but is compelled, despite his blindness, to seek relief by going outside in all kinds of weather. The chancellor reported that the bill should be dismissed, and plaintiff limited to a recovery at law for whatever damages he has suffered: (1) Because his home was and still is in a manufacturing district; (2) Because more harm would be done by granting than by refusing an injunction; and (3) Because of laches in not sooner filing the bill. The court in banc sustained these conclusions, and entered a final decree of dismissal from which plaintiff prosecutes this appeal. To the extent hereinafter stated, it must be sustained.

When plaintiff purchased his property he knew he would not have the same peace and quiet in that manufacturing district, as he would have been entitled to in one that was strictly residential. He knew also that, if the district continued to be industrial, the lot in the rear could be purchased for and improved as a manufacturing establishment. But neither he nor his property was outlawed because thereof; he could still insist that any improvement made on the rear property should be with due regard to whatever rights appertained to him as a home dweller in a manufacturing district: Dittman v. Repp, 50 Md. 516, 523. This is the true principle, and is so stated by us in Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, where complainant lived in a district in some respects like the one here. We there said (page 331): "In a case like the present where the annoyance arises from the conduct of a business which is not a nuisance per se, a strong effort should be made to conserve the rights of all the parties; and an important question is, Can the noise by any reasonable means be so moderated as to accord with the degree of quietness the plaintiff has a right to enjoy; and if it can by what means?" See also Blomen v. N. Barstow Co., 35 R.I. 198 and Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, in the latter of which Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, supra, is cited and followed.

Defendants however, gave no heed to plaintiff's rights. When they purchased the rear lot, they were bound to know that while they could construct their proposed plant at that place, and could operate it with the kind of machinery usual in the business, they were nevertheless required, under the applicable legal principle above stated, to so locate and install that which they intended to use, as to do as little injury to plaintiff and his dwelling as was reasonably possible, considering the use to which the machinery was to be put and the needs of the business. This is where they failed in their legal duty. Apparently they thought that as their business was a lawful one, which they were entitled to carry on at that place, no just complaint could be made, if also they were careful in conducting their operations. Such is not the law: Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257, 263; Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co., Ltd., 153 Pa. 366; Rogers v. Phila. Traction Co., 182 Pa. 473, 478. As already stated, they were in duty bound to so locate and install their heavy machinery as not to deprive plaintiff, when it was properly operated, of the degree of quiet he had a right to enjoy: Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, supra. This they did not do, though they knew, as everyone else does, that the noise and vibration could have been greatly minimized by placing the heavy machinery at the other side of their lot, and that this could have been done without injury to any one. It can still be removed there, with great benefit to plaintiff, at a cost to defendant of some $ 12,000, and a ceasing of operations for a few months while the work is being done. Defendant contends that the machinery was placed in its present position, because it was expected to result in a more economical use of the plant, due to the fact that it is easier there to load and unload long...