Quinn v. Hester

• Decision Date: 01 June 1916
• Citation: 186 S.W. 459,135 Tenn. 373
• Parties: QUINN v. HESTER.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

186 S.W. 459

135 Tenn. 373

QUINN v. HESTER.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 1, 1916

Appeal from Chancery Court, Carroll County; J. W. Ross, Chancellor.

Bill by H. L. Quinn against J. T. Hester, trustee, to enjoin collection of school tax. From an order overruling defendant's demurrer, he appeals. Reversed, demurrer sustained, and bill dismissed.

P. W Maddox, of Huntingdon, for appellant.

Jno. T Peeler, of Huntingdon, for appellee.

GREEN J.

The bill in this case challenges the constitutionality of chapter 667 of the Private Acts of 1915. This statute undertook to create a school district in Carroll county, and to levy a tax for school purposes within this district. The bill sought to enjoin the collection of said tax. A demurrer was filed which the chancellor overruled; he being of opinion that the statute was invalid. The defendant has appealed to this court.

The statute in question undertook to incorporate the "Trezevant special school district" in Carroll county, defined its boundaries, named the first school board provided for the election of their successors, and set out the powers and duties of said board or corporation. It was enacted that the trustee of Carroll county, within which the district lay, should apportion to the school district its pro rata share of the county school fund and its pro rata share of the state school fund paid to the county by the state, for the support of the schools which said corporation was authorized to maintain. The Legislature levied a tax of 40 cents on every $100 worth of taxable property, both real and personal, within said school district, and a poll tax of $1 on all male persons between the ages of 21 and 50 years within said school district. The basis of assessment was the assessed value of the property in said district as shown by the books of the county trustee, and it was provided that this special tax be collected in the same manner and at the same time as all other taxes were collected under the general laws of the state by the county trustee.

Other provisions of the act are not material to the questions before us for decision.

Several constitutional objections are urged against the statute, all of which, however, may be grouped under three heads:

(1) It is said that the act is in contravention of section 28 of article 2 of the Constitution as to uniformity of taxation.

(2) That the act is in contravention of section 29, art. 2, of the Constitution, which impliedly forbids the General Assembly to delegate the power of taxation except to counties or incorporated towns.

(3) That the act contravenes section 8, art. 11, of the Constitution, which declares that the Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular individuals, etc.

Considering the second objection first, an examination of the act shows that there has been no attempt whatever to delegate the power of taxation. The tax for which the act provides is imposed directly by the Legislature. No discretion whatever concerning the imposition of this tax is left to the school district. The rate of the tax is fixed and the levy is made by the statute, and the collection of the tax committed to the county trustee, who is directed to collect it along with all other taxes according to the general laws of the state. Inasmuch as there is no attempted delegation of authority to the school district, section 29 of article 2 of the Constitution has no application. Keesee v. Civil District, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 127, Waterhouse v Cleveland Public Schools, 55 Tenn. (8 Heisk.) 857, Lipscomb v. Dean, 69 Tenn. (1 Lea) 546, and Smith v. Carter, 131 Tenn. 1, 173 S.W. 430, are not in point.

The provisions of section 28, art. 2, of the Constitution requiring equality and uniformity of taxation throughout the state do not prevent local taxation for local purposes. Such provisions do not demand equality and uniformity as between different localities in the matter of local taxation. Such local taxes must merely be equal and uniform in the district to which they apply.

This court has said:

"The uniformity required by section 28, art. 2, is limited to uniformity in rate assessment and valuation of the particular tax involved. It has no reference to a uniformity of the sum total of taxes which a citizen is required to pay; that is, it does not require that the total taxes assessed against property situated in a municipality shall not exceed the sum total of taxes assessed against property located outside of a municipality. It does require that there shall be uniformity of valuation and assessment of property for purposes of taxation, and that the tax levy for any given purpose shall be uniform throughout the territory to which it is applied." King v. Sullivan County, 128 Tenn. 393, 160 S.W. 847.

Most of the states have similar constitutional provisions, and such constitutional provisions have universally been construed as just indicated. 37 Cyc. 734, and cases cited. Such construction has received approval of the Supreme Court of the United States in Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278, 26 L.Ed. 1090.

The very language of section 29 of article 2 of the Constitution which authorizes the Legislature to delegate to counties and municipalities the power to impose taxes for county and corporation purposes concedes the power to impose such taxes to be in the Legislature; for power cannot be delegated unless possessed. In the Constitutions of several of the states are to be found provisions restricting the Legislature from levying local taxes for local purposes. In the absence of such restriction, such power is plenary.

We have not been able to discover any constitutional objection to the creation of this special school district by the Legislature.

In Reelfoot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 36 S.W. 1041, 34 L. R. A. 725, this court approved the statement of Judge Cooley to the effect that taxing districts within a state may be as numerous as the purposes for which taxes are levied. Cooley on Taxation, § 151.

In Reelfoot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, supra, the court was considering the validity of an act which created a levee district and conferred the power of taxation upon that district. The act was held invalid as an unauthorized attempt to delegate the taxing power, and because the taxes proposed to...