Quinn v. Monona County

• Decision Date: 30 October 1908
• Citation: 117 N.W. 1100,140 Iowa 105
• Parties: THOMAS QUINN, Appellant, v. MONONA COUNTY, WM. UHL, and TADLOCK BROTHERS, Appellees
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

117 N.W. 1100

140 Iowa 105

THOMAS QUINN, Appellant, v. MONONA COUNTY, WM. UHL, and TADLOCK BROTHERS, Appellees

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 30, 1908

Appeal from Monona District Court.--HON. DAVID MOULD, Judge.

THIS is a proceeding to determine the boundary line between the property owned by plaintiff and that owned by defendants other than Monona County, and to ascertain and define the limits of a duly established highway between the lands owned by the respective parties. Defendant Uhl admitted the allegations of the petition, and consented to the entry of a decree in plaintiff's favor. The other defendants filed answers, and among other defenses pleaded in abatement another action pending. The case was tried to the court resulting in a decree for defendants and a finding establishing the plea in abatement. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Decree Affirmed.

C. R Metcalfe, for appellant.

S. D Crary and W. D. Crary, for appellees.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

The pleadings are very voluminous and complicated, covering many closely printed pages of the abstract. The controversy is really over the proper location of the highway between the east halves of sections nine and sixteen in a township in Monona County, Iowa. Plaintiff owns the northwest quarter of section sixteen, and defendants Uhl and Tadlock Brothers the southwest quarter of section nine, in the same township. This highway was legally established in the year 1894, and it is claimed by defendant Monona County that the fence on the north side of plaintiff's land is something like thirty feet north of where it should be, constituting an obstruction to the highway. This plaintiff denies, and he claims that the fence is on the true line between the highway and his (plaintiff's) land, and that, if this be not true, it is upon a line established by recognition and acquiescence. The prayer of the petition is that the fence be duly established as the permanent line between plaintiff's land and the highway, and that the same be made of record and otherwise made to conform to title 21, chapter 5, sections 4228-4239, Code. An estoppel on the part of the county was also pleaded. About all that is said regarding the defendants other than Monona County is that they have also acquiesced in and recognized the south line of the highway as being marked by the fence upon the north side of plaintiff's farm. Defendant Uhl admitted the allegations of the petition, and consented to a decree as prayed; but it is manifest that he cannot bind the county or the public in giving such consent. Tadlock Brothers and the county pleaded another action pending, denied the allegations of plaintiff's petition, and, by counterclaim, asked affirmatively that the fence be removed as an obstruction to the highway, and that plaintiff be enjoined from placing any other or further obstruction thereon. The action pending which was pleaded in abatement of plaintiff's suit was Quinn v. Baage, then in the District Court of Monona County, which reached this court on appeal and was decided in December, 1907; the opinion being reported in 138 Iowa 426. All the pleadings and proceedings in that case so far as it had then progressed were introduced in evidence upon the trial of this action in the District Court, and the testimony in that case, so far as applicable, was introduced in evidence. But little other additional testimony was taken, and that had reference to the true line between the two tracts of land. The action now before us was tried in equity by consent of parties, and, whatever its form, the pleadings make it apparent that the only question in the case was the proper location of the highway between the two tracts of land above described.

I. The line between the two tracts of land and the corners and boundaries thereof were not in dispute as between plaintiff and Uhl; but issue was tendered between plaintiff and Tadlock Brothers. This issue, however, was not over the corners and boundaries of the lands owned by the respective parties, save as these were incidentally involved in fixing the proper highway line on the south side of the thoroughfare. It is perfectly manifest in this case that the only issue between the parties is the true and proper location of the line between the parties highway and plaintiff's property. By turning to the opinion in Quinn v. Baage, supra, it will be seen that this was the exact issue in that case, and that plaintiff was finally defeated in that suit. This, of course, is immaterial on the issue of another suit pending; for, no matter if the result had been favorable to plaintiff in the end, the plea in abatement, if held sufficient, would have been good. The conclusion reached in that case upon appeal is only important as indicating what the decision should be in this case on the merits. A determination of the issues on the former appeal upon testimony substantially the same as in this case would not constitute a former adjudication for the case had not then been decided on appeal; but it would be stare decisis of the matters common to the two cases. Viewed in the latter light, the opinion on the former appeal is not conclusive as res adjudicata; but is entitled to weight upon the principle that a case once decided should not be overruled, save for some apparent and imperious necessity. As the real issues were common to the two cases, the plea in abatement is good, unless it appears that there was such a difference in the parties to the litigation as that a decree rendered in either case would not have been binding in the other.

In the case of Quinn v. Baage et al. the defendants were road supervisors and township trustees, and in that case the defendants filed a counterclaim asking that plaintiff be enjoined and restrained from interfering with them in the removal of plaintiff's fence. In that action they necessarily were representing the county or the public and no objection was raised by the plaintiff to their right to prosecute this counterclaim. They were...