O'QUINN v. Chambers County, Tex.
Decision Date | 04 June 1986 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. G-85-308. |
Citation | 636 F. Supp. 1388 |
Parties | David O'QUINN, Alvin L. Martin, Danny Jackson, James Golleher and John Fountain v. CHAMBERS COUNTY, TEXAS, and Sheriff C.E. Morris, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Chambers County, Texas. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Harris D. Butler, III, Law Offices of Harris D. Butler, III, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs.
Carla Cotropia, Mills, Shirley, McMicken & Eckel, Galveston, Tex., William H. Bruckner, Roxella T. Cavazos, Bruckner & Sykes, Houston, Tex., for defendants.
Plaintiffs, present and former Deputy Sheriffs of Chambers County, Texas, sue Chambers County and Sheriff C.E. Morris, individually and in his official capacity. Plaintiffs seek damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs allege that, in wilful violation of the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216, defendants have not compensated them for earned "overtime" that accrued after April 15, 1985. Plaintiffs also sue on their overtime claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of their Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, various retaliatory acts allegedly taken in response to plaintiffs' requests for overtime compensation and to this suit. Plaintiffs finally aver a § 1985 claim for tampering with witnesses.
Defendants move with supporting evidence for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiffs have affirmed their factual allegations with affidavits. Although some of plaintiffs' statements do not meet the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 56(e), the primary factual issues are disputed and thus cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Therefore, the Court may only grant defendants' motion if they are entitled to judgment on a claim as a matter of law. See generally Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465.
The primary FLSA issues in this case arise from Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). In Garcia, the Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). The Garcia Court held that the minimum pay and overtime provisions of the FLSA apply to the states, even when they act "in areas of traditional governmental functions," such as police work. 83 L.Ed.2d at 1021. Within only ten months, the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-150, Reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 99 Stat. 787, were enacted in response. Effective April 15, 1986, section 2(c) of the Amendments provides that no state or political subdivision of a state shall be liable under the FLSA for minimum pay and overtime violations occurring before April 15, 1986. See Kartevold v. Spokane County Fire Protection District No. 9, 625 F.Supp. 1553, 1562 (E.D.Wash.1986) ( ).
Retroactive application of the Amendments to a post-Garcia claim arising before the Amendments, plaintiffs argue, would deprive them of due process. The Court disagrees.1 Plaintiffs must show that they had a property interest in overtime that the Amendments deprived them of without due process. Plaintiffs do not have a property interest. Furthermore, Congress acted rationally when enacting the Amendments, thereby giving plaintiffs all the process that they are due.
Plaintiffs claim a property interest2 (overtime) under the FLSA that vested after Garcia and prior to the Amendments. A property interest in a statutory benefit, however, has thus far been limited to cases where individuals had enjoyed benefits under the statute. E.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1154, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Stern v. Tarrant County Hospital District, 755 F.2d 430, 435 (5th Cir.1985) (Clark, C.J., concurring). Cf. Mohler v. State of Mississippi, 782 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 1986) (per curiam) ( )(dictum). Thus, the Court finds that plaintiffs do not have a property interest in overtime under the FLSA. See Confederation of Police v. City of Chicago, 481 F.Supp. 566, 569 (N.D.Ill.1980) ( ).
Legislation in the field of national economic life comes to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, even if the legislation applies retroactively. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 727-29, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2717, 81 L.Ed.2d 601, 610-11 (1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892-93, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). Retroactive economic legislation must only meet the test of due process, which requires that the "retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose." Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at 727-29, 104 S.Ct. at 2717, 81 L.Ed.2d at 611. See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 476 (2d ed. 1983) ("If the legislation does have a rational relationship to a proper governmental end, the Court will uphold the retroactive law even though it may impair recognizable property rights"). "The burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." Travelers Insurance Co. v. Marshall, 634 F.2d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2892).
The Court finds that Congress clearly acted rationally to further a legitimate legislative goal. The Senate Report to the Amendments explains the purpose of the retroactive provisions:
S.Rep. No. 99-159 at 7-8, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 651, 655-56 (emphasis added). The Committee went on to note that it "deferred application of the overtime provisions until exactly one year after the mandate in Garcia so that state and local governments may make necessary adjustments in their work practices, staffing patterns, and fiscal priorities." Id. at 15, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 663. Thus, Congress acted to protect the fiscal integrity of the states and their political subdivisions. This is clearly a rational and legitimate purpose.3
This conclusion is butressed by a series of cases that arose out of a previous Congressional amendment of the FLSA. The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq., relieved employers from liability for failure to pay overtime and minimum wages to employees who had a claim under the FLSA but who did not have a claim based on a contract, custom, or practice. The district courts uniformily held that the Portal-to-Portal Act was constitutional. E.g., Holland v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.Supp. 274 (W.D.N.Y.1947); Ackerman v. J.I. Case Co., 74 F.Supp. 639 (E.D.Wisc.1947); Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 74 F.Supp. 412 (D.Maryland 1947). Judge Chesnut reasoned persuasively in Seese:
As Congress had the constitutional power to originally enact the Fair Labor Standards Act and thereby affect the relationships of employer to employee in interstate commerce, it is not to be doubted that it had equal power in the same field to amend or modify these relationships... . It is probably true that when the Fair Labor Standards Act was first enacted, it necessarily affected then existing purely private contracts of employment. ... If the original Act validly had that effect, it is difficult logically to see how the present modification of existing rights is less valid. If it had thought wise to do so, Congress could have repealed the Fair Labor Standards Act in toto and if the repealing Act ... did not contain a saving clause with respect to existing claims, it is not apparent why it would have been invalid as to them.
Finally, if the retrospective aspects of the Amendments were "particularly harsh...
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