Quinn v. Poole

• Decision Date: 25 March 1957
• Docket Number: No. 9705,9705
• Citation: 85 R.I. 280,130 A.2d 364
• Parties: Robert J. QUINN v. Edward F. POOLE d.b.a. Armory Cab Co. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 364

130 A.2d 364

85 R.I. 280

Robert J. QUINN v. Edward F. POOLE d.b.a. Armory Cab Co.

Ex. No. 9705.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 25, 1957.

Frank J. McGee, Edward I. Friedman, Irving H. Strasmich, all of Providence, for plaintiff.

Higgins & McCabe, Eugene V. Higgins, Providence, for defendant.

PAOLINO, Justice.

This action of trespass on the case for negligence arose out of a collision between two motor vehicles. The case was tried in the superior court before a justice thereof sitting with a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant's motion for a new trial was heard and denied. The case is before us on his exceptions to the denial of that motion, to the trial justice's refusal to direct a verdict, and to the charge. His other exceptions were waived.

The evidence shows that the collision occurred on January 1, 1953, at about 5 a. m. at the intersection of Mathewson and Fountain streets in the city of Providence, between two taxicabs, one owned and operated by the plaintiff and the other belonging to defendant and operated by his servant Nicholas Coesos. At the time the weather was clear but there were several inches of snow on the ground. It was dark and the street lights were on, as were the lights of both vehicles. The plaintiff, who was proceeding southerly on Mathewson street, paused momentarily on the crosswalk at the northerly curb line at the intersection. He testified that he came almost to a complete stop at a point far enough out so that he could look up and down. This was a blind corner. Both streets were one way, the traffic on Mathewson street going from north to south and that on Fountain street from west to east. Fountain street is approximately 60 feet wide, having room for at least six lanes. Mathewson street is between 20 and 30 feet wide, having room for about three lanes.

The plaintiff testified that he had chains on his taxicab at the time of the accident; that the snow was deep and loose; and that road conditions were bad. He also testified he had his car under such control that he could have stopped it at any time during the period he was traveling from the curb line at Mathewson street to the center of Fourtain street, and that he felt he 'was entitled to cross the street because of the big difference between the intersection and the spot where he [defendant] was.'

When the plaintiff reached the curb line on the crosswalk he paused, looked to his right, and saw defendant's cab 200 feet away coming easterly down the center of Fountain street towards Mathewson street at a very rapid rate of speed. At the time there were no other machines there. He then looked ahead along Mathewson street and proceeded across the intersection at a speed of 5 to 10 miles an hour. When he was approximately at the center of the intersection he looked to his right for the second time and could see that defendant's vehicle was closer to him, possibly 30 or 40 feet away. The plaintiff testified that he estimated defendant's taxicab was going 35 to 40 miles per hour when the right rear end of his cab was struck by the front center of defendant's cab, and at the time of the collision his right rear fender was in the center of the intersection.

The operator of defendant's taxicab testified that he was driving easterly on Fountain street in the middle of the road at a moderate rate of speed, and that the weather was clear but Fountain street was 'pretty icy.' He stated his vehicle was equipped with chains and that he was not driving any faster than 15 to 20 miles per hour, although he admitted he had told a police officer after the accident that he was going 25 miles per hour at the time of the collision. The plaintiff had testified that defendant's driver in his statement to the same police officer had said he was going 35 miles per hour.

The defendant's operator further testified that when he first saw plaintiff the latter was just at the curb line; that he, the witness, was 40, 50 or 60 feet up Fountain street in the center of the road and passing the Plaza Hotel; that when he saw plaintiff come out of Mathewson street he put on his brake; that plaintiff, who was looking in the opposite direction, kept going as if there was nobody coming down the street; and that after the collision plaintiff's car went over the curb and crashed into a store window. The defendant's other witness, who was a passenger in his cab at the time of the accident, testified in corroboration of defendant's driver.

The defendant argues that plaintiff, having seen defendant's taxicab coming down Fountain street at a very rapid rate of speed, failed to continue to observe it, and that 'had he so looked, he would have been able to stop his automobile and have avoided the accident.' He contends therefore that this omission on the part of plaintiff constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that the trial justice should have directed a verdict for the defendant.

It is well established that if on any reasonable view of the testimony the plaintiff can recover on a motion for a directed verdict for a defendant, the case must be submitted to the jury. On such a motion the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are not before the trial court for determination, but the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom must be construed most favorably to the plaintiff. Reddington v. Getchell, 40 R.I. 463, 101 A. 123; Douglas v. First National Stores, Inc., 54 R.I. 278, 172 A. 723; Kane v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, 73 R.I. 264, 54 A.2d 401.

After examining the transcript, we are of the opinion that the evidence and all inferences which could be reasonably inferred therefrom as favorable to the plaintiff presented an issue of fact. It was for the jury to find whether plaintiff, in...