Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1914 |
| Citation | 216 Mass. 486,104 N.E. 371 |
| Parties | STEVENS et al. v. ROCKPORT GRANITE CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Frank H. Stewart, of Boston, and Frederick H. Tarr, of Gloucester for appellant.
Wm. G Thompson and Romney Spring, both of Boston, for appellees.
The plaintiffs are owners of abutting estates on the seashore of the village of Bay View in Gloucester, which are used only for residence in the summer. The defendant operate several granite quarries and has a finishing plant of considerable extent near the plaintiffs' property. It is the chief industry of the village. It was established about 1866, and the plaintiffs' estates were occupied at approximately the same time by one of the defendant's predecessors in title. The case was heard by a master. The substance of his findings is that, beginning with 1902, the defendant has installed from time to time surfacing machines, so that at the time this suit was brought seven were in operation. These machines, in the process of development of the granite industry, have become necessary for the successful prosecution of the defendant's business. They are operated by compressed air and produce in the respective houses of the plaintiffs 'and would so interfere with that of normal persons generally during those portions of the year when windows and doors are kept open.' This noise is different in kind and amount from any produced by the conduct of the defendant's business prior to their use. It would involve a large expense to move the defendant's plant to any other location and there is none in the vicinity to which it conveniently can be moved. These machines produce considerable dust offensive and dangerous to the health of workmen. For this reason the machines are operated out of doors. The master further finds that 'no serious consideration has been given by the defendant to devising a method of overcoming or diminishing the noise, and no suggestion of such a method has been made by the plaintiffs or any one in their behalf, except that it has been suggested that a high fence be constructed between the location of the surfacing machines and the house of the plaintiff Stevens.' A fence adequate to make a considerable reduction in the noise would cost not over $1,000. A device for blowing away the dust caused by the machines is in existence, but its practicability was not shown by the evidence. It did not appear whether by its use the machines could be operated under cover, thereby diffusing less noise in the neighborhood, but no experiments or investigation seem to have been made to this end.
A decree was entered by a single justice declaring that the defendant was creating a nuisance by the operation of its surfacing machines, and restraining it from operating these machines 'in such an unreasonable manner as to interfere with the reasonable comfort and enjoyment of life' by the plaintiffs or other persons of ordinary sensibilities occupying their houses.
The law of nuisance affords no rigid rule to be applied in all instances. It is elastic. It undertakes to require only that which is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances. In a commonwealth like this, which depends for its material prosperity so largely on the continued growth and enlargement of manufacturing of diverse varieties, 'extreme rights' cannot be enforced. One who settles in a district, which possesses natural resources of a special kind, cannot prohibit the development of those resources merely because it may interfere in some degree with personal satisfaction or aesthetic enjoyment. No one can move into a quarter given over to foundries and boiler shops and demand the quiet of a farm. On the other hand, the noisy or noisome factory cannot with immunity invade territory stamped by use for residence. The test whether a nuisance exists through noise in any case depends upon all the attendant conditions. It is not open to doubt that noise alone may constitute a nuisance. That which is proper in one place might be highly objectionable in another. That which well might be enjoined in one region would be innocuous in another. That which would be permitted at one hour or season might be restrained at another. In order that a noise may amount to a nuisance, it must be harmful to the health or comfort of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person of peculiar temperament, unusual sensibilities or weakened physical condition, may be affected. Nor is it protected if those of exceptional strength and robustness, or whose faculties have become benumbed by close business or other experience with it are not disturbed. The pertinent inquiry is whether the noise materially interferes with the physical comfort of existence, not according to exceptionally refined, uncommon, or luxurious habits of living, but according to the simple tastes and unaffected notions generally prevailing among plain people. The standard is what ordinary people, acting reasonably, have a right to demand in way of health and comfort under all the circumstances. The number of people concerned by the noise and the magnitude of the industry complained of are both elements entitled to consideration in reaching a conclusion as to the fact. Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen, 95, 90 Am. Dec. 181; Davis v. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289, 43 Am. Rep. 519; Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768, 4 Am. St. Rep. 316; Shepard v. Hill, 151 Mass. 540, 24 N.E. 1025; Boston Ferrule Co. v. Hills, 159 Mass. 147, 34 N.E. 85, 20 L. R. A. 844; Wade v. Miller, 188 Mass. 6, 73 N.E. 849, 69 L. R. A. 820; St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Cases, 642; Rushmer v. Polsne & Alfieri, Ltd., [1906] 1 Ch. 234; s. c. [1907] A. C. 121; Walter v. Selfe, 4 De Gex & S. 315, 322; Sturgis v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852; Crump v. Lambert, L. R. 3 Eq. 409; Baltimore & Potomac R. R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 2 S.Ct. 719, 27 L.Ed. 739; Adams v. Ursell. [1913] 1 Ch. 269; Collins v. Vayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 A. 24, 19 Ann. Cas. 991; Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448; Dittman v. Repp, 50 Md. 516, 522, 33 Am. Rep. 325; Norcross v. Thomas, 51 Me. 503, 81 Am. Dec. 588.
The neighborhood in question is of a mixed character. It is adjacent to the sea, with inlets upon a somewhat bold and rocky shore. On this account it has become increasingly attractive for summer residence. The plaintiff and others nearby, and more at a greater distance, have estates for this purpose.
Nature also has planted valuable stone quarries in the vicinity, which have been opened and worked, and are useful not only to their owners but also in centers of population where they give beauty and strength to public buildings. This circumstance renders apposite the words of James, L. J., in Salvin v. North Brancepeth, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 705, at 709: 'If some picturesque haven opens its arms to invite the commerce of the world, it is not for this court to forbid the embrace, although the fruit of it should be the sights and sounds and smells of a common seaport and shipbuilding town, which would drive the Dryads and their masters from their ancient solitudes.' Both these uses, commencing about the same time, have grown together in the same village. It cannot be said upon the evidence or upon the findings of the master that either has become so dominant as to impress its special character upon the community. The village is not given over exclusively to the granite industry, nor has the summer resident so overwhelmed it as to have become its distinctive feature. Therefore, each must yield something to the presence of the other. The plaintiffs cannot demand the quiet of a remote cove far distant from any industry. The defendant cannot insist upon conducting its business in disregard of those who seek some degree of rest and refreshment by the ocean side. The standard of comfort for the one is affected by the reasonable business needs of the other and the same is true conversely.
It cannot be said that the finding of the master is unsupported by the evidence. Whether a nuisance exists is usually a question of fact. It is apparent that in determining such a question of fact as is presented on this record, the actual hearing of the noises made by the machines (as the master did at his view) was a most important factor in reaching a conclusion. This cannot be transcribed and presented in the record. Obviously the power to describe it depends in some degree upon the imagination and versatility of the witness. The weight to be attributed to the testimony of individuals and the decision whether the plaintiffs and their visitors were ordinary people manifestly depended upon observation of them. We should hesitate to reverse a conclusion of the trial magistrate under these circumstances. The familiar rule as to the effect to be given to findings by a master is that, where they rest upon conflicting oral testimony and upon observations made at a view, and have been affirmed by the court, they have every reasonable presumption in their favor. They will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Willets v. Langhaar, 212 Mass. 573, and cases cited at page 576, 99 N.E. 466; Stewart v. Henreddy, 212 Mass. 340, 98 N.E. 1030. A careful reading of the entire evidence fails to demonstrate that the master was mistaken or in error in finding the facts set out in the report, or to convince us that the opposite...
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