Quinn v. Quinn

• Decision Date: 11 May 2010
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: Erin QUINN, respondent, v. William QUINN, appellant.

899 N.Y.S.2d 859

73 A.D.3d 887

Erin QUINN, respondent,

v.William QUINN, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 11, 2010.

T. Kevin Murtha & Associates, P.C., Westbury, N.Y. (William Bird III of counsel), for appellant.

In a matrimonial action, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Willen, J.H.O.), entered May 8, 2009, as awarded the plaintiff an attorney's fee in the sum of $9000.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

An award of an attorney's fee pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court (seeDeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881, 524 N.Y.S.2d 176, 518 N.E.2d 1168; Stadok v. Stadok, 25 A.D.3d 547, 547, 806 N.Y.S.2d 419; Herzog v. Herzog, 18 A.D.3d 707, 709, 795 N.Y.S.2d 749). The issue of such a fee " 'is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case' " (Gruppuso v. Caridi, 66 A.D.3d 838, 839, 886 N.Y.S.2d 613, quoting Morrissey v. Morrissey, 259 A.D.2d 472, 473, 686 N.Y.S.2d 71). In its determination of an attorney's fee application within the context of a matrimonial action, the trial court must consider, inter alia, the relative financial circumstances of the parties (see Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667; Timpone v. Timpone, 28 A.D.3d 646, 813 N.Y.S.2d 752; Popelaski v. Popelaski, 22 A.D.3d 735, 803 N.Y.S.2d 108). The determination an attorney's fee can also be affected by the consideration of whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation (see Matter of Brink v. Brink, 55 A.D.3d 601, 867 N.Y.S.2d 94; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667; Grumet v. Grumet, 37 A.D.3d 534, 829 N.Y.S.2d 682).

Here the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in awarding an attorney's fee to the plaintiff. Although the parties are on relatively equal financial footing, the record discloses that, but for the defendant's conduct in this case, the plaintiff would not have incurred significant legal fees (see Brink v. Brink, 55 A.D.3d 601, 867 N.Y.S.2d 94; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667; Saslow v. Saslow, 305 A.D.2d 487, 758 N.Y.S.2d 825; see also Baron v. Baron, 71 A.D.3d 807, 897 N.Y.S.2d 456). Accordingly, an award of an attorney's fee was warranted (see Denholz...